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The Radioactive Legacy of the Russian Pacific Fleet Operations 
and Its Potential Impact on Neighboring Countries 
 
1 Introduction 
Frank L. Parker 
 
Study background, statement of need, goals 
The impact of the operation and decommissioning of the world’s nuclear navies is an environmental 
concern because of the ecologically sensitive nature of the oceans and their cultural and religious 
significance to many people.  This is evidenced by the enactment of the London Convention that 
prohibits dumping of hazardous materials into the seas. Much of the interest on nuclear 
contamination of the oceans has been centered in the operation of Russia’s nuclear navy. Although 
Russia has five regional fleets (Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black and Caspian), only the Northern 
Fleet and the Pacific Fleet sustain nuclear operations. The Russian Northern Fleet has 84 operating 
nuclear submarines with 161 nuclear reactors and two nuclear powered battle cruisers.  In addition, 
there are 71 inactive nuclear submarines with 135 reactors at its bases.  In addition to the naval 
vessels, there are eight nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear container ship as of 1996. In the Pacific 
Fleet, there are 42 operating nuclear submarines, one nuclear powered battle cruiser and one nuclear 
powered communications ship.  An additional 55 inactive nuclear submarines of the Russian Pacific 
Fleet are laid up at various bases in the Far East (Bradley, 1997).   
The interest in the West about the legacy of the Russian nuclear fleet has been unequally divided 
despite the fact that the Russian Navy was reported to have stored more radioactive waste in the Far 
East than in the Northwest (630 vs. 54 TBq) (Egorov et al, 2000).  Most of the interest has been 
concentrated on the activities of the Northern Fleet as evidenced by the activities of the Arctic 
Military Environmental Cooperation group (AMEC), the Contact Expert Group (CEG) of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program 
(AMAP). For example, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) suggested 20 high-
priority remediation projects to the CEG in April 1998.  Ten dealt expressly with the Northern fleet 
and four dealt with submarine problems that were based on conditions in the Northern fleet.  Not 
one proposal dealt with the Pacific Fleet.  Further, Bradley (1997) devotes 17 pages to the Northern 
fleet but only 5½ pages to the Pacific fleet.  Of additional interest in the Far East is that a number of 
nuclear accidents have already taken place in this area.  An accident on a nuclear submarine in the 
Chazhma Bay (near the Sea of Japan) on August 10, 1985, resulted in the release of 200,000 TBq (5 
MCi) of radioactive substances, and a radioisotope thermal generator containing 13,000 TBq (350 
kCi) of activity was lost during transport near Sakhalin Island.  One could say that conditions, a 
priori, are worse in the Far East because of a lack of infrastructure to move some of the spent fuel 
and ships’ hulls from their present locations to more centralized sites or even sites where treatment 
can take place.  Relatively little is known in the West about conditions in the Far East despite their 
obvious similarity to conditions in the Russian Northwest.  Therefore, after consultation with our 
Russian colleagues, we at IIASA decided to study the problems of the Russian Pacific Fleet. 
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Figure 1-1:  Naval nuclear facilities in the Russian Far East (from OTA, 1995) 
 
The nuclear legacy in the Russian Far East has been derived mainly from the operations of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet and its Pacific coastal bases.  The radioactivity is stored at land-based nuclear 
waste storage sites, in submarines awaiting decommissioning, in spent nuclear fuel, onboard nuclear 
service ships, and at shipyards and submarine repair facilities.  The decommissioned nuclear 
submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet are distributed in many places of the Russian Far East.  The 
nuclear facilities are concentrated mainly in two groups near Vladivostok in southern Primorye 
Territory and near Petropavlovsk at the southern part of the Kamchatka peninsula (cf. Figure 1-1).  
The first group, in the Primorye Region, comprises an assortment of naval bases together with the 
Far Eastern Plant Zvezda ("Star)" on the Dunai Peninsula opposite to Vladivostok across Ussuri 
Bay.  The second major group comprises the naval bases in Krasheninnikov Bay together with the 
Kamchatka Marine Plant near Petropavlovsk on south of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Currently, 
decommissioning of Pacific fleet nuclear submarines occurs only in Primorye Region at the civilian 
Far Eastern Plant Zvezda.  Decomissioning activities at the Kamchatka Marine Plant in Vilyuchinsk 
are limited.   
A fraction of the radioactive waste produced in the Far East was dumped in ten officially sanctioned 
areas in the Far East seas (with the last dumping occurring in 1993). The dumped wastes included 
both liquid and solid wastes, including two reactors without spent nuclear fuel.  It should be noted 
only one of these ten sea disposal sites meets the IAEA depth and location requirements for 
dumping radioactive waste at sea.  The total activity discarded in the Far Eastern seas (excluding 
the radioisotope thermal generator which was lost in 1987 in the Sea of Okhotsk near Sakhalin 
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Island, which contained approximately 25 PBq of 90Sr) was around 430 TBq (Sivintsev and 
Kiknadze, 1998b). 
The necessity to quickly decommission a large number of Russian nuclear submarines that have 
reached, or are close to, the end of their service life creates a potentially serious problem.  Russia 
has a backlog of more than fifty nuclear submarines in the Far East awaiting final disposal.  There is 
also a risk associated with the large amount of spent fuel that is still on board decommissioned 
submarines.  
In general, the radiation situation in the Russian Far East resulting from radioactive waste disposal, 
nuclear accidents, and any potential threats due to hypothetical accidents at land-based nuclear 
waste storage sites, has not been examined in detail and has not been subject to the same scrutiny as 
radioactively contaminated sites in the rest of Russia.  
Recently, two articles have appeared in the Russian Journal of Atomic Energy (“Atomnaya 
Energiya”) which provide a comprehensive view of the land and water contamination surrounding 
the naval bases of the Pacific Fleet (Danilyan et al. 2000a, 2000b). In the second paper it is stated 
that: 
The results of investigations performed over many years make it possible to conclude in 
general that the influence of accident-free operation and utilization of nuclear powered 
submarines from the Pacific Ocean fleet on the radiological conditions on the marine water 
areas used is negligible (less than 1% the activity of global fallout)…At the same time, it 
should be noted that the probability of a reactivity accident during offloading of spent 
nuclear fuel from reactors in a nuclear powered submarine has not been ruled out. For the 
existing technology, it is considered to be 5·10-5 events/(reactor·yr). This is a high level and 
it does not correspond to the target safety criterion. 
This is consistent with our initial evaluation that the atmospheric transport of accidental releases has 
the potential to cause greater transboundary impact than the hydrospheric transport.  We began with 
studying the possibility of accidental releases reaching and affecting parts of Japan and have 
recently extended these analyses to other nations around the Russian nuclear naval sites in the Far 
East. 
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2 Background:  Facilities and Source Terms 
Main Contributors: V.A. Danilyan, V. I Kobzev, S.A. Lavkovsky, A.A. Maksimov, Yu. V. 
Sivintsev, and V.L. Visotsky 
Edited by K. L. Compton 
 
The information presented in Chapter Two is based largely on work conducted by Russian institutes 
who were partners in the Far East Study.  The bulk of the work is derived from six reports: two 
reports prepared for the Far East Study by the Central Design Bureau "Lazurit" based on data from 
ISTC Project 101 referenced as Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001); project 
reports prepared for the Far East study under the direction of Yuri Sivintsev (Sivintsev et al. 2000, 
Lysenko et al. 2002); and two journal articles which appeared in the Russian Journal of Atomic 
Energy ("Atomnaya Energiya") in 2000 (Danilyan et al. 2000a, 2000b).  Data in this chapter is 
based on these reports and is therefore not cited unless there is a need to identify the specific source 
of information.  In addition, a literature review was carried out to identify other possible sources of 
information and to compare the previously reported information with the information made 
available during the study. Information derived from these outside sources of information is 
referenced when used.  A final section provides some technical details regarding the ships and casks 
used to store spent nuclear fuel in the Russian Pacific Fleet. 
2.1 Primorye Territory  
Primorye Territory, covering an mostly forested area of approximately 161 thousand km², lies at the 
extreme southeastern end of Russia in East Asia between 42°N-48°N and 130°E-139°E (Figure 2-
1).  The major naval facilities in Primorye Territory comprise a naval base at Pavlovsk Bay, a 
shipyard at Bolshoi Kamen, a ship repair facility at Chazhma Bay, a naval facility at Razboinik 
Bay, and a fuel management and waste management facility at Cape Sysoeva.  Each will be 
considered in more detail below. 
2.1.1 Pavlovsk Bay Naval Base 
The Pavlovsk Bay Naval Base is located on the eastern side of Strelok Bay (see Figures 2-1 and 2-
2).  The base is home to decommissioned submarines, including three submarines with cores that 
have been damaged during accidents.  Pavlovsk Bay is also the current berth for several major 
support ships, including the floating workshops PM-80, PM-125, PM-133, and technological 
tankers TNT-27 and TNT-5.  The PM-80 contains damaged spent nuclear fuel.  According to the 
Inspection of State Supervision for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Power Plants of the 
Administration of State Supervision, Defense Ministry of the RF, neither the PM-125 nor the PM-
133 are usable for defueling or refueling of nuclear submarines. 
Decommissioned Submarines 
As of January 2000, 16 decommissioned non-defueled submarines were berthed at the Pavlovsk 
Bay facility.  An estimate of the inventory of radioactivity in the decommissioned submarines has 
been provided by Lysenko et al. (2002) as a part of an evaluation of hypothetical accidents.  Table 
2-1 represents a conservative assessment of the estimated activity in one submarine reactor core 
three years after final shutdown.  Because most first- and second-generation submarines have two 
reactors, the values from Table 2-1 should be multiplied by two to estimate the total inventory per 
submarine. 
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Figure 2-1:  Primorye Territory (inset shows naval facilities)   
Map source:  www.expedia.com 
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Figure 2-2:  Pavlovsk Bay Naval Base (adapted from Danilyan et al, 
2000b) 
Figure 2-3:  Three-compartment unit alongside a decommissioned Victor 
Class SSN at Pavlovsk Bay.  The vessels are now stored at Razboinik Bay.  
(Handler, 1995.  Photo credit: J. Handler).   
Anchorage for
Damaged Submarines
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Table 2-1:  Isotopic inventory of typical submarine reactor core three years after 
shutdown (assumed burnup 42 GWd) (Lysenko et al. (2002)) 
Radionuclide  Ɍ1/2,  years Activity, Bq 
137Cs 30 4.9x1015 
90Sr 29.1 4.2x1015 
144ɋе 0.78 2.3x1015 
134Cs 2.06 1.9x1015 
241Pu 14.4 1.1x1015 
106Ru   1.01 3.2x1014 
238Pu 87.7 4.1x1013 
241Am 432 1.1x1013 
239Pu 24,100 6.5x1012 
240Pu 6,540 4.1x1012 
60Co 5.27 2.6x1011 
55Fe 2.7 1.7x1011 
 
Damaged Submarines 
Three major accidents resulting in core damage on submarines in the Russian Pacific Fleet have 
been reported.  All three damaged submarines are stored afloat at Pavlovsk Bay.  A short 
description of each accident is given below.  A more extensive description of the accident in 
Chazhma Bay is given in Sivintsev et al. (1994).  Although several of these accidents had been 
described in by Handler (1994a), there is one remaining unconfirmed report that refers to a Victor 
SSN (tactical number 371) that suffered a loss of coolant accident at Pavlovsk Bay in the summer 
of 1986.  There are no references to such an accident on the K-371 in published Russian sources.  
However, Bellona (1996) reports that this submarine underwent a "critical underspace leakage" 
and is laid up at a Northern Fleet shipyard near Murmansk.  
July 1979 Loss of Coolant Accident 
According Sivintsev et al. (2000a) and Kutcher et al. (1996), the submarine designated as factory 
number 541 (Tactical no. not reported) underwent a loss of coolant accident in 1979.  This may be 
the submarine referred to by Handler (1994a) as the "K-116, an Echo I SSN, [Project no 659T] 
(order no 541), (that) suffered a meltdown due to operator error while the submarine was at sea 
near Russia…as of 1994, it was stored at the Pavlovsk submarine base awaiting the deployment of 
special decommissioning procedures".  The ship is a Project 675 (NATO designation "Echo II") 
class guided missile submarine built in 1965 at the Severodvinsk Machine-building Enterprise.  It 
is 115.4 m long and 9.3 m wide with draft of 7.8 m at a surface displacement of 4500 tons.  It 
normally carries a crew of 90 and is powered by two VM-A reactors, each of which is rated at 70 
MWt (Bellona, 1996).  The ship was transferred in 1966 from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific 
Fleet.  There is some inconsistency regarding the number of refuelings.  According to information 
from Lavkovsky (2000), the starboard1 reactor had been defueled twice, and the port reactor three 
times.  The starboard reactor began operations in 1971, and the port in 1978.  However, according 
to Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), the starboard reactor had been refuelled in 1971 and again in 
1979.  The port reactor was reported to have been refueled in 1971 (during the same overhaul that 
the starboard reactor was refuelled) and again in 1978.  Both were permanently shut down at some 
point between July and August 1979.  Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) reports that the total power 
generation of the core of the port reactor was approximately 0.17 GWd, and the starboard core had 
generated 8.3 GWd.  The total power generation of the steam generating plant amounted to 18.7 
GWd (port) and 19.8 GWd (starboard). 
                                                 
1
 It appears that reactors on Project 675 submarines are arranged fore-and-aft.  The designation "port" denotes the  
forward reactor and the designation "starboard" denotes the aft reactor.  On the Project 675 (Echo II) SSGNs the 
reactors are installed in the sixth compartment. 
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According to Kutcher et al. (1996), a loss of coolant accident occurred in the port reactor in the 
summer of 1979.  Existing reports conflict as to the exact time and location of the accident.  
Sivintsev et al. (2000a) reports that the accident took place in June alongside the pier in Pavlosky 
Bay, whereas Kutcher et al. (1996) reports that the accident took place during a surface transit on 
July 2 from Pavlovsk Bay to Vladimir Bay.  Given that the port reactor had only approximately 
sixty hours of full power operation, it appears that the accident may have been related to improper 
procedures during the refueling of the port reactor.  Major leakage along the port reactor cover 
resulted in a sharp pressure drop in the primary circuit.  As a result, the primary coolant boiled and 
fuel assemblies were damaged, with a loss of cladding tightness.  This resulted in the spread of gas 
and aerosol activity to all compartments.  The leakage from the primary circuit entered the reactor 
shield and the hold of the reactor compartment.  The equipment installed in the reactor 
compartment completely failed due to the flooding from leakage of the reactor.  This also led to 
strong radioactive contamination of the reactor compartment.  The nuclear submarine was 
decommissioned from the Navy as a result of the accident (Kutcher et al., 1996).  The estimated 
radioactivity inventory of the spent fuel (in Bq) and activated reactor structures is given in Table 
2-2.  Additional information on the radiation conditions onboard the submarine is given in Kobzev 
and Lavkovsky (2001). 
Table 2-2:  Estimated radioactive inventory (Bq) onboard the Project 675 (Echo II) SSGN 
Factory Number 541 as of August 1998 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Fuel 
Internal 
Reactor 
Components 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Shield 
Tank 
Reactor 
Compartment Fuel 
Internal 
Reactor 
Components
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Shield 
Tank 
Reactor 
CompartmentIsotope 
Starboard Reactor Port (Damaged) Reactor 
239Pu 2.0x1012 4.0x1010
240Pu 3.2x1011 6.4x109
241Pu 3.0x1012 6.1x1010
241Am 4.8x1011 9.6x109
90Sr 5.5x1014 1.2x1013
134Cs n/r n/r 
137Cs 5.9x1014 
 
1.3x1013
 
55Fe 4.4x1012 1.8x1013 8.2x1011 2.0x1011 7.6x107 1.9x1011 1.4x1013 6.4x1011 1.5x1011 6.0x107 
60Co 1.4x1013 5.1x1013 1.5x1012 5.8x1011 6.3x107 4.5x1011 4.4x1013 1.3x1012 5.0x1011 5.4x107 
63Ni 1.8x1013 8.9x1013 1.7x1012 1.1x1012 9.9x107 3.6x1011 8.4x1013 1.6x1012 1.0x1012 9.4x107 
152Eu 8.9x1010     2.2x109     
154Eu 7.8x1011     2.1x1010     
Total 1.2x1015 1.6x1014 4.0x1012 1.9x1012 2.4x108 2.6x1013 1.4x1014 3.5x1012 1.7x1012 2.1x108 
n/r: not reported 
 
August 1985 Criticality Accident 
On the morning of 10 August 1985, during completion of reactor refueling work on a Project 675 
(NATO designation "Echo II") SSGN (Factory No. 175, Tactical No. K-431/B-431) at the 
Chazhma Bay Ship Repair Facility, a reactivity accident occurred in the port reactor as a result of 
violation of standard refueling procedures.  The accident is described in greater detail elsewhere 
(Sivintsev et al. (1994a), Sivintsev (2000a, 2000b), Takano et al. (2001)).  The resulting thermal 
explosion of the reactor destroyed the forward and aft machine enclosures and the forward 
enclosure of the control and protection system.  The entire core consisting of freshly loaded 
nuclear fuel was blown out of the reactor. The fuelling shack was also partially destroyed, and its 
roof was blown off to a distance of 70 - 80 m where it fell into the water 30 m from shore. The 
submarine sustained damage to its pressure hull in the aft section of the reactor compartment.  
Immediately after the explosion in the reactor compartment, a fire broke out, which was brought 
under control after four hours.  Combustion products, fission and activation products, and fine 
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particles of nuclear fuel fell out within a radius of 50-100 m around the damaged submarine. On 
the basis of a theoretical paper (Romanov, 1993), it is possible to estimate that the energy of the 
explosion was approximately 5x1018 fissions.  This value is consistent with the results of 
activation measurements made immediately after the accident (Sivintsev, 2000b).   
After the accident, the damaged submarine was towed from Chazhma Bay to Pavlovsk Bay, where 
it is currently berthed.  A description of the current condition of the K-431 is provided in 
Goriglejan (1999).  The environmental contamination resulting from this accident is described in a 
number of publications, including Sivintsev et al. (1994) and Chaikovskaya et al. (2001). 
December 1985 Loss of Coolant Accident 
The third reported submarine reactor accident in the Russian Far East also occurred in 1985.  The 
Project 671 (NATO designation "Victor I") class nuclear submarine (Factory no. 610, tactical no. 
K-314/B-314) was built in 1972 by the Leningrad Admiralty Association and assigned to the 
Pacific Fleet in 1975.  The submarine carries a crew of 90 and is 94.3 m long and 10.6 m wide, 
with a draft of 7.3 m at a surface displacement of 3500 tons.  The submerged displacement is 6085 
tons.  The vessel is powered by a VM-4 nuclear power plant with two reactors located side-by-side 
in the third compartment.  The reactors had both undergone two previous refuelings, the latest 
being completed in November 1979.  Both were permanently shutdown on 31 Dec 1985.  The 
power generation of the installed cores amounted to 6.3 GWd each, and the total power generation 
of the steam plants amounted to 16.7 GWd each. 
The submarine suffered an accident to the port reactor while pierside in Pavlovsk Bay in 
December 1985.  It is described as a primary coolant leak of the portside reactor resulting in core 
damage (“loss of cladding tightness”) and flooding of the reactor compartment by primary coolant. 
The environmental contamination resulting from the accident is described in Danilyan et al. 
(2000b).  Damage of the portside reactor plant core made off-loading impossible. In addition, the 
elevated radiation levels in the reactor compartment hamper off-loading of the undamaged 
starboard core. The nuclear submarine is stored afloat with both cores still on board. This may be 
the submarine referred to by Handler (1994a) as "the K-314, a Charlie SSGN (order no 610) (or 
maybe a Victor I SSN), (that) suffered a reactor meltdown in the Pacific, reportedly in Russian 
waters."  The estimated radioactivity inventory (in Bq) of the spent fuel and activation products in 
structural components is given in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3:  Estimated radioactive inventory (Bq) onboard the Project 671 (Victor I) SSN 
Factory Number 610 as of August 1998 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001).   
Fuel 
Internal 
Reactor 
Components 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Shield 
Tank 
Reactor 
Compartment Fuel 
Internal 
Reactor 
Components
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Shield 
Tank 
Reactor 
CompartmentIsotope 
Starboard Reactor Port (Damaged) Reactor 
239Pu 6.8x1012 6.8x1012
240Pu 1.6x1012 1.6x1012
241Pu 7.4x1013 7.4x1013
241Am 2.0x1012 2.0x1012
90Sr 1.0x1015 1.0x1015
134Cs 1.4x1013 1.4x1013
137Cs 1.1x1015 
 
1.1x1015
 
55Fe n/r 4.3x1014 1.6x1011 n/r 4.3x1014 1.6x1011 
60Co n/r 2.9x1014 6.2x1010 n/r 2.9x1014 6.2x1010 
63Ni n/r 1.4x1014 3.3x1010 n/r 1.4x1014 3.3x1010 
152Eu 
154Eu 
n/r 
Total 2.2x1015 8.6x1014 2.6x1011 2.2x1015 8.6x1014 2.6x1011 
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Floating Workshops 
In addition to damaged and undamaged submarines awaiting decommissioning, there are also 
service ships berthed at Pavlovsk Bay.  These include three PM-326 class floating workshops.  
Two of these (the PM-125 and the PM-133) were refitted to store spent fuel in ChT-4 canisters and 
are thus designated as PM-326M class support ships.  All are in very poor condition and are not 
usable for their designated purpose of defuelling and/or refuelling nuclear submarines. The 
technical characteristics of fuel storage onboard PM-326 and PM-326M floating workshops is 
given in Section 2.3 
The PM-80 is a Project 326 barge built in 1964 which had been reported to contain considerable 
amounts of wedged, damaged spent fuel (113 damaged spent fuel assemblies in 1995).  The fuel 
appears to have been in storage for a considerable amount of time, as the date of last criticality is 
reported to be 1969.  However, a technology has been developed to extract the damaged fuel 
(Sarkisov, 1999), and as of 1998, 90 spent fuel assemblies had been removed from the PM-80.  As 
of 1 August 1998, the PM-80 held 23 damaged spent fuel assemblies from different first-
generation cores with 430 TBq of radioactivity.  Data on the inventory of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste on the PM-80 are given in Tables 2-4 and 2-5.  According to Table 18 in 
Danilyan et al. (2000b), the total LRW storage capacity of the PM-80 as of January 2000 was 
319.4 m³, and it contained 5.6 TBq of radioactivity in 136 m³ of liquid radioactive waste in tanks 
1-4 and montejuses2. This appears consistent with the 5.4 TBq of activity in 136 m³ reported by 
Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) in Table 2-5 below.  In addition, the PM-80 was reported to contain 
four storage containers totalling 6 m³ with a total activity of 0.0074 TBq.  However, Table 19 in 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) report 4.0 m³ of SRW containing 0.16 TBq of activity.  The PM-80 is in 
critical condition.  According to information from Lavkovsky (2000), all of special systems to 
ensure nuclear and radiation safety and systems for loading and storage of spent fuel and liquid 
radioactive waste are defective. The drydocking that should have taken place in 1994 has not yet 
taken place. The inter-compartmental bulkheads, doors, hatches, and manholes are not watertight, 
making the vessel vulnerable to sinking in the case of flooding. The radiation monitoring systems 
are defective.  Because there is no system for monitoring the spent fuel storage tanks, the 
possibility of water leakage from storage tanks cannot be excluded. The vessel has been 
decommissioned.  The volumetric activity of water in the spent fuel storage tanks is 2.2x105 kBq/L 
in the forward storage compartment and 1.4x105 kBq/L in the aft storage compartment.  Data on 
the estimated radioactive inventory in spent fuel assemblies as of August 1998, presuming that the 
fuel assemblies had reached their design power generation, is given in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2-4:  Radioactive inventory (Bq) in spent fuel assemblies onboard the PM-80 as of 
August 1998 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs Total 
1.6x1011 1.8x1011 6.8x1012 6.4x1011 2.0x1014 1.0x1010 2.2X1014 4.3x1014 
 
                                                 
2
 A montejus is a type of sedimentation tank used for water treatment. 
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Table 2-5:  Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the PM-80 as of 
April 2000 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in 
volume, m³ Activity, Bq 
Specific 
activity, kBq/L
Forward spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 12 2.7x1012 222,000 
Aft spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 12 2.4x1012 196,000 
Sewage water tank No.1 23.5 23 3.0x1010 1,300 
Sewage water tank No.2 23.5 23 1.9x1011 8,100 
Enclosure for high activity liquid waste 25 23 5.6x1010 2,400 
Enclosure for low activity liquid waste 25 23 5.5x1010 2,400 
Enclosure for low activity liquid waste 25 15 3.5x1010 2,300 
Enclosure for spent fuel assembly storages 2 2 5.0x109 2,500 
Enclosure for filter washing No.1 3 3 5.0x1010 17,000 
 
The PM-125 is a Project 326M barge built in 1960 and modified in 1982.  As of August 1 1998, 
the vessel held approximately 360 fuel assemblies (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001), representing 
two first-generation cores3.  Based upon an assumed combined burnup for both cores of 5.2 GWd4 
and a final criticality in 1985, the total activity as of August 1998 was estimated to be 3,900 TBq.  
Data on the inventory of spent fuel and radioactive waste on the PM-125 are given in Tables 2-6 
and 2-7.  According to Table 18 in Danilyan et al. (2000b), the total LRW storage capacity of the 
PM-125 as of January 2000 was 359.2 m³, and it contained 0.34 TBq of radioactivity in 194.5 m³ 
of liquid radioactive waste in tanks 1-4 and montejuses. This appears consistent with the 0.33 TBq 
of activity in 194 m³ reported by Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) in Table 2-
7.5  In addition, the PM-125 was reported to contain four storage containers totalling 6 m³ with a 
total activity of 0.021 TBq.  However, Table 19 in Danilyan et al. (2000b) report 16.5 m³ of SRW 
containing 0.33 TBq of activity in SRW containers in the zone of controlled radiation safety.  The 
PM-125 is also in very poor condition.  According to data from Lavkovsky (2000), the last 
drydocking took place in May 1992.  Hull corrosion is up to 18%.  There is a pitting corrosion of 
the inner hull in the area of the third and fourth boiler fuel tanks, and the bottom framing is 
damaged by the pitting corrosion with corroded sections up to 30mm long and 3 to 5 mm deep 
near the waterline.  The inter-compartmental bulkheads, doors, hatches, and manholes are not 
watertight, making the vessel vulnerable to sinking in the case of flooding.  Most of the safety-
related systems on the ship are defective, including the fire protection, drainage, spent fuel 
handling, water treatment, and refrigeration and heating systems.  There is therefore a significant 
threat of fire, flooding, or of freezing of the water in the spent fuel storage compartments during 
the winter.  The nuclear fuel handling cranes are missing small assemblies, and the use of nuclear 
fuel offloading gears is prohibited.  Water quality in the tanks with spent fuel assembly does not 
meet the requirements to store spent nuclear fuel storage containers. Because of the poor condition 
of the vessel, the Inspection of State Supervision for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants of the Administration of State Supervision, Defense Ministry of the RF, has 
prohibited use of the PM-125 for defuelling and refuelling of nuclear submarines.  
                                                 
3
 Lavkovsky (2000) reports that the spent fuel onboard the PM-125 is from two second generation cores.  We use the 
later data from Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) as presumably the most current data. 
4
 This value seems low for a combined burnup when compared to the 42 GWd burnup per core used by Lysenko et al. 
(2002) or the values reported for the cores in storage on the PM-74, which are approximately 1550 MWh per SFA for 
both first- and second-generation submarines in contrast to the 350 MWh per SFA for the fuel on the PM-125 under 
the assumption of combined burnup. 
5
 In contrast, Handler (1994a) reports that the PM-125 contained 108 m³ of waste containing 0.8 TBq as of March 
1994.   
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Table 2-6: Radioactive inventory (Bq) in spent fuel assemblies onboard the PM-125 as of 
August 1998 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs Total 
5.7x1012 1.3x1012 6.2x1013 1.7x1012 1.9x1015 6.8x1012 1.9x1015 3.9x1015 
 
 
 
Table 2-7: Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the PM-125 as of 
April 2000 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in volume, 
m³ 
Activity, Bq Specific 
activity, kBq/L
Bow spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 10 2.5x1011 25,000 
Aft spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 10 3.0x1010 3000 
Sewage water tank No.1 23.5 18 6.0x106 0.33 
Sewage water tank No.2 23.5 6 2.2x107 3.7 
Sewage water tank of special sanitary unit No.1 14.6 10 2.1x106 0.21 
Sewage water tank of special sanitary unit No.2 14.6 0.5 1.0x105 0.21 
Sewage water tank of special sanitary unit No.3 20.1 9 1.7x107 1.9 
Sewage water tank of special sanitary unit No.4 23.5 11 1.1x107 0.96 
Treated water tank No.1 46 45.6 8.8x106 0.19 
Enclosure for high activity liquid waste 25 24 2.0x109 85 
Enclosure for low activity liquid waste 25 24.8 1.0x1010 410 
Enclosure for low activity liquid waste 25 24.8 1.5x1010 590 
Enclosure for spent fuel assembly storages 2 1 2.5x1010 25,000 
 
 
The third floating workshop in Pavlovsk Bay is the PM-133, a Project 326 barge built in 1962 and 
upgraded to PM-326M class in 1972.  This is the floating workshop that was involved in the 1985 
Chazhma Bay accident.  The vessel currently holds two second-generation spent cores (560 spent 
fuel assemblies) with an estimated total activity of 9,200 TBq in storage (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 
2001).  Data on the inventory of spent fuel and radioactive waste on the PM-133 is given in Table 
2-8 and 2-9 based on a burnup of 10.4 GWd per core and a final shutdown in 1994.  According to 
Danilyan et al. (2000b), the total LRW storage capacity of the PM-133 as of January 2000 was 
333.8 m³, and it contained 1.8 TBq of radioactivity in 68.0 m³ of liquid radioactive waste in tanks 
1-4 and montejuses. This is consistent with the 1.8 TBq of activity in 68 m³ reported by Lavkovsky 
(2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) in Table 2-8.  6In addition, the PM-133 was reported to 
contain two storage containers totalling 3 m³ with a total activity of 0.0074 TBq.  However, 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) report 6.25 m³ of SRW containing 0.21 TBq of activity in SRW containers 
in the zone of controlled radiation safety.  The last routine overhaul was in 1987 after the radiation 
accident in Chazhma Bay.  Additional individual repairs were carried out 1995.  According to 
Lavkovsky (2000), the prescribed service life of 30 years has been exceeded.  Corrosion is 
ubiquitous.  The bilge in the sewage room (eighth compartment) has been completely destroyed by 
corrosion, with holes up to 50 cm in diameter.  In the ninth compartment there is maximum hull 
destruction by stratification corrosion.  Like the PM-80, most of the systems are defective, 
                                                 
6
 In contrast, Handler (1994a) reports that the PM-133 contained 46 m³ of waste containing 0.013 TBq as of March 
1994.   
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including the drainage, heating, fire protection, and spent fuel handling systems.  The Inspection of 
State Supervision for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Power Plants of the Administration 
of State Supervision, RF Defense Ministry, has prohibited use of the PM-133 for defuelling and 
refuelling of nuclear submarines. 
 
Table 2-8:  Radioactive inventory (Bq) in spent fuel assemblies onboard the PM-133 as of 
August 1998 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs Total 
1.1x1013 2.7x1012 1.8x1014 1.2x1012 4.1x1015 4.6x1014 4.5x1015 9.2x1015 
 
Table 2-9:  Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the PM-133 as of 
April 2000 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description 
Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in volume, 
m³ Activity, Bq 
Specific activity, 
kBq/L 
Bow spent fuel storage tank 12.3 10 1.1x1012 110,000 
Aft spent fuel storage tank 12.3 10 3.6x1011 36,000 
Enclosure for low activity water 25 23 1.1x1010 480 
Enclosure for low activity water 25 23 8.1x1010 3,500 
Enclosure for spent fuel assembly storages 2 2 2.6x1011 130,000 
 
Technological Tankers and Miscellaneous Support Ships 
In addition to the three floating workshops, the Project 1783A technological tankers TNT-5 and 
TNT-277 are berthed at Pavlovsk Bay (Danilyan et al. (2000b)).  According to data from Kuzin 
and Nikolsky (1996) and Lavkovsky (2000), each of these vessels is 74.4 m long and 12 m wide, 
and displaces 2300 tons at a draft of 3.95 m. The vessels require a crew of 33, and can cruise for 
1000 km at a speed of 9 knots.  Top speed is 11 knots.  The tanks of special-purpose tankers TNT-
5, TNT-42, TNT-23 and TNT-27 are allowed to store LRW with specific activity less than 0.37 
kBq/L. 
The TNT-5, built in 1960, has a design LRW capacity of 969 m³ in a total of nine tanks.  These 
comprise two 123 m³ tanks, four 120.1 m³ tanks, two 116.1 m³ tanks, and one 10 m³ tank.  There is 
no detailed inventory data available for the TNT-5 provided by either Lavkovsky (2000) and 
Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) or Danilyan et al. (2000b).  However, Handler (1994a, 1995) 
reported that the TNT-5 was in such poor condition in 1994 that it was taking on water.  It was 
therefore in the process of being emptied to avoid problems in the event that the vessel were to 
sink, and contained only 100 tons of LRW as of December 1994.   
                                                 
7
 Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) reports that the TNT-27 is located at Krashenninikov Bay.  
However, Handler (1994) reports that the TNT-5 was towed from Bolshoi Kamen to Pavlovsk Bay on May 27 1994, 
and that the TNT-27 was moved to Pavlovsk Bay on 1 August 1994. Given that Danilyan et al. (2000b) also reports 
the location of the TNT-27 as "Pavlovskogo Bay", it seems likely that the TNT-27 is in Pavlovsk Bay. 
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The TNT-27, built in 1967 and shown in Figure 2-4, has a design LRW capacity of 905.7 m³ in 
nine tanks.  Inventory data are shown in Figure 2-10.  It appears that the tanks are holding waste 
with a considerably higher level of activity than permitted (cf Table 2-24). 
Figure 2-4:  TNT-27 underway in the Sea of Japan in October 1993  
(Handler, 1995.  Photo credit: J. Handler) 
Table 2-10:  Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the TNT-27  
(Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description Designed capacity, m³ Filled in volume, m³ Activity, Bq 
Specific activity, 
kBq/L 
Tank No.1 104.3 80 2.9x1011 3,630 
Tank No.2  104.3 80 3.3x1010 410 
Tank No.3 123.7 70 2.3x1011 3,200 
Tank No.4 123.7 70 2.3x1011 3,300 
Tank No.5 114 60 5.3x109 89 
Tank No.6 114 60 2.9x109 48 
Tank No.7 95.5 60 6.9x108 12 
Tank No.8 95.5 60 8.9x108 15 
Tank No.9 30.7 30 6.8x1010 2,300 
 
According to Danilyan et al. (2000b), the total LRW storage capacity of the TNT-27 as of January 
2000 was 906.1 m³, very close to the figure reported by Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and 
Lavkovsky (2001).  However, Danilyan et al. (2000b) reports a total activity of 0.033 TBq 
contained in 859 m³ on the TNT-27 in tanks 1-9 as of January 1, 2000.  This is not consistent with 
the 0.86 TBq of activity in 570 m³ as of April 2000 reported by Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and 
Lavkovsky (2001) in Table 2-10 above.8  In addition, the TNT-27 was reported to contain three 
storage containers totaling 4.5 m³ with a total activity of 0.026 TBq.  However, Danilyan et al. 
(2000b) report 8 m³ of SRW containing 0.053 TBq of activity in SRW containers in the zone of 
controlled radiation safety in the form of filters and SRW containers. 
                                                 
8
 In contrast, Handler (1994a) reports that the TNT-5 contained 794 m³ of waste containing 0.029 TBq and that the 
TNT-27 contained 905 m³ of waste containing 0.26 TBq as of March 1994.   
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Shore Facilities 
There is no detailed information on radioactive waste inventories in shore facilities at Pavlovsk 
Bay.  The only reported levels are found in Danilyan et al. (2000b), summarized below.   
 
Table 2-11: Radioactive Waste Inventories in Shore Storage at Pavlovsk Bay  
(Danilyan et al, 2000b) 
Object Type of storage Waste Type Volume, m³ (actual/capacity) 
Aggregate 
activity, Bq
Dosimetric control service Zone of controlled radiation safety SRW  4/- 3.0x1010 
Radiation safety service Drainage tanks No 1,2 LRW 960 / 1000  7.1x108 
2.1.2 Bolshoi Kamen and the Far Eastern Plant Zvezda9 
Bolshoi Kamen ("Big Rock") is a city of 80,000 which is centered on shipbuilding and repair 
works together with food industry and construction (see Figures 2-1 and 2-5).  The town of 
Bolshoi Kamen adjoins closely to the territory of the Zvezda ("Star") shipyard.  On the seacoast 
northeast from the town, there is a youth camp at a distance of 2.5 km from the territory of the 
shipyard.  The central part of the town spreads along the seashore over the crest of a hill within the 
distance of 1.5 - 2 km from the sea.  A reservoir is located to the east of the town about five 
kilometers from the shipyard.  The land near the town is widely used by the city dwellers for 
agriculture, including for kitchen gardens and country houses.   
 
Figure 2-5:  Far Eastern Plant Zvezda(adapted from Danilyan et al., 2000b) 
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 The description of the surroundings of Bolshoi Kamen is taken from Mordashev and Pechkurov (2000) 
Defuelling Piers
Fl
o
at
in
g 
w
o
rk
sh
o
p
an
ch
o
ra
ge
SRW Storage
LRW tanker
anchorage
N
   16
The zone of the Far Eastern Plant Zvezda (Figure 2-5) comprises the bay of Bolshoi Kamen and 
the adjacent coastal area.  The bay of Bolshoi Kamen is a part of the Ussury Gulf, located at 43°11' 
N, 132°20’ E.  The bay has a Ω-shaped form with a narrow inlet in the western side.  The area of 
bay is 2.4 km² and the depth reaches 12 m in parts.  The median tidal amplitude is 21 cm, but can 
range up to 60 cm.  The exchange of water with the Ussury Gulf is limited. There is a weak 
(median speed 0.01 - 0.04 m/sec) and changeable counter-clockwise current in the bay.  Bottom 
sediments are sandy and oozy.  The shape and position of the bay make it a good shelter for 
vessels staying there even in the case of dangerous meteorological conditions near to the 
northwestern coast of the Sea of Japan.  For region of the bay of Bolshoi Kamen southerly winds 
are prevailing in winter (October - March) and northeasterly winds are prevailing in summer (May 
- August).  The median wind speed is 4 - 7 m/sec.  In some areas, wind deflection from the 
prevailing direction is possible because of the local terrain. Strong gales in which the windspeed 
can exceed 14 m/sec are frequent, occurring more than seventy days per year.  Recurrence of calm 
seas is less than 10% per year. 
The terrain surrounding the bay of Bolshoi Kamen is ringed by small hills (50-70 m) which slope 
gently to the sea.  The northern shore of the bay is higher than eastern, southern and southwestern 
shores.  Main structures of the yard are located along the shores of the bay.  The main part of 
industrial site is located on Cape Lagerny to the northwest of the bay. Before the beginning of 
construction works, the shores of Cape Lagerny were high and abrupt, with elevations of 20-25 m. 
There was a 34 m hill in the central part of the cape. These peaks have been leveled down to 
absolute marks of 2-3 m and the site has been occupied by industrial buildings.   
Decommissioned Submarines   
Bolshoi Kamen is the main site for decommissioning of nuclear submarines in the Russian Far 
East, and exact numbers of decommissioned submarines is thus subject to change depending upon 
the pace of decommissioning operations.  As of 2000, six submarines and three three-compartment 
modules were located at the Zvezda Shipyard (Danilyan et al, 2000b).  Of these, one was defueled, 
and the other eight were awaiting defueling.  The estimated inventory in a typical submarine core 
was previously given in Table 2-1. 
Floating Workshops 
According to Kuzin and Nikolsky (1996), the PM-74, a Project 2020 (“Malina” class) floating 
workshop designed by the "Iceberg" Central Design Bureau and built in 1985 by the 61 
Communars Shipyard Production Association Nikolaev, is berthed at Bolshoi Kamen.  A ship of 
the Project 2020 class is shown in Figure 2-6.  According to Zakharkin (1995), there were 1368 
spent fuel assemblies in storage as of 1995.  According to Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), there 
were a total of 1368 fuel assemblies from two first generation cores and four second generation 
cores as of August 1998.  There are 640 spent fuel assemblies (last criticality in 1991), comprising 
two first generation cores with a burnup of 10.4 GWd each and one second generation core with a 
burnup of 21 GWd.  There were 728 spent fuel assemblies (last criticality in 1994) comprising 
three second generation cores with a burnup of 15.6 GWd.  Based upon the preceding 
assumptions, data on the inventory of spent fuel and radioactive waste on the PM-74 is given in 
Table 2-12.  
Table 2-12:  Radioactive inventory in spent fuel assemblies onboard the PM-74  
(Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs Total 
3.8x1013 8.6x1012 5.3x1014 5.6x1012 1.4x1016 1.1x1015 1.5x1016 3x1016  
 
Table 2-13:  Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the PM-74 as of 
April 2000 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
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Storage description Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in volume, 
m³ 
Activity, Bq Specific activity, kBq/L 
Spent fuel assembly storage tank No. 1 40 32 4.1x109 129 
Spent fuel assembly storage tank No. 2 40 32 1.1x109 3.44 
Spent fuel assembly storage tank No. 3 40 32 6.6x1010 2,070 
Spent fuel assembly storage tank No. 4 40 32 9.8x109 307 
Spent fuel assembly storage overflow tank 3.8 3.8 5.5x1010 14,400 
Cooling water tank No. 1 82.6 4.6 1.0x109 226 
Cofferdam of cooling water tank No. 1  21 1.4x1011 6,670 
 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) reports a capacity of 637.2 m³ that contains 174.6 m³ of waste totalling 1.3 
TBq in tanks and spent fuel storage compartments.  This data is not consistent with Kobzev and 
Lavkovsky (2001), who reports a capacity of 246.4 m³ and a total of 157.4 m³ of waste containing 
0.28 TBq in all LRW storage tanks (cf. Table 2-13).  As of April 2000, the vessel also contains 57 
containers of SRW totalling 85.5 m³ with a total activity of 0.0047 TBq.  However, Danilyan et al. 
(2000b) report a zone of controlled radiation safety containing 15.40 m³ with 14 TBq in 
containerized reactivity control rods. 
 
Figure 2-6:  Project 2020 (“Malina”) Class Floating Workshop (Bellona, 1996) 
According to Lavkovsky (2000), the PM-74 is overdue for overhaul.  The lifting cranes have been 
prohibited from use.  Defective systems include radiation monitoring systems, the water shielding 
system, temperature monitoring system in spent fuel assembly Storage Tank № 2, sampling 
system, high pressure air system, and the vacuum-generating system.  Operation has been 
prohibited by the Inspection of State Supervision for Nuclear Radiation Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants of the Administration of State Supervision for Nuclear Radiation Safety, RF Defense 
Ministry. 
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Technological Tankers and Miscellaneous Support Ships 
According to data from Kuzin and Nikolsky (1996) and Lavkovsky (2000), the Project 11510 
technological tanker (TNT) "Pinega", built in 1989, is also berthed at Bolshoi Kamen.  The 
“Amur”, a ship of the same class at the Pinega, is shown in Figure 2-7.  The 122 m long, 17 m 
wide vessel displaces 8250 tons with a draft of 6.2 m.  The vessel has a crew of 86 and can cruise 
for 4000 km at 14 knots, with a top speed of 15 knots.  It can hold up to 685.6 m³ of LRW.  The 
tanks of Pinega are allowed to store LRW with a specific activity of up to 370 kBq/L for low 
activity water and up to 370 MBq/L for high activity water.  According to Lavkovsky (2000), the 
LRW inventory, primarily composed of 90Sr, 137Cs, and 60Co, is given in Table 2-14.  Twelve tanks 
are installed for LRW storage on TNT "Pinega".  In addition to the tanks listed below, there is also 
one 3.5m³ tank for high activity acidic wastes and one 5.1 m³ overflow tank.   
Figure 2-7: The Project 11510 class technological tanker "Amur", sister ship to the "Pinega" 
(Bellona, 1996) 
  
Table 2-14:  Radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste onboard the "Pinega" as of 
April 2000 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description Design capacity, 
m³ 
Filled in 
volume, m³ Activity, Bq 
Specific activity, 
kBq/L 
Tank No. 1(low activity) 107.1 102 7.9x109 78 
Tank No. 2 (decontaminated water) 89.46 85.2 2.4x109 29 
Tank No. 4 (overflow) 11.24 10.7 6.7x108 63 
Tank No. 5 (low activity, alkaline) 203.7 194 3.1x108 1.6 
Tank No. 7 (high activity) 63.4 63 2.6x109 41 
Tank  No. 9 (high activity, acid) 104.9 51 1.2x109 23 
Tank No. 12 (high activity, alkaline) 76.3 58 7.9x108 14 
 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) reports that the Pinega contains thirteen (instead of twelve) tanks for LRW 
with a capacity of 873.6 m³, and which contain 682.1m³ of LRW totalling 0.095 TBq of activity.  
This is in contrast with the twelve tanks with a total capacity of 656 m³, reported by Kobzev and 
Lavkovsky (2001), which are reported to be filled with 564 m³ of LRW containing 0.016 TBq.10  In 
                                                 
10
 Handler (1994a) reported that the Pinega contained 320 m³ of waste containing an unknown amount of radioactivity 
as of March 1994.   
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addition, Danilyan et al. (2000b) reports 42.6 m³ of solid radioactive waste containing 0.7 TBq of 
activity.  This does not appear consistent with Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) who report a higher 
volume but a lower total activity.  Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) reports that there is 46.3 m³ of 
solid radioactive waste containing 0.12 TBq of activity.  It comprises twenty-five 1.5 m³ SRW 
containers containing a total of 0.078 TBq, four one m³ SRW containers containing a total of 
0.00023 TBq, eleven 0.18 m³ compartmental radiation monitoring units containing a total of 
0.00036 TBq, one 0.1 m³ mechanical filter and one 0.5 m³ decontamination tank each containing 
37 MBq, two protective plugs containing a total of 2.2 MBq, four 0.1 m³ filtering device barriers 
containing a total of 0.0037 TBq, and nine filtering device barriers containing a total of 0.033 TBq. 
According to Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) and Shilgan (2001), three barges for LRW treatment 
or storage are berthed at Zvezda.  These are the recently completed PZO-500 "Landysh", and two 
PE-50-Mr 002 floating cells (PEK-50), the PEK-50 No. 170 and the PEK-50 No. 171.  The PZO-
500 "Landysh" is intended for LRW processing.  It is a single-deck non-self-propelled vessel with 
an ice-reinforced double hull and a three-layer deckhouse.  The vessel was built in 2000 by 
Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Environmental Services, Inc and the Amur Shipyard.  It is capable of 
storing 1150 m³ of LRW in seven tanks of 50 m³ each (the tanks being equipped with a biological 
shielding made of reinforced concrete of 240-400 mm thickness) and four tanks of 200 m³ each. 
The barrels of solidified cement concentrate are stored in a special space in the cementation unit.  
PZO-500 tanks are allowed to store LRW provided that the specific activity does not exceed 370 
kBq/L in the 200 m³ tanks and 370 MBq/L in the 50 m³ tanks.  As of January 2001, the Landysh 
held 187 m³ of waste with a total activity of 0.032 TBq.  The total specific activity of the waste 
was 170 kBq/L, comprising mainly 137Cs (111 kBq/L), 90Sr (12 kBq/L), and 60Co (1.3 kBq/L).   
   20
 
Figure 2-8: PEK-50 floating LRW storage at the Far Eastern Plant Zvezda  
(Handler, 1995.  Photo credit: J. Handler) 
The two floating cells PEK-50 No. 170 and PEK-50 No. 171, shown in Figure 2-8, were built in 
1991 at the Zvezda Shipyard. The floating cells are non-self-propelled and unmanned floating 
structures with ice-reinforced hulls.  Each PEK-50 is capable of storing 50 m³ of LRW at a full 
displacement of 131.2 tons.  SRW storage on PEK was not intended.  PEK tanks are allowed to 
store LRW with specific activity less than 370 kBq/L.  As of January 2001, the PEK-50 No. 170 
contained 50 m³ of LRW totalling 0.0082 TBq, with a specific activity of 163 kBq/L, comprising 
mainly 137Cs (89 kBq/L), 90Sr (16 kBq/L), and 60Co (4.4 kBq/L).  The PEK-50 No. 171 contained 
40 m³ of waste with 0.033 TBq of activity, with a specific activity of 813 kBq/L (which exceeds 
the 370 kBq/L limit).11  The majority of the waste is 137Cs at 651 kBq/L.   
Shore Facilities 
According to Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), the following shore facilities for radioactive waste 
storage are located at the Zvezda Shipyard.  The launching slip (Object 103) contains a special 
tank section for LRW storage designed by the State Union Design Institute "Soyuzproektverf" that 
was commissioned in December 1975.  It consists of two 20 m³ cells and one 3.2 m³ enclosure.  
The tanks are made of stainless steel, painted by oil paint, with no local protection. The enclosure 
is made of concrete covered by stainless steel.  The special tank section is located in the cellar 
space one meter below ground level with 600mm thick concrete walls. As of April 2000, the two 
tanks contained 34 m³ of waste with an specific activity of 137 kBq/L and an aggregate activity of 
0.0047 TBq, comprising mainly 137Cs (100 kBq/L), 90Sr (0.12 kBq/L), and 60Co (4.8 kBq/L).  The 
deactivation section (Object 121) contains a system for LRW storage designed by 
"Soyuzproektverf" that was commissioned  in December 1969.  It consists of two 20 m³ tanks. The 
tanks are made of stainless steel, painted by oil paint.  There is no biological shielding, but the 
tanks are in an isolated cellar space.  As of April 2000, the two tanks contained 30 m³ of waste 
with a specific activity of 11 kBq/L and an aggregate activity of 321 MBq comprising 137Cs (2.5 
kBq/L), 90Sr (0.03 kBq/L), and 60Co (4.4 kBq/L).  In addition, the management and protection 
section of Object 121 contains another 1.7 m³ tank.  The tank is made of stainless steel, painted by 
oil paint and without biological shielding.  As of April 2000, the tank contained 1 m³ of waste with 
                                                 
11
 In contrast, Handler (1994a) reports that the two PEK-50s contained 80 m³ of waste containing 0.011 TBq as of 
March 1994. 
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a specific activity of 7.2 kBq/L for a total activity of 7.2 MBq comprising 137Cs (1.02 kBq/L),  90Sr 
(0.005 kBq/L), and 60Co (0.03 kBq/L). 
A temporary (although the design service life is undefined) storage site for SRW designed by 
Soyuzproektverf was commissioned in 1980.  The site area is 3025 m² and is designated for 
storage of 600 m³ of SRW.  The temporary storage site is located at the pier and is an open asphalt 
pad.  Part of it is covered with shed with a removable roof. Along the perimeter of the site there is 
fencing made of 3 mm metal sheets.  There are two reception appliances for collection and control 
of groundwater.  As of April 2000, 53 m³ of wastes (tanks left after LWR storage, planks, and 
twelve containers) containing a total of 0.001 TBq were stored at the site. The isotopic 
composition of the wastes is 60-70% 137Cs, 10-12% 90Sr, 10-15% 60Co, and 3-5% 54Мn.  A long-
term reinforced concrete storage for SRW (object 130) designed by Soyuzproektverf was 
commissioned in 1964.  The area is 450 m² with a storage capacity of 1530 m³.  The walls are 600 
to 1000 mm thick.  There are no monitoring wells. The object was operated until 1968.  As of 
April 2000, the facility contained 195 m³ of waste with a total radioactivity of 3.5 TBq.  The 
compartment for high activity SRW houses in-bulk spent core rods and automatic control rods 
which give rise to an exposure rate at 3 m of 9 R/h.  There are two compartments for low activity 
SRW such as rubbish, individual protection means, metal cuts etc.  The isotopic composition of 
the wastes is estimated as the same as for the temporary storage site, namely 60-70% 137Cs, 10-
12% 90Sr, 10-15% 60Co, and 3-5% 54Мn.  The total shore storage reported in Lavkovsky (2000) 
comprises 3.5 TBq in 248 m³ of SRW and 0.005 TBq in 65m³ of LRW.  In contrast, Danilyan et 
al. (2000b) report only 230 MBq of activity in the zone of controlled radiation safety in the form 
of reactor internal components. 
2.1.3 Chazhma Bay Ship Repair Facility 
Chazhma Bay (see Figure 2-1) was the site of the most severe accident in the history of the 
Russian Pacific Fleet, as discussed above.  Chazhma Bay is the site of a ship repair facility that 
was home of one non-defuelled decommissioned submarine as of January 2000 (Danilyan et al. 
(2000b).  Although there is some information on the contamination resulting from the 1985 
accident in Sivintsev et al. (1994) and Chaikovskaya et al. (2001), there is very little data on the 
waste stored there.  Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) reports that the floating radiometric control 
stations PKDS-5 and PKDS-12, each of which are equipped with two 40 m³ tanks, are located at 
the Chazhma bay.  The LRW storage tanks on the PKDS tanks are allowed to store LRW with 
specific activity less than 0.37 kBq/L.  However, there are no data available from Lavkovsky 
(2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) on the inventories stored there.  Danilyan et al. (2000b) 
reports that there are SRW containers contain 0.013 TBq in 4 m³, and that tanks 1 and 2 of the 
Radiation Safety Service (ɋɊБ), with a design volume of 170 m³, contain 80 m³ of LRW with 640 
MBq of activity.  It is unclear if all the wastes and contaminated soil from the 1985 accident are 
stored onsite or if they have been transferred to the Cape Sysoeva Waste Facility. 
2.1.4 Razboinik Bay Naval Station 
Razboinik Bay (see Figure 2-1) is located across the inlet from Chazhma Bay.  After submarines 
are dismantled into three-compartment units at the Zvezda Shipyard, they are towed to Razboinik 
Bay for storage (Handler, 1995; cf. Figure 2-3).  This facility was home to nine decommissioned 
nuclear submarines and thirteen three-compartment units as of January 2000 (Danilyan et al. 
(2000b).  Of these, seventeen had been defuelled, and five were awaiting defuelling.  There is also 
very little data on the wastes at Razboinik Bay.  Table 2-15 gives data on the inventory of SRW at 
this facility taken from Danilyan et al. (2000b).  
   22
Table 2-15:  Radioactive Waste Inventories at Razboinik Bay  
(Danilyan et al. (2000b)) 
Object Type of storage Kind of SRW Volume, 
m³ 
Aggregate 
activity, Bq 
Block-module № 416 11.0 3.1x1011 
Block-module № 156 12.1 1.7x1010 
Block-module № 141 8.2 7.4x1008 
Division of 
long-term 
stored NS 
Block-module № 908 
Steam-generators, primary circuit 
components , pumps, reactor compartment 
internal components, etc. 
3.0 7.4x1008 
 
Zone of controlled 
radiation safety  2 2.8x10
10
 
2.1.5 Cape Sysoeva12 Naval Waste Facility 
The Cape Sysoeva Naval Waste Facility, shown in Figure 2-9, is located on the southern tip of the 
Dunai Peninsula (see Figure 2-1).  This site is also referred to by Handler (1994a) as the 
"Shkotovo Waste Site", "Military Unit 40752" or the "joint repair workshop".  This facility 
contains the vast majority of all non-spent fuel waste in the Russian Far East.  Contamination at 
the site is rather extensively discussed in Danilyan et al. (2000a).  According to Lavkovsky 
(2000)13, the following objects for radioactive storage are located in the Cape Sysoeva Waste 
Facility.  For LRW transfer between the shore base and the technical support vessels there is an 
enclosure No.1 of the transfer system (pier) located near the service pier.  Liquid radioactive 
wastes containing mainly 137Cs, 90Sr, 60Co, and 144ɋе are stored in a tank farm containing six 
vertically installed tanks in an open area near Enclosure 1.   Solid radioactive wastes are stored 
both in closed constructions and at open sites.   
Figure 2-9:  Cape Sysoeva Waste Management Facility  
(adapted from Danilyan et al, 2000b) 
                                                 
12
 Handler (1994) reports this as being located on "Cape Maidelya" on the "Shkotovo Peninsula" rather than Cape 
Sysoeva on the Dunai Peninsula.  The site is the same. 
13
 The location of this is given as "Pavloskogo Bay" in the spreadsheets from Lavkovsky (2000).  However, the facility 
names correspond exactly to those given for the Cape Sysoeva waste facility. 
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Constructions 1-5 are open concrete pads for storage of SRW.  They currently contain 5000 m³ of 
waste, including soil with traces of radioactive contamination from the accidents in 1985-86, 
totaling 3,700 TBq (mainly 137Cs- and 60Co).  Construction 29 is a closed storage designed to hold 
up to 2000 m³ of medium activity SRW.  Construction 31 is a closed storage designed to hold up 
to 2500 m³ of high activity SRW.  Construction 32 is a concrete pad for temporary storage of low 
activity wastes arranged at the stationary technological berth14.  As of January 2000, it contained 
1600 m³ of waste, including soil with traces of radioactive contamination from the accidents in 
1985-86, with 1,200 TBq of activity.  Handler (1994a) reports that Construction 31 contains ion 
exchange resins and contaminated equipment from a number of submarines, including the primary 
loop of the K-431 that suffered the August 1985 accident in Chazhma Bay.  Water is reported to 
have leaked into this storage unit.  He also reported that Construction 32 was built in 1992 and was 
used for storage of ion exchange resins, and notes that this facility was not reported to be leaking 
as of 1993. 
Construction 7 is a closed (protected) storage of about 750 m² area designed to hold up to 2000 m³ 
of high activity SRW.  Handler (1994a) reports that this facility was constructed in 1963, but was 
out of use by 1990.  He reports that "damaged fuel assemblies that could not be packed into 
TUKs…and shipped to Chelyabinsk and other residue from the Chazhma Bay accident are in this 
burial…it is rumored that fuel rods that have changed shape or were too damaged to transport after 
removal from wet storage were put here".  Although it is not possible to confirm that damaged 
spent fuel is buried here, the activity of 3,700 TBq reported by both Danilyan et al. (2000a) and 
Lavkovsky (2000) is consistent with this conjecture.  It is also stated in the caption of Table 4 in 
Danilyan et al. (2000a) that an unspecified "accident" occurred at storage site 7.  However, it is 
also reported the facility has been remediated, with the 560 tons of LRW being pumped out of the 
bays (possibly an indication that the storage site had leaked, allowing water to enter the facility), 
and that the "this source of contamination of the territory and water area has been liquidated".  It is 
not clear if this means that the wastes have been removed or simply that the leaks have been 
sealed. 
Construction 7а is a concrete pad for temporary storage of SRW with a capacity of about 750 m³.  
Danilyan et al. (2000a) refers to the contents of this facility as an "Assembly 26".  This may refer 
to the fresh core that was ejected during the accident at Chazhma Bay, which is also referred to as 
Assembly 26: "..full active core in form of the special construction (assembly 26) with a freshly 
loaded nuclear fuel." (Sivintsev, 2000a).   
Danilyan et al. (2000a) report that Buildings 5, 11, and 30 are used for spent fuel storage.  
However, the details of the construction are not given.  We presume that spent fuel is stored in 
shipping casks inside these buildings.  Handler (1994a) reports that the spent fuel assemblies were 
moved from wet storage in Building 5 to "storage site No. 30" after leaks were found in 1991 from 
one of the tanks of structure No. 5 for storage of spent fuel assemblies.  This building may be 
similar to Building 5 at Andreeva Bay in the Russian Northern Fleet.  He reports that "Buildings 
29 and 30 contain the TUKs with spent fuel.  No. 29 was built in 1981 and No. 30 in 1986.  Both 
utilize dry storage of the fuel assemblies contained within the TUK shipping containers…These 
buildings can hold approximately 600 TUKs or some 1,200 containers together." (p. 16).  
Although the numbering is not the same as that given by Danilyan et al. (2000a) (who reports that 
Construction 29 is a SRW facility, not a SNF facility), it seems reasonable to conclude that 
facilities 11 and 30 contain spent fuel in dry storage in transport containers, particularly as Lysenko 
et al. (2002) report that "According to the practice of SNF treatment adopted in Russia, after 
removal from the ship reactors, SFA (spent fuel assemblies) are temporarily stored in the transport 
containers of ɌUK-18 or МBA type." 
                                                 
14
 It can be noted that in contrast to the report of Lavkovsky (2000), the location of Construction 32 given by Danilyan 
et al. (2000a) and shown in Figure 2-9 above is not near the service pier.  Given that there is also an inconsistency in 
the reported inventories between these two sources, it could be that there are two facilities carrying the number “32”. 
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A summary of the reported information is given below.  There are inconsistencies between the 
inventories reported by Danilyan et al. (2000a) and Lavkovsky (2000), most notably in the 
contents of Constructions 1-5 and 32 and Tank 3B. 
Table 2-16:  Information on Waste Inventories at Cape Sysoeva as of Jan 2000  
(Lavkovsky (2000), Danilyan et al. (2000a))15 
Storage location Type of Material/Waste 
Design 
capacity* 
(m³) 
Used 
Volume* 
(m³) 
Specific 
activity* 
(kBq/L) 
Activity* 
(Bq) 
Activity** 
(Bq) 
Amount 
Entering 
Env (Bq)**
Spent and fresh fuel 
assemblies       Building 5 
LRW, SRW     2.0x1012 1.5x1012 
Constructions 1-5 SRW 5000 5000  3.7x1015 2.7x1012 3.7x109 
Building 6 Fresh fuel assemblies     2.2x1011 None 
Construction 7  SRW 2000 2000  3.7x1015 3.7x1015 7.4x1010 
Construction 7a SRW* Assembly 26**     - None 
Building 11 Spent fuel assemblies, SRW     8.1x10
15
 None 
Construction 29  SRW 2000 1800  2.1x1013 2.18x1013 3.7x109 
Building 30 Spent fuel assemblies     1.3x1017 None 
Construction 31  SRW 2500 895  2.2x1015 2.2x1015 None 
Construction 32 SRW 2000 1600  1.2x1015 1.9x1011 None 
Construction No.2A LRW 1000 837 130 1.1x1011 
Construction No.2B LRW 1000 510 120 6.0x1010 
Construction No.2C LRW 200 188 7.8 1.5x109 
Construction No.2D LRW 100    
Construction No.3A LRW 1000 550 270 1.5x1011 
Construction No.3B LRW 300 25 48,000 1.2x1012 
3.0x1011 3.7x109 
*Lavkovsky, 2000 
** Danilyan et al., 2000a 
 
There also appear to be inconsistencies - albeit slight - between the values reported by Danilyan et 
al. (2000a) and Danilyan et al. (2000b).  In Danilyan et al. (2000b), the site is reported to have a 
capacity of 3600 m³, of which 3165 m³ is filled with a total of 0.41 TBq of activity as of January 
2000.  The total volume of 3600 m³ appears to correspond to the total volume of the six LRW 
tanks (2A/B/C/D, 3A/B).  However, Danilyan et al. (2000a) reports that these tanks contain 0.26 
TBq of activity.  However, the date of measurement is not reported in Danilyan et al. (2000a), and 
the inconsistency may arise if the tanks are in use and the values refer to different dates.  Danilyan 
et al. (2000b) also reports that a total SRW storage capacity of 16,500 m³ is available at the base, 
of which 14,923 m³ containing 9,900 TBq is present in the form of standard sources of ionizing 
radiation, cases, steam generators, filters of primary and third circuits of NPP, shells of protective 
rods, main circulation pumps of primary circuit, circulation pumps of other circuits etc. 
2.2 Kamchatka Oblast  
The Kamchatka Region (Figure 2-10) is a mountainous peninsula of approximately 171 thousand 
km² lying between the Sea of Okhotsk on the west and Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea on the east.  
The central and southern parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula are subject to a frequent seismic 
activity and have more than 20 active volcanoes.   
                                                 
15
 The location of this is given as "Pavloskogo Bay" in Lavkovsky (2000).  However, the facility names, and in some 
cases the activity levels, correspond exactly to those given for the Cape Sysoeva waste facility. 
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Figure 2-10:  Map of Kamchatka Oblast (inset shows naval facilities) (map source:  
www.expedia.com) 
There is considerably less information about the facilities near Petropavlovsk, and the 
identification of individual facilities given below is provisional.  Reports of naval nuclear support 
facilities in the Kamchatka Oblast mention Seldevaya Bay, Gornyak Shipyard, Shipyard 30, 
Primorye, Primorskoe, Petropavlovsk-55, Rybachiy, and Vilyuchinsk-3.  All of these facilities are 
located on the shores of Krasheninnikov Bay, as shown below.  There appear to be three separate 
facilities:  a shipyard on Seldevaya Bay, a refuelling and waste management facility similar to that 
located on Cape Sysoeva, and a naval base on the Vilyuchinsk peninsula.   
 
Rybachiy
Naval Base
Seldevaya Bay
Naval Shipyard
Kamchatka Refuelling
and Waste Management
Facility
   26
2.2.1 Seldevaya Bay Naval Shipyard  
The Seldevaya Bay Naval Shipyard is also referred to by OTA (1995) as "Shipyard 30" and the 
"Gornyak Shipyard" and by Handler (1994a) as Gornyak, Primorskoe and Petropavlovsk-55.  
Danilyan et al. (2000b) refers to this site as the "Primorskii ship repair plant" (Table 18) and as the 
"Town of Primorskii" (Table 19) and reports that it contains a PKDS (floating radiometric control 
station) with 20.6 m³ of SRW in containers, totalling 0.067 TBq, and 50 m³ of LRW with a total of 
0.017 TBq in tanks 1-4 (with a total capacity of capacity of 73.5 m³) of the Radiation Safety 
Service.  This description appears to correspond to the PKDS-60 in Seldevaya Bay reported by 
Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), which is reported to contain 25.6 m³ of SRW 
containing 0.058 TBq and 59.5 m³ of LRW containing 220 MBq.  Details are provided in Table 2-
17.  LRW on PKDS-60 is stored in two 25-m³ tanks and two 10-m³ tanks for high purity water.  
Low-activity SRW on the PKDS is stored in the storage facility.  SRW in containers is allowed to 
be stored at the open deck.  Although the PKDS tanks are officially only allowed to store LRW 
with specific activity less than 0.37 kBq/L, three of the four tanks exceed the allowable limits. 
Table 2-17: Inventory of the LRW on the PKDS-60 as of April 2000 (Lavkovsky (2000) and 
Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001)) 
Storage description Design capacity, m³ Filled volume, m³ Activity, Bq 
Specific activity, 
kBq/L 
Tank No.1 25 20 1.48x1008 7.4 
Tank No. 2 25 20 2.96x1007 1.5 
High purity water tank 10.5 10 1.85x1006 0.19 
Transportation tank 10 9.5 3.34x1007 3.5 
 
In addition, Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) report that there are eight 1 m³ 
SRW containers containing 630 MBq, one 0.6 m³ sorption column containing 0.011 TBq, three 3 
m³ solidified processed LRW packages containing 0.016 TBq, two 1 m³ primary circuit circulation 
pumps containing 740 MBq, and an SRW storage facility containing 6 m³ of SRW with a total of 
0.029 TBq.   
2.2.2 Kamchatka Refuelling and Waste Management Facility 
A refuelling and waste management facility (referred to by Handler (1994a) as Military Unit 
95051 and also as "Ground 3") is located on the southern shore of Krashenninikova Bay.  
According to Handler (1994a), the site opened in 1963-1964 and encompasses 50 km² in total.  
The actively used area comprises about 4-5 km² and contains three burial trenches, two piers, and 
facilities for refuelling and defuelling.  This facility appears to be the Kamchatka equivalent of the 
Cape Sysoeva facility in Primorskoe Territory. 
Danilyan et al. (2000b, Table 2) reports that there are five defuelled nuclear submarines and no 
three-compartment blocks at "Bukhta Seldevaya", which we presume is the waste management 
and refuelling facility.   
According to Lavkovsky (2000), there were two covered waste storage facilities at this site as of 
January 2000.  Each is designed to contain 1700 m³ of SRW in an area of 600 m².  Construction 16 
is a high activity waste storage that contained 250 m³ of waste with a total activity of 56 TBq as of 
January 2000.  Construction 19 is a storage site for low activity waste that is reported to contain 
100 m³ of waste with an activity of 2,200 TBq.  In addition, there is a burial site designed for 
storage of up to 600 m³ of medium activity SRW beyond the territory of the base.  It currently 
contains 600 m³ of waste with a total activity of 6.9 TBq.  This amounts to a total of 4000 m³ of 
storage capacity with 950 m³ in use containing 2,200 TBq.  In contrast, Danilyan et al. (2000b) 
reports that there is a total of 833.5 m³ of SRW at the base out of a total capacity of 3300 m³.  The 
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wastes are reported to consist of standard ionizing radiation sources, cases, steam generators, ion 
exchange cartridges, shells of protective rods, containers, etc.  The total activity is reported as 59 
TBq.  This is considerably lower than the total of 2,200 TBq reported by Lavkovsky (2000), 97% 
of which is reported to be in Construction 19.  However, it could be that the value reported by 
Lavkovsky (2000) for Construction 19 is a misprint. 
These are most likely the three burial sites reported by Handler (1994a); however, it is impossible 
to determine which facility in his report corresponds to which facility reported by Lavkovsky 
(2000).  Handler (1994a) reports that there are two "new" burial sites opened between 1984-1987, 
both of which are approximately 80 m x 40 m and 4.5 m deep and containing four sections.  The 
site was reported to hold LLW such as contaminated trash and equipment as well as spent ion-
exchange resins.  Although designed to be watertight, he reports that 80% of the cells have water 
in them.  He also reports on an "old" burial site referred to as the "burial site for high-level waste" 
which had ceased operations by 1987.  He reports that items which may be in this trench include 
metal containers containing damaged fuel and old neutron sources.  This site is the suspected 
source of leakage of radioactivity.  The same reference describes several other facilities, including 
a temporary dry storage facility, a fresh fuel storage facility, and a spent fuel facility known as 
Building № 5 intended for wet storage of spent nuclear fuel.  However, it has apparently never 
been used for this purpose and now houses the defuelling machine belonging to the base.  These 
facilities are not mentioned by Lavkovsky (2000), Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), or Danilyan et al. 
(2000b). 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) report that there are three service ships docked at nuclear support facilities 
in Kamchatka, all apparently at the refuelling and waste site. These are the PM-32 floating 
workshop and the two Project 1783A technological tankers TNT-23 and TNT-42 (also designated 
as the BNS-204900).  According to Lavkovsky (2000), the "Bay of Krashenninikov" (which we 
presume refers to the Seldevaya Bay Waste Management Facility) is home to the PM-32, the TNT-
23, the TNT-27, and the TNT-43.  As previously noted, the TNT-27 is elsewhere reported as being 
berthed at Pavlovsk Bay Naval Base, and we presume that it is currently located at Pavlovsk Bay.  
The PM-32 is a Project 326 non-self propelled floating workshop designed by the "Iceberg" CDB 
and built in 1966 by the 61 Communars Shipyard Production Association Nikolaev.  Forward 
storage and aft storage compartments for spent fuel were installed in the fourth compartment in 
1966.  Each compartment has 410 holders for spent fuel assemblies.  The spent fuel assemblies 
stored onboard the PM-32 are wedged, damaged, and in an emergency condition.  There is some 
inconsistency in the reported amount of fuel onboard the PM-32.  According to Zakharkin (1995), 
there were 126 fuel assemblies as of 1995.  This is also the figure used by Kobzev and Lavkovsky 
(2001) in which it is reported that the operation of the spent fuel assemblies onboard the PM-32 
was completed not later than in 1969 and that the total activity is 2,300 TBq. The activity given in 
Table 2-18 is based upon the assumption that they have reached the design generation.  However, 
Lavkovsky (2000) reports that the spent fuel assembly storage houses 126 damaged spent fuel 
assemblies in the bow storage plus an additional 101 spent fuel assemblies in the aft storage, 
totalling 1,800 TBq.  The results of both assessments are given below.  The point may however be 
moot, as it was planned to unload the PM-32, and Sivintsev (2000a) reports that a considerable 
portion had already been extracted.  The level of activity of the LRW is not consistent between the 
two available sources.  Danilyan et al. (2000b) reports that out of a capacity of 388.6 m³, 47 m³ of 
LRW containing 210 TBq of activity is present in Tanks No 1-4 and montejuses.  However, 
Lavkovsky (2000) reports only roughly a third of that amount (60 TBq total) is present in 49 m³.  In 
any event, it is clear that the PM-32 is a major source of LRW.  According to the data of Danilyan 
et al. (2000b), the water in the spent fuel storage tanks of the PM-32 contained 95% of the LRW 
(by activity) in the Russian Far East - including the shore-based LRW facilities.  With respect to 
solid waste, Lavkovsky (2000) reports that there was one 5-m³ SRW container containing 0.033 
TBq of activity stored onboard the PM-32 as of April 2000.  This is the same as that reported by 
Danilyan et al. (2000b).  The PM-32 is in critical condition, having probably the most severe 
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contamination problems of all the Russian Pacific Fleet floating workshops.  The degree of 
damage to the spent fuel assemblies is indicated by the fact that the specific activity of the water in 
the forward spent fuel storage tank increased by a factor of fifty over a period of two months.  The 
last routine repair was conducted in 1979, and a partial repair docking was conducted in 1994.  
Hull corrosion is severe, reaching up to 30% at the waterline.  Corrosion has also destroyed most 
of the equipment inside the hull.  The gamma-background in the spent fuel assembly storage 
compartment is 40 mR/h and beta-contamination is 1500 dpm/cm².  The exposure rate is 400 mR/h 
in the refrigeration plants spaces and fourth compartment hold, 30 mR/h in the sewage tank room, 
20 mR/h in the water flushing room, 18 mR/h on the aft bulkhead of the third compartment, 15 
mR/h on the forward bulkhead of the 5th compartment, and 10 mR/h on the upper deck of the 
fourth compartment in the strict control zone. The level of radioactivity in the cooling water is 890 
MBq/L in the forward spent fuel assembly storage tank and 2900 MBq/L in the aft spent fuel 
assembly storage tank.  The state of special systems in the spent fuel assembly storage units is 
unsatisfactory, as all of the systems to ensure nuclear and radiation safety and monitoring systems 
are defective due to long-term operation and absence of repair.   
Table 2-18:  Assessment of activity in spent fuel on the PM-32 
 
239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs Total 
Lavkovsky (2000) 2.2x1012 3.6x1011 5.0x1012 6.7x1011 7.6x1014 2.6x1014 8.0x1014 1.8x1015 
Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001)** 8.6x1011 9.7x1011 3.7x1013 3.5x1012 1.1x1015 5.7x1010 1.2x1015 2.3x1015 
* Conservative assessment based on 227 spent fuel assemblies (126 forward, 101 aft). 
** Based upon data from OKBM (1998) and 126 spent fuel assemblies 
 
Table 2-19:  LRW on the PM-32 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
Storage description 
Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in volume, 
m³ 
Activity, Bq Specific activity, kBq/L 
Bow spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 12 2.2x1012 1.8x105 
Aft spent fuel assembly storage tank 12.3 12 5.8x1013 4.8x106 
Sewage water tank No.1 23.5 13.5 5.0x109 370 
Sewage water tank No.2 23.5 11.8 1.0x1010 850 
 
According to Danilyan et al. (2000b), the Project 1783A technological tankers TNT-23 and TNT-
42 are berthed at Seldevaya Bay ("Bukhta Sel'devaya").  According to data from Kuzin and 
Nikolsky (1996) and Lavkovsky (2000), each of these vessels is 74.4 m long and 12 m wide, and 
displaces 2300 tons at a draft of 3.95 m. The vessels require a crew of 33, and can cruise for 1000 
km at a speed of 9 knots.  Top speed is 11 knots.  The tanks of special-purpose tankers are allowed 
to store LRW with specific activity up to 0.37 kBq/L. 
The TNT-23, built in 1968, has a design LRW capacity of 877.2 m³ consisting of eight tanks.  The 
inventory onboard the TNT-23 is reported in Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) 
and is fairly consistent with the value reported by Danilyan et al. (2000b), who reports a filled 
LRW volume of 678.66 m³ with a total radioactive inventory of 1.4 TBq contained in Tanks 1-9.  
However, it can be noted that the activity levels in the LRW on the ship exceed the allowable 
levels considerably, by over four orders of magnitude in some cases.  Danilyan et al. (2000b) also 
reports that there is 1.3 m³ of SRW containers in the "Zone of controlled radiation safety" 
containing 0.026 TBq. 
Table 2-20: LRW onboard the TNT-23 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001)) 
Storage description 
Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in 
volume, m³ Activity, Bq
Specific 
activity, kBq/L 
Tank No.1 105 55.8 3.3x1010 590 
Tank No.2  105 46.9 4.0x1010 850 
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Tank No.3 124.3 104 8.9x1009 85 
Tank No.4 124.3 112 5.0x1011 4,400 
Tank No.5 114.8 101 6.7x1011 6,700 
Tank No.6 114.8 100 7.8x1010 780 
Tank No.7 94.5 88.9 4.6x1010 520 
Tank No.8 94.5 69.8 1.3x1011 1,900 
Total 877.20 679 1.5x1012  
 
The TNT-42, built in 1968, has a design LRW capacity of 966 m³ in nine tanks.  The inventory 
onboard the TNT-42 is reported in Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001).  It 
appears that the vessel has been essentially emptied, as can be seen from the "filled volume" 
column.  The vessel holds a total of 0.8 m³ of LRW with 130 MBq of activity, which in 
comparison with the other tankers is essentially empty.  This would appear consistent with 
Danilyan et al. (2000b), who appears to report that the TNT-42 is empty.  However, because there 
is no data for Tanks 1,4 or 9 given in Lavkovsky (2000) and Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001), this 
cannot be confirmed. 
Table 2-21:  LRW onboard the TNT-42 (Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001)) 
Storage 
description 
Designed 
capacity, m³ 
Filled in 
volume, m³
Activity, 
Bq 
Specific 
activity, 
kBq/L 
Tank No.1 120  
Tank No.2  120 0.2 4.8x107 240 
Tank No.3 120 0.2 9.6x106 48 
Tank No.4 120  
Tank No.5 120 0.1 2.6x107 260 
Tank No.6 120 0.1 2.7x107 274 
Tank No.7 118 0.1 1.7x107 170 
Tank No.8 118 0.1 4.4x106 44 
Tank No.9 10  
2.2.3 Rybachy Naval Base 
There is relatively little information on the Rybachy Naval Base (Vilyuchinsk-3).  Danilyan et al. 
(2000b, Table 2) reports that there are seventeen nuclear submarines and no three-compartment 
blocks at the "Bukhta Krasheninnikov", which we presume is the naval base.  Three of these are 
defuelled and fourteen still contain fuel.  The estimated inventory of a single reactor core was 
previously given in Table 2-1.  The following information is given for the "Town of Rybachiy" in 
Danilyan et al. (2000b) 
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Table 2-22:  RW at the Rybachy Naval Base (adapted from Danilyan et al, 2000b) 
Object Type and No of storage or capacity. Volume, m³ (total/currently filled) 
Aggregate 
activity, Bq
Dosimetric control service Zone of controlled radiation safety, SRW Containers 1 1.5x1009 
Radiation safety service Tanks No 1,2 1000 / 52.3 1.0x1008 
Blocks*   - / 76.7 1.6x1010 
Withdrawn NS Apparatus enclosure, Driving gears and directors of reactivity control system - / 3.1 6.7x10
10
 
*may refer to components from decommissioned submarines; cf. Table 2-15 for information at Razboinik Bay 
2.3 Spent Fuel Storage Characteristics16 
Spent fuel in the Russian Pacific Fleet is stored both afloat and ashore.  There are two classes of 
ships in the Russian Pacific Fleet that contain spent fuel.  These ships are known as "floating 
workshops" ("plavuchaya masterskaya").  The Project 326 class ships are non-self propelled 
barges converted for use in refuelling nuclear submarines.  The Project 326M class ships are 
Project 326 barges with upgraded spent fuel handling and containerized storage facilities.  The 
later class of ships (Project 2020) was designed for submarine support.  Ships of this class are self-
propelled.  These are discussed in more detail below.  In addition, the transport casks presumed to 
be used for shore-based storage are discussed below. 
2.3.1 Shore Based Storage in Transport Casks 
In Lysenko et al. (2002), it is reported that the land-based storages rely on interim dry storage in 
transport casks.  Four types of special casks for holding and shipping spent nuclear fuel from naval 
reactors have been identified: TUK-11s, TUK-12s, TUK-12/3s, and TUK-18s.  The first three 
types are old spent fuel shipping containers.  TUK-11s are thick-walled hermetic cylinders made 
of corrosion-resistant steel, 2.8 m long and 0.9 m in diameter.  TUK-12s are of similar 
construction, although longer and thinner: 3.5 m long and 0.7 m in diameter.  Each TUK consists 
of two parts: a protective cover (the outward container) and a closed cylinder (internal casing).  
TUK-18s consist of a large thick-walled hermetic cylinder made of corrosion-resistant steel and an 
extricable part holding seven smaller cylindrical ChT-4 cases.  The large cylinder is 4.7 m long 
and 1.4 m in diameter with 300 mm thick sidewalls.  The extricable part holding the ChT-4 cases 
is 780 mm in diameter.  Each ChT-4 case holds seven fuel assemblies and weights 265 kg when 
empty.  The entire TUK-18 cask with the ChT-4 case then holds 49 spent fuel assemblies and 
weighs 40 MT when fully loaded. Using the data given in Table 2-1 on the inventory of a typical 
submarine core three years after shutdown, and assuming that each core contains 287 spent fuel 
assemblies, the typical inventory of TUK-18 loaded with spent fuel is provided in Table 2-23. 
 
Table 2-23:  Estimated isotopic inventory (Bq) of a TUK-18 fully loaded with spent fuel 
Radionuclide 238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 241Am 90Sr 134Cs 137Cs 144ɋе 106Ru 
Ɍ1/2,  years 87.7 24100 6540 14.4 432 29.1 2.06 30 0.78 1.01 
 Inventory (Bq) 7.0x1012 1.1x1012 7.0x1011 1.9x1014 1.9x1012 7.2x1014 3.2x1014 8.4x1014 3.9x1014 5.5x1013
 
                                                 
16
 Data on characteristics of support ships is summarized from Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) unless otherwise noted. 
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2.3.2 Project 326 Class Floating Workshops 
This class of ship comprises barges converted for nuclear service.  The modifications necessary for 
nuclear service were designed by the CDB "Iceberg" and carried out by the 61 Communars 
Shipyard Production Association Nikolaev.  Each vessel is 92 m long and 13.4 m wide, with a full 
displacement (4000 ton) draft of 4.5 m, and requires a crew of 59. 
On Project 326 class barges, spent fuel is stored in two compartments, arranged fore-and-aft 
(Drawing 326-490.2-2-1, CDB "Iceberg", St. Petersburg). Each compartment contains a tank that 
can contain up to 287 spent fuel assemblies in stationary holders.  The total spent fuel capacity of 
the floating workshop is therefore approximately 574 spent fuel assemblies, which represents 
approximately two cores of a first- or second-generation nuclear submarine.  Each floating 
workshop can therefore manage the fuel from one first or second-generation submarine.   
The storage is arranged in a specially shielded compartment in the forward part of the workshop 
between frames Nos. 36 and 49.  The forward compartment is 7.8 m long and about 6 m wide.  
The storage compartment is fitted with a double hull to reduce the likelihood of the loss of the 
storage tightness in the event of the workshop grounding or in case of collision with another 
vessel.  The space between the primary and secondary hull is about 1 m. There are also 3 m wide 
side cofferdams. A biological shield is fitted to the tank and is made of steel with a thickness of 
400 m on the bottom and 500 mm on the sides and top.  
The tanks have a diameter of about 2.5 m and a height of about 2 m.  The stationary holders are 
arranged along six circumferences.  The tops of the stationary holders are affixed to the tank cover.  
The bottom of the holders are held in place by a space grating that keeps them in place, preserving 
the assigned distance between them.  The system allowing loading of spent fuel assemblies into 
the holders comprises a system of guiding gears above the tank roof that are remotely rotated with 
the help of an electric drive.  The biological shielding is fitted with 6 removable plugs for loading 
of spent fuel assemblies to the holders.  The holders are arranged in six circles with radii 
corresponding to the removable plugs.  A 600 mm diameter cylindrical coolant water-distributing 
device is installed in the central part of the tanks.  High-purity distilled water is used as cooling 
water.  Water is supplied to the distributing device from the bottom.  In its top part there are outlets 
for release of cooling water for spent fuel assemblies. The cooling water is removed from the tanks 
through the conic bottom part of the tanks near the distributing device. Arrangement of cooling 
water supply and removal through the tank bottom allows their drainage without installation of 
additional systems or devices. The cooling water system includes both primary and backup heat 
exchangers cooled by seawater from the general ship cooling system, primary and backup VTsN-
80 circulation pumps, and pipelines with shut-off fixtures. The VTsN-80 circulation pumps can 
supply 50 m³/h of water at a head of 80 m. The storage compartments are equipped with a 
ventilation system that is connected to the ventilation system of the strict control zone.  The 
ventilation system is fitted with fine filters and exhausts through the top of the foremast. 
Project 326 and 326M class barges have essentially the same systems for LRW and SRW storage.  
The LRW and SRW storage facilities have no special-purpose cooling systems.  Air-conditioning 
systems are installed in the spaces where tanks with LRW or containers with SRW are located if 
operating conditions require long-term presence of personnel in them. All tanks with LRW and 
spaces for SRW storage are serviced by a uniform ventilation system of the strict control zone with 
air release in the top of the foremast after its passage through fine filters.  LRW specific activity 
should not exceed the following values: 
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Table 2-24:  Permissible levels for liquid radioactive waste storage on PM-326 floating 
workshops 
System Allowable Level, kBq/L 
Circuit water tanks 3.7x105 
Spent fuel assembly tanks, equipment post-decontamination water tanks, over-flow  
spent fuel assembly  and control ones 
3,700 
Waste and treated water tanks 37 
Special laundry  and special shower water tanks 0.37 
 
SRW storage facilities comprise a special storage with five containers for storage of 2 sets of spent 
containers for the control and shielding system, thermometers and suspensions with ionisation 
chambers.  Storage of SRW in containers is allowed on the upper deck of the workshop, if 
required.   
2.3.3 Project 326M Class Floating Workshops 
The Project 326M class barges are modified Project 326 class barges (hence the "Project 326M" 
designation) that were refitted between 1970 and 1975.  The retrofit primarily affected the spent 
fuel storage tanks, as shown in "Storage facility for spent technological channels, drawing 326M-
283-06, CDB "Iceberg", St. Petersburg).  Instead of 287 stationary holders, 41 ChT-4 removable 
containers were installed in the storage tanks.  Each container contains seven spent fuel assemblies 
of first- or second-generation nuclear submarines.  The total spent fuel capacity of the floating 
workshop is therefore approximately 574 spent fuel assemblies, which represents approximately 
two cores of a first- or second-generation nuclear submarine.  Each floating workshop can 
therefore manage the fuel from one first- or second-generation submarine. 
The spent fuel storage tanks are larger, with a diameter of about 2.8 m and a height of about 3 m.  
The removable containers are arranged along 3 circumferences and are held in position by top and 
bottom space gratings.  The upper biological shielding is penetrated by openings for loading 
containers to the tank.  These openings are coaxial to the openings in the space gratings and are 
closed by protective plugs, which also allow fixing of the containers in the tank with sealing of the 
holder - upper space grating assembly.  The tanks are filled with high purity distilled water.  A 
cylinder with openings in the top and bottom is welded into the center of the tank and contains a 
heat exchanger for cooling the tank water.  Forced circulation of tank water is not provided.  
Cooling water is supplied and removed from the heat exchanger through the top above the 
biological shielding.  A fresh water circuit cools the heat exchangers in the tank with both primary 
and backup NTsV-63/30 electric pumps.  The freshwater cooling loop contains a primary and a 
backup heat exchanger that are cooled by seawater from the general ship cooling system. A water 
level signalling device and a thermal gauge are installed to allow monitoring the water temperature 
and the level of water in the spent fuel storage tank. The removable containers are also filled with 
high purity distilled water and are sealed hermetically by a cover.  A pipeline running from the 
center of the tank bottom to its sidewall is used for filling and draining the tanks. As in the Project 
326 class barges, the storage compartments are equipped with a ventilation system that is 
connected to the ventilation system of the strict control zone.  The ventilation system is fitted with 
fine filters and exhausts through the top of the foremast. 
The systems for LRW and SRW storage are essentially the same as those on the unmodified PM-
326 class ships, as discussed in the previous section. 
2.3.4 Project 2020 (“Malina”) Class Floating Workshops 
The Project 2020 class floating workshops represent a newer generation of support ships which 
were designed for servicing (including defueling and refueling) of nuclear submarines.  A Project 
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2020 Class ship was shown in Figure 2-6.  The vessels are 137.8 m long and 21 m wide with a full 
displacement draft of 7 m at the full displacement of 13,900 tons.  The vessel requires a crew of 
218 and can cruise for 45 days or 13,000 miles at a speed of 10 knots.  The top vessel speed is 
given as 11.5 knots. 
The spent fuel assembly storage facility (Drawing 2020-283-088SB, CDB "Iceberg", St-
Petersburg) on the workshop consists of 4 compartments (tanks), each of which can house 51 ChT-
4 removable containers similar to those on the project 326M vessels.   Although Kobzev and 
Lavkovsky (2001) states that these ships are designed to hold 582.1 m³ of LRW and cores from one 
nuclear submarine or one surface vessel, the reported inventories and the description above 
indicate that they are capable of storing considerably more.  It would appear that the capacity is 
approximately 1428 spent fuel assemblies, or approximately five first/second generation cores (at 
least two nuclear submarines). 
Each compartment is rectangular with a length of about 2.8 m, a width of about 3.5 m, and a height 
of about 4.8 m. The total cooling water volume is approximately 32 m³.  The biological shielding 
is constructed of 400-500 mm thick steel.  A 650 mm diameter cylindrical cooling water 
distribution device is welded at the centre of the compartment. It has up to 4 oval orifices of 400 x 
200mm size each in the top and bottom parts, in which a heat exchanger for cooling the water in 
the compartment is installed.  The cooling system is chilled by seawater from the ship general 
cooling system with the aid of two NTsV-160/20A-P pumps and two TK600/90-1 heat 
exchangers.  The water level and temperature in the compartment are monitored. A pipe line for 
filling and draining of the compartment is also installed. The cooling and ventilation systems are 
similar to those of the project 326M workshops.   
The liquid radioactive waste storage capacity of the Project 2020 class workshops comprises four 
40 m³ compartments (tanks) for spent fuel assemblies, a 3.8 m³ overflow tank for the spent fuel 
assembly storage tanks, a 33.5 m³ decontamination water tank, two tanks (57 m³ and 20.5 m³) of 
acid (post-decontamination) waste waters from spaces, two tanks (24.5 m³ and 29 m³) of alkaline 
(post-decontamination) waters, a 29 m³ special laundry water tank, an 18.2 m³sanitary control 
station water tank, three treated water tanks (two 82.6 m³ tanks and a 29 m³ tank), and two 6.2 m³ 
control (inspection) tanks. 
For solid radioactive waste storage, there are four shielded special cells for storage of containers 
from the control and shielding system, thermometers, and suspensions of ionisation chamber and 
thermocouples; a container in a space for preparation of the dismantled equipment; and special 
cells for SRW storage. 
2.4 Conclusions 
There are significant variations between reported descriptions of the radiological situation in the 
Russian Far East.  The task of developing a reliable source term is hampered by the variety of 
names used to refer to different facilities, the inconsistencies between reported inventories from 
different sources, and the omissions in reports of important facilities.  For example, any discussion 
of the spent fuel situation at the Russian Pacific Fleet bases that did not include Building 30 would 
miss the largest single source in the Russian Far East17.  There are no data on spent fuel storage on 
shore in Kamchatka.  It is unclear if this is because there is no spent fuel in storage at Kamchatka 
                                                 
17
 Consideration of SNF aboard all non-defuelled submarines at a facility could yield higher total inventories.  
However, it is difficult to imagine a common mode failure that would affect all submarines, or even more than one 
core on a single submarine.  In contrast, depending upon the conditions of storage, all stored fuel elements in a single 
building could be affected by a common mode failure, such as an airplane crash or a major fire.  There is also 
presumably considerably less provision for containment in the spent fuel storage buildings.  When submarines are laid 
up, the spent fuel is isolated from the environment by at least two major barriers:  the reactor pressure vessel and the 
pressure hull of the submarine, which is designed to be made air- and watertight. 
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or because it is not reported.  It would be very useful to clarify the status of the PM-32 and the 
PM-80, as these are major sources both of damaged spent fuel and of LRW.  If the damaged fuel 
has been removed, it would be useful to know how the damaged fuel is being managed.   
Despite these problems, it has been possible to draw a general picture of the sources of radioactive 
contamination in the Russian Far East.  Spent fuel contributes the vast majority of the radioactive 
inventory.  Much of this appears to be in land-based dry storage – probably in transport casks - 
although considerable amounts are stored in the holds of floating workshops or remains in non-
defuelled submarines.  Although details of the source term at the Cape Sysoeva waste facility are 
not given, it is clear that this is a major source of radioactivity.   
In almost all cases, there are a few large sources that dominate all others.  For spent fuel and solid 
radioactive waste, the inventories are dominated by the Cape Sysoeva facility.  The largest single 
source of radioactivity in spent fuel is Building 30.  For solid radioactive waste, the dominant 
sources are constructions 1-5, 7, 31, and 32, all of which contain more that 1,000 TBq and which 
together constitute 99% by activity (11,000 TBq) of the solid radioactive waste in the Russian Far 
East18.  The vast majority (97.5%) of the reported radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste 
is onboard the two floating workshops containing damaged spent fuel, with most of this being 
onboard the PM-32 (210 TBq out of a total of 220 TBq, or 95%) (Danilyan et al. 2000b, Table 
18).   
Most of the ships are in extremely poor condition and are storing wastes for which they were not 
designed.  The PM-80 and PM-32 had contained wedged and damaged fuel.  It is worth noting that 
the major problems with wedged damaged fuel are associated with the unmodified PM-326 class 
ships that store fuel assemblies separately.  It is not clear if this implies that the upgrades to 
containerized fuel in removable cases solved the problem of wedged fuel or if the fuel on the PM-
125, PM-133, and PM-74 is simply wedged in the removable containers rather than in the tank 
itself.  The technological tankers store wastes dramatically in excess of their allowable limits, by 
up to four orders of magnitude.  Basic systems for vessel safety to prevent fires or flooding or to 
monitor wastes are out of order.  Fires have broken out on ships on several occasions, including 
onboard the PM-80 in 1999 (Kudrik, 1999) and onboard a decommissioned submarine as recently 
as November 2002 (Interfax, 2002). 
                                                 
18
 Or 83% of a total inventory of 13,000 TBq, depending upon the true inventory of Construction 19 in Kamchatka.  
The inventory of Construction 19 in Kamchatka needs to be clarified, as the discrepancy has a significant impact on 
the results. 
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3 Transboundary Atmospheric Transport 
Main Contributors: Alexander Mahura, V. Mordashev, A. Pechkurov, Vanya Romanova, and 
Makoto Takano 
Edited by Keith Compton 
 
The previous chapter provided a discussion of the potential sources of radioactive contamination.  
Work has also been carried out in the framework of the Far Eastern Study to evaluate the 
likelihood of transboundary transport and to scope the potential impacts to neighboring countries.  
An evaluation of the environmental conditions in the Russian Far East, including the regional 
climatology, was prepared by V. Mordashev and A. Pechkurov based on publications of the Far 
East Geological Institue (Mordashev and Pechkurov 2000).  This work has been supplemented by 
evaluations provided by Romanova and Takano (2002) and Mahura (2002).  In this chapter, the 
probability that contamination released into the atmosphere will reach surrounding countries is 
assessed based upon the work reported in Mahura (2002) and a scoping analysis of the potential 
deposition and doses in the case of atmospheric transport from a site in the region of Vladivostok 
to the Japanese Islands is provided based upon the work of Takano et al. (2001) and Romanova 
and Takano (2002). 
3.1 Climactic Settings 
The Primorye region lies in the monsoon belt of the temperate climate zone. The typical winter 
and summer surface pressure patterns are shown in Figures 3-1a and 3-1b, respectively.  The 
annual average atmospheric humidity is 71%.  The annual average precipitation is 770 mm.  
Precipitation greater than 0.1 mm occurs, on average, 115 days per year.  Light breezes (2 - 3 
m/sec) are the most common winds in the region, although winds can reach almost hurricane force.  
The maximum sustained wind velocity observed at Vladivostok has been registered as 34 m/sec 
and gusts of up to 38 m/sec have been recorded.  Based on statistical analysis of historical data, 
there is a 5% probability in any given year of wind velocity exceeding 41 m/sec.  The weather in 
the region is dominated by the movement of several large atmospheric systems, resulting in two 
seasons (a cold, dry winter and a warm, wet summer) with relatively consistent wind patterns, with 
transitional periods in the spring and fall.  These are discussed in more detail below. 
Winters are relatively short, cold, and dry, with both the lowest average temperature (-20° C) and 
the lowest monthly average precipitation (15.4 mm) observed in January.  Figure 3-1a shows the 
mean January sea surface pressure system.  A large high-pressure system (anticyclone) known as 
the Asian High covers most of northeastern Asia during the winter.  It is a shallow low-level 
phenomenon (up to 500 hPa) and is the strongest one in the Northern Hemisphere during the 
winter season.  A low-pressure zone known as the Aleutian Low dominates the northern part of the 
Pacific Ocean.  The location of these pressure fields results in a flow of cold, dry continental air 
from the mainland to the ocean (winter monsoon) from the Asian High to the Aleutian Low.  
Another low-pressure system (the Equatorial Low) is situated near Australia and New Guinea. The 
southward streaming from the Asian High to the Equatorial Low can influence the wind system, 
causing the air masses to move south and influence Korea.   
As a result of this circulation, the typical winter weather in the region is characterized by relatively 
clear skies and limited precipitation with strong, recurrent (70%) northern and northwestern winds.  
The average cloud cover ranges from 20% - 40%, with upper and mid-level clouds predominating.  
The maximum wind velocities are observed in winter.  The monthly average wind velocity in  
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Figure 3-1a:  January Sea Surface Pressure (image source:  
http://www.cdc.noaa.gov/cgi-bin/DataMenus.pl?stat=mon.ltm&dataset=NCEP) 
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Figure 3-1b: July Sea Surface Pressure (image source: 
 http://www.cdc.noaa.gov/cgi-bin/DataMenus.pl?stat=mon.ltm&dataset=NCEP) 
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January ranges from 5 to 8 m/sec.  Strong winds (exceeding 14 m/sec) are observed with a 
recurrence of 14% on the coast and 5% in enclosed bays.  Winters are colder than in the regions of 
the European Russia located at the same latitude.  The average monthly temperature on the 
southern  coast in January ranges from –10o to –13oC. The absolute minimum temperatures are –
31oC in Vladivostok and –46oC in Ussuriysk.  However, thaws may occur on the coast even in the 
most severe winters and last for three or four days, with temperatures rising up to +8oC.  The 
lowest relative humidity is observed in December and January, with an average value in January of 
only 61%.  During October through March the total average precipitation on the coast is over 129 
mm, only 17% of the annual total.  The driest months are January and February, when the monthly 
average precipitation is less than 20 mm. In winter precipitation occurs mainly as snow.  The snow 
cover lasts on average 77 days, with an average depth of about 68 cm.  Snowstorms are infrequent.  
On average, 4 to 14 snowstorms are observed per year (two to four per month) and occur mainly 
between November and January.  The snowstorms are often accompanied by winds exceeding 14 
m/sec and air temperatures below -10oC, and last for four to nine hours.  In the spring, a change in 
atmospheric circulation occurs as the atmospheric pressure centers begin to shift position.  This 
causes a rather unstable wind regime with low air temperatures and infrequent precipitation. 
Southerly winds begin to recur more frequently, accompanied by a rise in relative humidity.  
Average temperatures rise above freezing across most of the territory by late March.  In April the 
average temperature ranges from 2o to 6oC, and in May from 6o to 12oC.  Daily high temperatures 
in May can rise to 30oC.    
An extensive low-pressure system dominates much of Asia in the region of Northern India, 
Pakistan and Southwest China (Figure 3-1b) during the summer.  A subtropical high-pressure 
system is situated in the northern Pacific east of Japan.  Summers are relatively cloudy with 
frequent rain.   The warmest month is July, with an average temperature of 25° C.  In the city of 
Vladivostok, the average precipitation from July to September exceeds 100 mm per month, with 
the highest monthly precipitation (148.7 mm) observed in August.     
In contrast to the winter, warm and wet masses of air flow from the ocean onto the mainland 
during the summer monsoon.  Summers are therefore characterized by higher rainfall, more 
overcast weather, and weaker, more variable southerly and southeasterly winds.  In summers the 
average cloud cover increases up to 70% - 90%, with low-level clouds predominating.  In July the 
winds are mild and generally do not exceed 2 - 6 m/sec.  Strong winds (>14 m/sec) are observed 
with a recurrence of between 2-9% on the coast and less than once per year in enclosed bays.  The 
greatest amount of precipitation (641 mm, or ~83%) occurs during the warm period.  The relative 
humidity is highest between June and August, with the July monthly average reaching 89%.  
August is the warmest summer month on the coast of the territory, with an average daily 
temperature of 24oC and a maximum of 35oC.  
In the first half of the summer monsoon (June and July) air flowing from the Sea of Okhotsk (cf. 
Figure 1-1) results in cool, overcast, and drizzly weather with southerly and southeasterly winds 
prevailing.  A cold ocean current flows along the coast resulting in relatively frequent (10-22% 
recurrence) and long (up to ten hours) periods of mist and fog, predominately during nights and in 
the morning.  In the protected bays the recurrence of mists is much less.  The relative humidity 
increases rapidly between May and June, with steady rain predominating in the first half of 
summer.  The temperature in July averages 14oC to 21oC.  In the second half of the summer, from 
the middle of July till September, air masses originating from the east and south result in warm 
(temperatures often above 25oC), wet (80–90% humidity) weather with periods of intense 
precipitation caused by typhoons and southeast cyclones.  The typhoon season is from June till 
November, with approximately 75% of the typhoons occurring in August and September.  The 
passing of a tropical cyclone is accompanied by a thick cloud cover with very heavy and 
continuous showers, and by very rough seas. The sharp changes of atmospheric pressure can cause 
sea level fluctuations with a period lasting from several minutes to one hour.  In gulfs and bays, 
the value of such fluctuations range from 0.2 to 0.5 m, and in rare cases can reach 0.7 to 1.0 m.  In 
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the Sea of Japan tropical cyclones come from the southwest.  About 16% of all observed cyclones 
enter the northern Sea of Japan and the Primorye Territory.  However, even tropical cyclones in 
the southern part of the Sea of Japan can influence weather in this region, resulting in strong rains 
and storm force winds.  On average, from three to eleven thunderstorms are expected per year, and 
these occur mainly during the summer.  Thunderstorms typically last from 1 to 1.8 hours, but 
storms lasting 10-12 hours have been recorded. 
The air temperature begins to decrease starting from the middle of August, although autumn is 
much warmer than spring.  Daily high temperatures in September averages 12o - 16oC.  In October 
the daily high temperature ranges from 8oC to 10oC.  The relative humidity begins to decrease in 
September.  In the autumn (sometimes up to the end of November) the weather is warm, dry, and 
sunny. Average air temperatures drop below freezing in November, leading back into the winter 
weather pattern.   
The Kamchatka region shares some general characteristics with the weather of the southern 
Primorye Territory due to the impact of the major synoptic systems discussed above.  However, 
the climate of Kamchatka is much more more diverse and unstable.  Surrounded by seas, the 
Kamchatka Peninsula has a relatively mild climate in relation to its latitude.  The coastal areas of 
Kamchatka exhibit a maritime climate.  However, there are very few warm days in Kamchatka.  In 
the coastal areas, the temperature exceeds 20°ɋ on average only one to six times per summer.  The 
highest temperature in the coast and on islands is observed in August.  Thaws are frequently 
observed in January and February, during which the temperature can rise up to +5°C.  Cyclones 
coming from the southeastern coast exert a considerable impact on the climate of Kamchatka. 
They bring warm and moist air from the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea, resulting in snowfalls, 
continuous snowstorms and strong gales.  Precipitation on Kamchatka is higher than in any other 
region of Russia, but with enormous spatial variability. In contrast to Primorye Territory, more 
precipitation occurs in the winter than during the summer.  The greatest amount of precipitation - 
up to 2500 mm per year - falls on the mountain slopes in the south of the peninsula.  In the central 
Kamchatka lowland, protected from the effect of cyclones by the Middle and Eastern Ridges, 
precipitation is less, reaching only 400 mm per year. In the northeastern coastal area this index 
makes 500-600 mm per one year.  In winter, weather conditions are very much unsteady that may 
be expressed, for example, by sudden snowfalls and strong winds.  The monthly snowfall or more 
can be accumulated within a single day.  The summer on Kamchatka may turn out rainy.  
3.2 Probability of Transport: Trajectory Analyses 
The likelihood that contamination released into the atmosphere in the region of either Vladivostok 
or the Kamchatka Region could reach neighboring countries was evaluated by Mahura (2002).  An 
atmospheric trajectory model was used to calculate trajectories originating over the main locations 
in Primorye Territory and Kamchatka Oblast.  A statistical analysis consisting of exploratory, 
cluster, and probability field analyses was then used to explore the structure of the set of modeled 
trajectories.  The purpose of the analysis was to evaluate the general atmospheric airflow patterns 
and the characteristics of the atmospheric transport (e.g., the number of trajectories and/or days 
throughout the year when released air parcels might reach specified regions, predominant 
atmospheric layers for transport, average and minimum transport times, etc) from the naval nuclear 
facilities in the Russian Far East.  We also investigated the variations in seasonal, monthly, and 
annual flow patterns to better characterize the uncertainty in these trajectories.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, each of the two regions contain a number of facilities.  Because these 
facilities are close to each other in relation to the model grid (one degree grid spacing, which is 
approximately 100 km) used for evaluating atmospheric trajectories, the facilities were grouped 
into two Nuclear Risk Sites (NRS) for modeling purposes.  The Vladivostok NRS (VNRS) 
comprises the Far Eastern Plant Zvezda, the Pavlovsk Bay naval base, the ship repair facilities in 
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Chazhma and Razboinik Bays, and the waste management facility at Cape Sysoeva.  The 
Kamchatka NRS (KNRS) comprises the Gornyak Shipyard, the Seldevaya Bay Waste 
Management Facility, and the Rybachiy submarine base.  For atmospheric transport modeling, the 
geographical coordinates of the VNRS are taken as 42° 55’N and 132° 25’E (see Figure 3-2), and 
those of the KNRS are taken as 52° 55’N and 158° 30’E.  The geographical region of interest for 
modeling impacts on potential receptor countries covers the North Pacific region from 2.5° to 
77°N latitude and 90°E to 82.5°W longitude.  This region includes Japan, Korea, eastern Russia, 
northeastern China, and parts of the USA (primarily the state of Alaska and the Pacific coast).  
3.2.1 Methodology 
3.2.1.1 Specification of regions of potential impact 
Due to the large amount of radioactive material present in the Russian Far East, a major accident at 
one of these facilities followed by a release of radioactive material could result in adverse impacts 
in neighboring countries.  A complete evaluation of such an accident requires an evaluation of 
both the probability of such an event, the probability of impacts to the individual neighboring 
regions, and the evaluation of potential consequences in the neighboring regions.  This study 
comprises an evaluation of the probability and characteristics of long-range atmospheric transport 
from the nuclear risk sites near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy counties to the 
different receptor regions.   
For this study, we defined (as shown in Figure 3-2) five regions (Japan, Korea, China, Aleutian 
Chain Islands, and the state of Alaska) as the regions of the NRS potential impact.  The regions of 
interest were defined by setting bounding boxes (an eastern and western boundary and a northern 
and southern boundary) to enclose the specified regions.  A more precise delineation of the 
geographical regions could be achieved by the use of a GIS.  This would allow a more precise 
evaluation of trajectory passages through the selected country’s borders.  However, in light of the 
uncertainties in trajectory modeling and for purposes of a scoping evaluation, the definition of 
impact regions by the use of latitude vs. longitude paralellograms was considered adequate. 
Japan was divided into three major sub-regions comprising the northern (140-145°E vs. 38-45°N), 
central (136-142°E vs. 33-38°N), and southern (130-136°E vs. 30-36°N) territories of Japan. 
These include the islands and adjacent seashores.  In a similar manner, the Korean peninsula was 
divided into two areas, comprising North (124-130°E vs. 38-43°N) and South (125-130°E vs. 34-
38°N) Korea. Due to more complex configuration of the Chinese border, we defined two areas. 
The first is the region of China bordering Primorye Territory close to Vladivostok, which we 
defined as the Northern Chinese Territories (120-132°E vs. 43-48°N).  The second, more distant 
region was defined as Central Shoreline China (112-124°E vs. 31-43°N). For the USA, we 
considered only two northern regions – the Aleutian Chain Islands (170E-160°W vs. 50-55°N) and 
the western territories of the State of Alaska (166-150°W vs. 55-72°N).  The west coast of the 
continental US19 was not considered because the trajectory travel times averaged more than five 
days to reach this region.  Because of the questionable accuracy of trajectory calculations after five 
days, and because of constraints on computer resources used for statistical analysis of the longer 
series, trajectories reaching the west coast were not analyzed.   
3.2.1.2 Isentropic trajectory modeling  
Each computed atmospheric trajectory represents the movement of an air parcel in time and space, 
which we take as an estimate of the motion of the center of a diffusing cloud.  Modeling of fully 
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 California, Oregon, and Washington. 
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three-dimensional trajectories is complex and requires incorporation of a large number of variables 
and parameters into the simulation.  There are a few simplified approaches to model atmospheric  
 
   
 
(a) Western North Pacific region (b) Eastern North Pacific region 
Figure 3-2: Geographical impact regions 
trajectories.  Two commonly used approaches are isobaric trajectory modeling and isentropic 
trajectory modeling (Danielsen, 1961).  For isobaric trajectories, it is assumed that air parcels 
move along constant pressure surfaces.  For isentropic trajectories, it is assumed that air parcels 
move along constant potential temperature surfaces.  Our study used an isentropic approach.  
Although this type of trajectory model requires the assumption of adiabatically moving air parcels 
and neglects various physical effects, it is still a useful research tool for evaluating airflow patterns 
within meteorological systems on various scales (Merrill et al., 1985; Harris & Kahl, 1990; 
Harris & Kahl, 1994; Jaffe et al., 1997a; Mahura et al., 1997a; Jaffe et al., 1997b; Mahura et al., 
1999 and others). Some uncertainties in these models are related to the interpolation of 
meteorological data from sparse measurements, the applicability of the horizontal and vertical 
scales, and assumptions on vertical transport (Merrill et al., 1986; Draxler, 1987; Kahl, 1996).  
More detail about the methods of computation, accuracy, and applications of trajectory models is 
given in an excellent review prepared by Stohl (1998). 
The model grid domain selected for this study, covering the North Pacific territories with adjacent 
countries and seas, is located between 2.5° -77° N and 90° E-82.5° W.  We extracted data covering a 
period of 10 years (1987-1996) from the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) 
Global Tropospheric Analyses dataset DS082.0 for use as input meteorological data.  More 
information about the DS082.0 dataset can be found at http://dss.ucar.edu/datasets/ds082.0/ and in 
publications by Baker, 1992; Trenberth & Olson, 1988; and Randel, 1992.  We interpolated the 
original gridded wind fields to potential temperature (isentropic) surfaces by applying a technique 
described by Merrill et al., 1986.  All forward isentropic trajectories from the nuclear risk sites 
regions were computed twice per day (at 00 and 12 UTC20) at sixteen different potential 
temperature levels.  These levels ranged from 255 ° K to 330 ° K with a 5 ° K interval.  We calculated 
four trajectories per site per temperature level per time step.  The use of four trajectories permitted 
an evaluation of the consistency of the wind field in the direction of the atmospheric transport.  
The initial points of trajectories are located at each corner of a 1 ° x 1°  of latitude vs. longitude box, 
where the NRS is in the center of the box.  Overall, a total of 467,200 trajectories 
(10x365x2x16x4) were computed for each NRS. All trajectories chosen for further statistical 
analysis have duration of five days.  We decided to limit trajectories to five days because 1) the 
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 Universal Coordinated Time 
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quality and accuracy of trajectory calculations drops significantly after five days, 2) observing 
development frames of the synoptic scales systems in the North Pacific region, and 3) the relative 
proximity of the analyzed NRS impact geographical regions from the sites of interest. 
We should note that quality of trajectory calculation is highly dependent on the quality of the 
original NCEP fields, which have a resolution of 2.5° latitude by 2.5° longitude.  In particular, the 
computed trajectories may not reflect the contribution of the frontal passages and local terrain 
phenomena.  In addition, although we used all calculated trajectories for the further analysis, we 
should note that here are differences in the representation of the general flow along trajectories.  
The flow is considered to be reasonably consistent along the transport pathway if all four 
trajectories show a similar direction of transport for one time period (as shown in Figure 3-3a). 
Trajectories showing a strong divergence of flow are defined as “complex trajectories” (as shown 
in Figure 3-3b).  These trajectories reflect more uncertainties in the air parcel motion.  
 
 
 
(a) consistent air flow (b) complex trajectories 
Figure 3-3: Examples of trajectories 
For both NRS the most probable release heights in a case of an accidental release would be within 
the surface layer of atmosphere (i.e., within the first hundred meters above the ground) provided 
that there would be no intense thermal forces or meteorological conditions driving the release to 
higher altitudes.  Therefore, at the next step, from all isentropic trajectories we selected only those 
trajectories originating within this layer.  This results in approximately 29,000 trajectories per site.  
Trajectories originating at the top of the boundary layer (~1.5 km above sea level) were selected to 
study altitudinal variations in the flow patterns.  
3.2.1.3 Data analysis 
Two main analyses were performed on the computed trajectories in order to evaluate the 
atmospheric transport patterns.  Cluster analysis was used to divide calculated trajectories into 
groups that represent major airflow patterns.  A probabilistic analysis was then carried out to 
evaluate the likelihood of phenomena of interest such as fast transport. 
Cluster analysis comprises a variety of multivariate statistical analysis techniques that can be used 
to explore the structure within data sets (Romesburg, 1984).  In this study, we used the technique 
that was applied in Jaffe et al. (1997a), Jaffe et al. (1998), Mahura et al. (1999a), and Baklanov et 
al. (2002) to summarize the airflow patterns for the Vladivostok and Kamchatka regions.  The 
analyses were carried out on a monthly, seasonal, and annual basis, as well as for the entire ten-
year period of 1987-1996.  The results of the cluster analysis are presented in Section 3.2.2.2. 
The second type of analysis was the construction of probabilistic fields in order to estimate the 
likelihood of phenomena of interest.  Two types of probabilistic fields were constructed.  Airflow 
fields were constructed to provide a general overview of the likely direction of the radioactive 
cloud’s transport as well as the probability that it would reach or pass any particular geographical 
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area.  The second field represents the typical transport time to different regions.  The final field 
represents the relative likelihood of the fast movement of air parcels during the first day of 
transport.  To construct these fields we used latitude, longitude, altitude, and time step values for 
each five-day and single day trajectory.  The results of the probabilistic analysis are presented in 
sections 3.2.2.3 (airflow), 3.2.2.4 (transport time), and 3.2.2.5 (fast transport).  In our study, 
analysis for each site was performed for the period of 1987-1996 and by seasons.  A complete 
description of the method used to construct the different fields can be found in Mahura (2002) and 
Mahura et al. (2002) 
3.2.2 Results And Discussion 
3.2.2.1 Nuclear risk sites possible impact 
The analysis of the probability of the NRSs impact comprises five elements: 
1. the number and percentage of trajectories reaching the boundaries of the chosen geographical 
regions 
2. the number and percentage of days that at least one trajectory originating from the release site 
had reached the region21. 
3. the average transport time of air parcels to reach these regions.  
4. the probability of transport within different atmospheric layers.  
5. the likelihood of very rapid (fast) transport of air parcels, i.e. transport in one day or less.  
A summary of the transport from the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs to the chosen 
geographical regions is shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2   
 
 
                                                 
21
 Note that this is different than 1), in that there are 128 trajectories originating in any given day. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of atmospheric transport from the Kamchatka NRS to geographical regions during 1987-1996 
 
Parameter vs. Region 
North 
Japan 
Central 
Japan 
South 
Japan 
North 
Korea 
South 
Korea 
North 
China 
Seashore 
China 
Aleutian 
Chain 
Alaska 
State 
Trajectories reached regions 
# (%) of trajectories 
612 
(2.3) 
67 
(0.3) 
39 
(0.2) 
111 
(0.4) 
48 
(0.2) 
287 
(1.1) 
105 
(0.4) 
7813 
(29.9) 
3511 
(13.4) 
Days when trajectories reach regions 
# (%) of days 
291 
(8.0) 
40 
(1.1) 
22 
(0.6) 
60 
(1.6) 
28 
(0.8) 
133 
(3.6) 
52 
(1.4) 
1964 
(53.8) 
1172 
(32.1) 
Transport time  
Average –  std.dev. (in days) 4.3 – 2.2 5.4 – 2.3 5.3 – 2.0 5.0 – 2.1 5.3 – 1.7 4.8 – 2.4 6.3 – 2.1 3.0 – 2.2 5.1 – 2.3 
Higher occurrence of transport (months) Dec-Apr Jan-Mar Nov-Feb Nov-Feb Nov-Feb Nov-Mar Nov-Mar Apr-Nov Jul-Aug 
Higher occurrence of boundary transport 
(months) Dec-Mar Jan-Mar Nov-Feb Jan-Feb Nov Mar Mar Apr-Nov May-Aug 
Fast Transport events (# (%) of trajectories 
reaching the region within one day) 
15 
(2.5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1886 
(24.1) 
3 
(0.1) 
Transport within boundary layer (%  of 
trajectories reaching the boundary layer of 
the specified region) 
42.5 47.8 69.2 7.2 43.8 9.8 6.7 53.1 26.9 
 
Table 3-2: Summary of atmospheric transport from the Vladivostok NRS to geographical regions during 1987-1996 
 
Parameter vs. Region North Japan 
Central 
Japan South Japan 
North 
Korea 
South 
Korea North China 
Seashore 
China 
Aleutian 
Chain 
Alaska 
State 
Trajectories reached regions 
# (%) of trajectories 
7249 
(31.9) 
1674 
(7.4) 
754 
(3.3) 
1435 
(6.3) 
777 
(3.4) 
7891 
(34.7) 
512 
(2.3) 
2234 
(9.8) 
1232 
(5.4) 
Days when trajectories reach regions 
# (%) of days 
1919 
(53.5) 
669 
(18.3) 
338 
(9.3) 
458 
(12.5) 
283 
(7.8) 
3174 
(86.9) 
189 
(5.2) 
822 
(22.5) 
525 
(14.4) 
Transport time 
Average –  std.dev. (in days) 1.6 – 1.5 1.8 – 1.8 2.5 – 2.0 2.0 – 1.9 2.8 – 2.1 0.5 – 1.4 3.9 – 2.3 5.7 – 2.2 7.0 – 1.8 
Higher occurrence of transport (months) Dec-Mar, May 
Dec-Mar 
May 
Mar-June, 
Aug-Oct May-Sep 
May-June, 
Aug-Oct May-Sep June-Sep 
May, 
Aug-Oct 
May, 
Aug-Oct 
Higher occurrence of boundary transport 
(months) Win-Spr 
Dec-Mar, 
May 
Mar-June, 
Aug-Oct June-Sep 
June, 
Aug-Oct May-Sep June-Sep Oct-Mar Nov-Mar 
Fast Transport events (# (%) of trajectories 
reaching the region within one day) 
4555 
(62.8) 
1030 
(61.5) 
240 
(31.8) 
774 
(53.9) 
152 
(19.6) 
1077 
(13.7) 
19 
(3.7) 0 0 
Transport within boundary layer (%  of 
trajectories reaching the boundary layer of 
the specified region) 
45.6 62.5 87.1 51.5 72.6 49.2 52.3 12.1 4.5 
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Monthly variations in the average transport time (in days) and number of trajectories 
reaching the specified regions over the entire 1987-1996 period are shown in Figures 3-
5 (KNRS) and 3-6 (VNRS).  To estimate the probability of impact, the number of 
trajectories reaching the region and the number of days this took were calculated.  If one 
or more trajectories crossed a region during a day, that day was counted as a day of 
impact in that region. This approach yields two values to estimate the probability of 
impact that air in the VNRS region will be transported to geographical region.  For 
example, as shown in Table 3-2, 31.9% of all forward trajectories starting at the 
Vladivostok NRS reach the North Japan region.  However, an annual average value of 
53.5% is obtained if instead one considers the percentage of days when one or more 
trajectories from the VNRS reach the northern Japan.  To some extent, the choice of 
which value to consider is related to the duration of the release.  For example, for an 
accident characterized by an "instantaneous" release (a release that occurs over a period 
short in relation to a day, e.g., less than one hour, such as a criticality accident), the 
number of trajectories would provide a better metric because the percentage of all 
trajectories represents the probability that an air parcel released at any given moment 
from the Vladivostok NRS region is transported to the North Japan region. However, if 
a release were to occur over an extended period (e.g., a fire lasting several hours), then 
the 53.5% value is probably more appropriate to consider because this represents the 
probability that an air parcel released on any given day from the Vladivostok NRS 
region is transported to the North Japan region.  Therefore, the 53.5 and 31.9% values 
represent upper and lower bounds to the probability of impact. 
The results can be summarized as follows.  For the Vladivostok NRS, the North China 
and North Japan regions are at a higher risk of possible impact than any other regions 
due to their proximity to NRS and their position with respect to prevailing winds.  
Although the Korean peninsula is geographically closer to the VNRS than much of 
Japan, the probability of impact is lower due to peculiarities in the general airflow 
patterns of westerly origin.  The probability of impact is 32-54% and 35-87% for the 
North Japan and North China regions, respectively.  On average, atmospheric transport 
to these regions could occur in less than one day to North China and slightly over one 
day to northern Japan.  Fast transport events are not common for the US territories, but 
these events could represent major concerns for the Japanese and North Korean regions.  
Boundary layer transport is common for all regions except the US, occurring over half 
of the time.   
For the Kamchatka NRS, the US territories are at the highest risk compared to the other 
regions.  The probability of impact is 30-54% and 13-32% for the Aleutian Chain 
Islands and Alaska State, respectively. On average, atmospheric transport to these 
regions could occur in three days to the Aleutians and five days to the Alaskan 
mainland.  The likelihood of impact within five days from an accident at the Kamchatka 
NRS is much less for the other regions, reaching only eight percent for northern Japan 
and less than two percent for all other regions.  Similarly, fast (one day) transport events 
from an accident at the Kamchatka NRS are also observed only in the north Japan, 
Aleutian Chain Islands, and Alaska State geographical regions.  Boundary layer 
transport dominates in most of the studied regions, but the free troposphere transport 
dominates transport to the Chinese and North Korean regions.  
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 (a) Originating in Kamchatka Oblast 
 (b) originating from Southern Primorye Territory 
 
Figure 3-4:  Monthly variations in the average atmospheric transport time (in days) to 
specified regions based on the forward trajectories during 1987-1996 
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 (a) Originating from Kamchatka and reaching regions in the Western Pacific 
 (b) Originating from Kamchatka and reaching regions in the Eastern Pacific 
 
Figure 3-5:  Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originating at lower 
altitudes within the boundary layer in Kamchatka Oblast and reaching the specified 
regions during 1987-1996 
Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the Kamchatka NRS 
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Figure 3-6:  Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originating at lower 
altitudes within the boundary layer in southern Primorye Territory and reaching the 
specified regions during 1987-1996 
3.2.2.2 Cluster analysis results 
Because of uncertainties in the trajectory calculations after five days, we decided to use 
only five-day trajectories in the cluster analysis.  Figures 3-7 and 3-8 show the 
atmospheric transport pathways from the KNRS and VNRS regions using trajectories 
during 1987-1996 originating within the atmospheric boundary layer. The mean 
trajectory for each cluster is given with points indicating 12-hour intervals.  Two 
numbers were used for each cluster.  The first number identifies the cluster and the 
second is the percentage of trajectories within the cluster.  The seasonal summary for 
atmospheric transport pathways from both NRSs is shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2.  For 
both NRSs westerly flow is dominant throughout the year, occurring more than 60% of 
the time.  Relatively rapid westerly flow toward the North American continent is most 
common during fall-winter (8-11% of the time) for the Kamchatka NRS and during 
winter-spring (12-13% of the time) for the Vladivostok NRS.  The probability of 
transport from the west increases up to 85% of the time at higher altitudes (1.5 and 3 km 
above sea level, i.e., within the free troposphere). 
Westerly flow is predominant for the Kamchatka NRS (see Table 3-1) throughout the 
year.  Transport from the west varies from 63% (in winter) to 87% (in spring) of the 
time.  Transport from the east occurs from 15% (in fall) to 37% (in winter) of the cases.  
Transport to the north occurs only during fall and it is equal to 17% of the cases.  Six 
clusters were identified for trajectories originating within the boundary layer over the 
Kamchatka NRS region (Figure 3-7).  Four of them (#1, 2, 3 and 4 with 2, 31, 8 and 
22% of occurrence, respectively) illustrates that westerly flow is most common in the 
Monthly variations in the number of trajectories originated over the Vladivostok 
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Figure 3-7:  Atmospheric transport pathways (cluster mean trajectories) from the 
Kamchatka NRS region based on the forward trajectories during 1987-1996 
 
 
Figure 3-8:  Atmospheric transport pathways (cluster mean trajectories) from the 
Vladivostok NRS region based on the forward trajectories during 1987-1996 
   50
Kamchatka Region, occuring about 63% of the time.  Cluster #1 illustrates a rather 
infrequent (2%) but relatively rapid westerly flow toward the State of Alaska and 
Canadian territories.  Cluster #6 (8%) illustrates a somewhat infrequent (8%) easterly 
flow toward the continent within both the boundary layer and free troposphere.  Cluster 
#5, which occurs 29% of the time, also represents easterly flow but is significantly 
slower in comparison with cluster #6.  
Throughout the year, westerly flow is also dominant for the Vladivostok NRS (see 
Table 3-2).  Transport from the west varies from 68% (in fall) to 82% (in summer) of 
the time. Transport from the east occurs only during winter-spring and varies from 7% 
(in spring) to 10% (in winter) of the cases.  Transport to the north is a peculiarity of the 
Vladivostok NRS.  It can occur in any season of the year and varies from 14% (in 
winter) to 32% (in fall) of the time.  Six clusters were identified for trajectories 
originating within the boundary layer over the Vladivostok NRS region (Figure 3-8).  
Four of them (#1, 3, 5 and 6 with 32, 3, 11 and 21% of occurrence, respectively) show 
westerly flow.  These were observed about 67% of the time.  Among these clusters, 
cluster #3 represents the possibility of the relatively rapid westerly flow toward the 
North America territories.  Cluster #4 (22%) shows easterly flow.  Cluster #2, which 
occur 11% of the time, is transport with the northward component of the flow through 
the Okhotsk Sea.  
3.2.2.3 Probabilistic airflow fields 
To test and compare the results of cluster analysis we calculated the airflow probability 
field using all forward trajectories that originated over the Kamchatka and Vladivostok 
NRSs regions during 1987-1996.  Such probability fields show geographical variations 
in the airflow patterns from the chosen sites.  In a climatological sense, the path of 
airflow from the chosen site could be represented by a superposition of the probability 
of air parcels reaching each grid region on a geographical map.  The regions with higher 
occurrence of trajectory passages are areas where the probability of the possible NRSs 
impact will be higher. 
In order to construct the airflow probability field, a new rectangular grid domain 
centered on the NRS was created with a resolution of 2.5° latitude by 2.5° longitude.  
The total number of five-day trajectories intersecting each grid cell was counted.  The 
grid cell that was crossed by the most trajectories was identified as an “absolute 
maximum cell” (AMC).  This represents the area that is traversed most often by parcels 
originating at the NRS.  This area is assigned a value of 100 and the other areas are 
scaled with respect to the number of intersections at the AMC.  In other words, the 
fields show the likelihood - relative to the maximum - that a trajectory will pass 
through a given area.  The analysis was done for the period of 1987-1996, by year, 
season, and month. 
Because all trajectories start near the site, the cumulative probability is 100% there.  In 
order to account for contribution at the greater distances from the site, we compared the 
number of intersections in cells adjacent to AMC and assigned the adjacent cells to the 
AMC if they had at least 90% of intersections as the AMC.  Thus, the field was altered 
using a correction factor similar to that described by Poirot & Wishinski, 1984 and 
Merrill, 1994.  This factor takes into account the contribution of flow at greater 
distances.  The airflow probability fields (Figure 3-9) also show that westerly flows are 
   51
predominant for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok NRSs and is therefore in agreement 
with the results of the cluster analysis.  
Figure 3-9 shows the airflow probability fields for the Kamchatka and Vladivostok 
NRSs constructed using all the 1987-1996 trajectories.  Each probabilistic field is 
presented using isolines at 5% intervals on the background of the geographical maps.  
The areas of the higher probability, which are located close to the NRSs regions, 
indicate that trajectories have spent more time in this geographical area.  For the 
Kamchatka NRS, the airflow is concentrated along the major tracks of the high and 
lower pressure systems.  These systems are under the influence of the Aleutian Low and 
Asian High.  During the fall, the airflow reaches the North America continent.  During 
May-November the possibility for the air masses to pass over the North Japan region is 
the lowest.  November is a time when air masses have ability to reach the Arctic shore 
territories, and it is a time for the Arctic front to move northward at the Russian Far 
East.  During August, the airflow could pass over the parts of the state of Alaska.  For 
the Vladivostok NRS, westerly flow was also dominant.  During summer, the northward 
component of the airflow became evident.  At the end of the spring, it passes over the 
northern parts of the continental areas of the Russian Far East.  During August-
November, the airflow could reach the northern areas of the Okhotsk Sea and seashore 
of the Magadan Region.  In September, the airflow pattern could be observed in the 
Seashore China region reaching the lower 30 ° N latitudes.  Detailed seasonal airflow 
probability fields within the boundary layer for both sites are shown in Mahura (2002). 
 
 
 
(a) Kamchatka NRS (b) Vladivostok NRS 
Figure 3-9:  Airflow probability field within the boundary layer for the trajectories 
during 1987-1996  (isolines are shown every 5 units) 
3.2.2.4 Probabilistic transport time fields 
Transport time fields were constructed to show 1) how long it will take to reach a 
particular region from the nuclear risk site location, and 2) which areas could be 
impacted within one day of release.  The construction of the transport time field is 
similar to the construction of the airflow fields.  A new polar grid domain was 
constructed with the risk site in the center.  The entire region was divided into 36 ten-
degree sectors extending 70 degrees (approximately 7.1 thousand km) at two-degree 
intervals along each sector line.  The number of trajectories intersecting each grid cell of 
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domain and ending at a specified time (for example two days) was counted.  The 
locations of local maxima were identified along each of the 36 sectors.  Because our 
concern is a possibility of the fastest transport, we selected the maximum that was 
closest to the release site.  After maxima had been identified for all 36 sectors, the 
locations of the nearest maxima were converted back into latitude vs. longitude 
coordinates.  Finally, an isoline for the typical transport time was drawn through the 
nearest maxima.  Applying a similar procedure, we are able to construct isolines for 
other transport times (e.g., 0.5,1, 1.5 and etc days of transport)22.     
The typical transport time fields can be used for emergency preparedness and response 
because these fields show 1) how far the air parcels might travel from the NRS during a 
given number of days of transport, and 2) how long it could take for an air parcel to 
reach a particular region.  Typical transport time fields are shown in Figure 3-10.  
Isolines of 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, and 2.5 days of transport were constructed using 36 points (i.e. 
for each 10º sector there is one point).  Only the fields for the entire 1987-1996 period 
are shown here.  A more complete breakdown of the results can be found in Mahura 
(2002). 
 
 
 
(a) Kamchatka NRS (b) Vladivostok NRS 
Figure 3-10:  Typical atmospheric transport time fields for the trajectories during 1987-
1996 
 
                                                 
22
 A pitfall in the interpretation of such analytic results is the fact that the airflow pattern is not usually 
symmetrically distributed around the site of interest. Therefore, the constructed typical transport time 
fields in the direction of the lower probability of atmospheric transport will not reflect a realistic figure. 
For construction of the typical transport time isolines, we use only those AMCs which are above 1.4% in 
the total contribution from individual sectors.  To resolve differences in contribution issue the AMC data 
represented in table with higher (threshold is higher than 1.4%) and lower (threshold is lower than 1.4%) 
percentage of occurrence were marked differently (“OK” - 100% and more of the AMC contribution into 
the 360 degrees belt; “>75” – 75-100%; “>50” - 50-75%, ”*” - 25-50%, ”-“ - <25%). 
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For the Kamchatka NRS (Figure 3-10a), only the territories of the Kamchatka Region 
and islands in the adjacent seas (the Komandor Islands of Russia and the far western 
islands of the Aleutian chain in the USA) are likely to be impacted within the first 2.5 
days after a release.  In contrast, as shown in Figure 3-10b, the typical transport time 
from the Vladivostok NRS to northern areas of Japan is only one to two days.  Typical 
transport time to reach the Koreas is about two days.  We should note that the pattern of 
these fields depends strongly on the dominance of the westerly flows.  Therefore, it is 
stretched toward the main tracks of the cyclones traveling to the Bering Sea and Gulf of 
Alaska. 
3.2.2.5 Probabilistic fast transport fields 
Although atmospheric transport from the radiation risk site or region to another 
geographical area might occur at any time, fast transport is of particular concern due to 
the potential for exposure to short-lived radionuclides and due to the time necessary to 
implement any preventative emergency countermeasures such as public warnings.  The 
fast transport field is a special case of the transport time, being constructed for the one-
day trajectories.  In this case, a procedure applied for computation of the airflow field 
was used with one-day trajectories rather than five-day trajectories.  All these fields 
show the probability of air transport from the NRSs during the first day with respect to 
the area of the maximum possible impact from the NRSs marked as 100 (Figure 3-11).  
The analysis has been done for the entire period and each year, as well as by season and 
month.  We analyzed the lowest altitude of trajectories, i.e. trajectories starting within 
the lower 500 m of the atmosphere.  Our analysis of the fast transport probability fields 
showed that the westerly flow is dominant for both NRSs. It is also in agreement with 
the results of the cluster analysis of trajectories. 
For the Kamchatka NRS, the area of the highest probability of fast transport from the 
NRS is located to the southeast from the site during all seasons except the summer.  
During winter, there is a possibility of the fast transport toward Sakhalin Island, and 
during the fall and spring transitional periods, it could reach the territories of the 
Magadan Region.  Because of generally lower wind speeds in summer, the fast transport 
area is concentrated around the release point in the summer.  
The area of the highest probability of fast transport is also to the east and south of the 
site for releases from the Vladivostok NRS.  As for the Kamchatka site, fast transport to 
relatively distant regions is most likely during the winter, fall and spring; the most likely 
region to be impacted within the first day after a release occurring in the early summer 
is near the site.  In the late summer and fall (June-August and October-November), the 
area most likely to be affected within one day after a release lies over the Sea of Japan.  
During September-November, northerly winds prevail and there is a possibility to reach 
rapidly the Korean peninsula.  During December-April, it lies over the northern and 
central regions of Japan.  In May, which might be considered as a transition period, 
there are two area likely to be impacted by fast transport, one over the Sea of Japan and 
one to the north of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East.   
   54
 
 
(a) Kamchatka NRS (b) Vladivostok NRS 
Figure 3-11:  Fast boundary layer transport (one day) probability field for trajectories 
during 1987-1996 (isolines are shown every 10 units) 
3.2.3 Conclusions 
The main findings of the atmospheric trajectory analysis are as follows.  For both sites, 
westerly flow is dominant throughout the year, occurring more than 60% of the time 
within the boundary layer and 85% of the time at higher altitudes (1.5 and 3 km above 
sea level, i.e., within the free troposphere).  Relatively rapid westerly flow toward North 
America is most likely during fall-winter (8-11% of the time) for the Kamchatka NRS 
and during winter-spring (12-13% of the time) for the Vladivostok NRS. 
For the Vladivostok NRS, the north China and north Japan regions are at the highest 
risk of possible impact in comparison with other regions, because of their proximity to 
the release site and the prevailing wind patterns.  The probability of impact is lower for 
the Korean peninsula due to the fact that the airflow patterns are generally of westerly 
origin.  On an annual basis, the lower and upper bounds of the probability of impact 
from the Vladivostok NRS are 35-87% for North China and 32-54% for the North Japan 
regions.  On average, atmospheric transport to northern China is likely to require less 
than one day and slightly over one day to northern Japan.  Fast transport events are not 
common for the US territories, but they could represent major concerns for the Japanese 
and North Korean regions.  Except for the US territories, material transported within the 
boundary layer is expected to reaches all regions more than half of time.  
For releases from the Kamchatka NRS, US territories are at the highest risk compared to 
the other regions.  The lower and upper bounds of the probability of impact from the 
KNRS are 30-54% for the Aleutian Islands and 13-32% for Alaskan mainland.  On 
average, atmospheric transport to these regions could occur in three and five days, 
respectively.  For all other regions, the bounds of possible impact are only a few percent 
with the exception of the North Japan region (8%).  Similarly, fast transport events are 
observed only in these three regions (Aleutian Chain Islands, State of Alaska, and 
Northern Japan).  Boundary layer transport dominates in most of the considered regions, 
but free troposphere transport dominates in the Chinese and North Korean regions. 
The typical transport time from the Vladivostok NRS to reach the northern seashore 
areas of Japan is one day.  Within 1-2 days the air parcels will pass over the Northern 
Japan.  Typical transport time to reach the Korean Peninsula is about two days.  For 
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releases from the Kamchatka NRS, only the territories of the Kamchatka Region and 
islands in the adjacent seas (the Komandor Islands of Russia and the far western islands 
of the Aleutian Chain islands of the USA) are likely to be reached during the first 2.5 
days 
3.3 Case Study: Atmospheric Transport and Deposition to Japan from an 
Accident in Southern Primorye Territory 
The discussion in the previous section had indicated a significant probability of 
atmospheric transport of radioactive material to the Japanese islands or the Korean 
Peninsula from an accident occurring at one of the facilities in southern Primorye 
Territory.  Because of this, combined with proximity to the sites near Vladivostok (the 
distance between Vladivostok and Japanese Islands varied from 700 to 1000 km and to 
Korea is about 400 km), the high population density of the Japanese islands and the 
Korean Peninsula, and the large inventories of radioactivity present in southern 
Primorye Territory, a case study was carried out to evaluate the possible impacts, 
including the doses that could be received as a result of exposure in the first few days 
after an accident and the level of deposition that could occur and give rise to long-term 
exposure.  Because winter is the time that winds are most likely to carry material from 
the Vladivostok region toward Japan, wind field measurement data for January 1997 
were made available for the study.  These results are described in more detail in Takano 
et al. (2001) and Romanova and Takano (2002).  The discussion that follows is a 
summary of the work carried out by those authors. 
3.3.1 Brief Description of WSPEEDI  
The computer code WSPEEDI (Worldwide System for Prediction of Environmental 
Emergency Dose Information) was developed in JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute) (Chino et al. (1995); Ishakawa (1994); Ishikawa (1995); Yamazawa 
et al. (1998)).  WSPEEDI is a system for prediction of radiological impacts due to a 
nuclear accident.  WSPEEDI consists of a wind model (WSYNOP) to generate large-
scale mass-consistent gridded wind fields from observations and a particle random walk 
model (GEARN) to simulate atmospheric dispersion and dry and wet deposition of 
radioactivity.  The simulations can be made for regions extending to hemispheric scales 
and vertically up to the top of the troposphere (10 km).  The accumulated external 
gamma dose during cloud passage is calculated from the time-integrated air dose rate.  
Finally, the cumulative committed (70 years) internal dose due to inhalation during the 
period of contaminated air passage can be computed.  The model accounts for complex 
source, terrain conditions, and the heterogeneous non-steady state conditions in the 
atmosphere.  
Inputs for the WSYNOP and GEARN models used in the current study included the 
following: 
− grid point value (GPV) meteorological data for WSYNOP for January 1997, 
provided by JAERI; 
− geographical data, covering 2500 km x 2500 km, centered at Vladivostok with 
latitude of 43.1° N and longitude 131.9° E (This was taken as the release point); 
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− table of yields of iodine and xenon isotopes with reactor type (BWR or PWR), fuel 
burn-up and cooling time; 
− physical data of 60 fission products, fertile material and activated nuclides (nuclide 
names, decay constants, conversion factors of dose from nuclide concentration); 
− starting date and time of calculation and duration of calculation for wind field 
system; and 
− starting date and time of release, duration of analysis, step of calculation, duration of 
the particle release, release height, reactor type, fuel burn-up, and the time of reactor 
shut down. 
The output of the model is as follows: 
− wind field data in vertical mesh boundary and date and time to which it corresponds, 
serving as input for GEARN; 
− concentration of radioactivity in the atmosphere and total deposition of radioactivity 
to the ground surface; and 
− internal and external dose due to inhalation and external cloud irradiation during 
cloud passage. 
The WSPEEDI code estimates internal and external radiological doses from obtained 
radiation concentrations in the air and on the ground.  The radiological dose by an 
inhaled radionuclide is evaluated as an integrated dose over lifetime (70 y) considering 
the biological half-life of the radionuclide.  However, the WSPEEDI code does not 
evaluate the long-term dose from prolonged exposure to radionuclides deposited on the 
ground.   
3.3.2 Wind Field Analysis for January 1997 
As discussed in Section 3.1, meteorological conditions over the Sea of Japan, East 
Russian coasts and Japanese Islands in the winter are characterized by northerly or 
northwesterly winds.  During winter the temperature falls below –20 ° C and the wind 
speed can vary from less than 5 m/s to about 20 m/s. The atmospheric transport has two 
typical directions: one toward the Japanese Islands and the other toward North Korea.   
A visual examination of the surface wind patterns occurring in January 1997 allowed 
the identification of three typical wind patterns of interest for modeling.  The WSPEEDI 
calculations for the horizontal components of the wind field for different dates in 
January 1997 are shown in Figure 3-12.  Figure 3-12a illustrates a condition that we 
term Strong North Winds (SNW), with horizontal velocities of about 20 m/s toward 
Japan Islands.  We consider this case to examine the impact of fast transport to Japan.  
Figure 3-12b illustrates the effect of slow northerly winds, with wind velocities of less 
than 5 m/s, and we term this case as the Weak North Wind condition (WNW). Figure 3-
12c illustrates a more complicated situation in which the wind rotates over Korea and 
the Japanese Island under the influence of a cyclonic system located over the Sea of 
Japan.  We term this condition as the Cyclonic Wind (CW).  These three wind 
conditions serve as a basis for the analyses of the radionuclide air concentrations, 
ground depositions, and radiation doses. 
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Figure 3-12:  Typical Wind Patterns in January 1997 
3.3.3 Analysis of the Results 
In order to illustrate the results of atmospheric transport under these conditions, the 
atmospheric concentrations resulting from a unit (1 Bq) release were computed for a 
short duration (sixteen minute) low altitude (75 m) release of six different nuclides.  The 
code calculates the concentration every 6 hours after the release at Vladivostok (Figures 
3-13 through 3-15 illustrate the concentration of 137Cs).  The maximum air 
concentration and resulting internal and external committed dose for a unit release are 
shown in Tables 3-3 and 3-4. 
Table 3-3:  Maximum Radionuclide Concentration in Air 25 m over the ground 
(Bq/m³ per Bq released) 
25 m over Japan Islands 25 m over Korea 
 
Isotope Strong North Winds 
24 h after release 
Weak North Winds 
72 h after release 
Cyclonic North Winds 
30 h after release 
137Cs 9.3x10-15 2.8x10-15 7.5x10-15 
134Cs 9.3x10-15 2.8x10-15 7.5x10-15 
90Sr 9.3x10-15 2.8x10-15 7.5x10-15 
131I 7.2x10-15 1.2x10-15 5.1x10-15 
133I 4.3x10-15 1.8x10-16 2.6x10-15 
135I 1.2x10-15 1.6x10-18 4.8x10-16 
 
Table 3-4:  Maximum External and Internal Dose (mSv per Bq released) 
Wind 
Condition 
Strong North Winds 
5 days after release 
Weak North Winds 
7 days after release 
Cyclonic Winds 
7 days after release 
Country Japan Japan Korea Japan 
Pathway External Internal External Internal External Internal External Internal 
I-131 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-19 >10-20 >10-19 
I-133 >10-20 >10-19 >10-20 >10-20 >10-20 >10-20 >10-21 >10-20 
I-135 >10-20 >10-20 >10-22 >10-22 >10-21 >10-21 >10-21 >10-21 
137Cs >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 
134Cs >10-20 >10-18 >10-19 >10-18 >10-19 >10-18 >10-20 >10-19 
90Sr - >10-17 - >10-17 - >10-18 - >10-18 
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Under strong north wind conditions, (Figure 3-12a) the contaminated air masses reach 
Japan in 12 hours and the maximum concentrations over central Japan occur 24 hours 
after the release.  The maximum concentration for 137Cs is 9.3x10-15 Bq/m³.  The 
contaminated air masses cover the central part of Japan and quickly leave the populated 
territory.  The residence time over Japan is about 12 hours.  Under a weak north wind 
condition (Figure 3-12b), the contaminated cloud requires considerably more time (36 
hours) to reach Japan.  However, because of the longer travel time, the contaminated 
cloud is much larger and it expands to cover almost the whole territory of the Japanese 
main island.  Although the maximum value for 137Cs is about three times less than under 
strong north wind conditions, (2.8x10-15 Bq/m³), the residence time is more than three 
days.  Under cyclonic wind conditions (Figure 3-12c), the air masses are transported 
towards the Korean peninsula and subsequently rotate over the southern Japanese 
islands.  Korea is affected mainly in the coastal regions.  The maximum concentration 
30 hours after the release is over the sea, and the maximum values are comparable to 
those under strong north wind conditions (table 3-3).  The residence time is longer due 
to the closed rotation system, which does not permit outflow of the air masses.  The 
lower results for radioiodines are due to the shorter half-lives (133I: 20.8 h and 135I: 6.61 
h).   
The total dry deposition to the ground for the three wind conditions is shown in Figure 
3-16.  Because precipitation data during this month was not available, wet deposition 
was not modeled.  The deposition velocity was set at 0.001 m/s for 137Cs and at 0.003 
m/s for 131I (aerosol).  The largest affected territory is in the case of weak north winds, 
in which case nuclide deposition can be expected over the whole Japan territory.  In the 
other two cases, deposition occurs in central Japan (SNW) and in Korea and South 
Japan (CW).  The maximum value of deposition in Japan is in the interval of 10-12 to  
10-13 Bq/m² per Bq released. 
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Figure 3-13: Atmospheric Concentrations under Strong North Wind Conditions 
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Figure 3-14: Atmospheric Concentrations under Weak North Wind Conditions 
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Figure 3-15: Atmospheric Concentrations under Cyclonic Wind Conditions 
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Figure 3-16:  Total Ground Deposition for a Unit Release (Bq/m² per Bq released)  
3.3.4 Parametric Study  
Although the main radionuclide release in the 1985 Chahzma Bay accident occurred in 
less than one minute, combustion products were released to the atmosphere for an the 
subsequent four hours as a result of the fire that broke out onboard.  This demonstrates 
the need for a parametric evaluation to cover the large number of possibilities in 
accident release scenarios.  Such an evaluation was carried out, with parameter 
variations including the duration of the release and the height of the release.  The 
structure of the parametric study is summarized in Table 3-5.  In all cases, the output of 
the calculation of the atmospheric concentration at the surface (25 m), external and 
internal doses, and total ground deposition.  In addition, calculations were carried out to 
estimate atmospheric concentration at different levels (Levels 1-10, corresponding to 
50, 171.05, 334.21, 539.47, 786.84, 1076.32, 1407.89, 1781.58, 2197.37, and 2655.26 
m) from a 75 meter, 16 minute unit release of one Bq of 137Cs. 
Table 3-5:  Structure of the simulations modeled using WSPEEDI 
Wind condition 
Strong 
Northwest 
Wind 
Weak   
Northwest  Wind 
Cyclonic North 
Wind 
Wind velocity 15-20 m/s > 5 m/s 10 m/s 
Fixed duration of the release 16 min and fixed 
unit release 1 Bq 
131I, 133I, 135I, 134Cs, 137Cs, 90Sr 
75 m 
950 m 
Release height sensitivity  
Variation of the release height for a fixed release 
duration (16 min) and unit release (1 Bq of 
137Cs) 2500 m 
- 
16 min 
1 hour 
Release duration sensitivity 
Variation of the release duration for a fixed 
release height (75m) and unit release (1 Bq of 
137Cs) 24 hours 
 
Simulations including different release durations at Vladivostok were carried out to 
estimate the effect of short and long release times.  The code resolution permits 120 
second release duration.  Calculations were carried out to evaluate 137Cs concentrations 
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for the three meteorological conditions for release durations of 16 min, 1 hour and 24 
hours.  The simulations for 16 min and 1 hour release do not show a significant 
difference in the shape of the contaminated air masses or of the max values of the 
concentration.  This is because the wind field is interpolated for every 6 hours and 
almost the same meteorological circumstances affects nuclide dispersion. The 
simulations for a 24-hour continuous release of one becquerel showed that the 
concentrations are smaller but the time of residence over the islands is longer.  Under 
weak north wind conditions the contaminated air masses stay over Japan more than four 
days, resulting in higher values for external and internal doses and ground deposition. 
Variations of the release height (such as might occur due to thermal rise during a major 
fire) were carried out for a point release.  Calculations were made for release heights of 
75 m, 950 m, and for 2500 m corresponding to a release in a slightly unstable layer, a 
release in a neutral layer, and a release in a stable layer, respectively.  The maximum 
concentration at level 25 m over the ground for the both SNW and WNW can be 
observed in a case of a low (75 m) release height (Table 3-6). 
Table 3-6:  Maximum concentration of 137Cs (Bq/m³) at different heights of the 
point release. 
Height of the release Strong North Winds 
(24 hours after the release) 
Weak North Winds 
(36 hours after the release) 
75 m 9.3 x10-15 9.0 x10-15 
950 m 7.6 x10-15 8.0 x10-15 
2500 m 1.6 x10-15 2.0 x10-15 
3.3.5 Dose Assessment 
In order to place these figures in context and to evaluate the doses that could result due 
to the exposure immediately after an accident, two accident release scenarios were 
constructed.  The first accident scenario is similar to the Chazhma Bay accident, in 
which a freshly loaded core undergoes a prompt criticality accident.  The nuclide of 
concern for long-range transport in this case is radioactive iodine, due to a rather high 
fission yield and sufficiently long half-life.  The second scenario differs from the first in 
that a spent core is assumed to undergo a criticality accident during defueling.  The 
accumulated fission products are the main radionuclides for the atmospheric transport 
analysis.    
A hypothetical reactivity accident onboard a submarine was analyzed by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO, 1998).  The NATO study includes an 
atmospheric transport analysis around the city of Murmansk, where navy bases of the 
Russian Northern Fleet are located.  However, the submarines of the Northern Fleet and 
of the Pacific Fleet are very similar, with the same submarine and reactor types and 
similar fuel burn-ups.  Therefore, the source term data used for the atmospheric 
transport analysis in NATO study can be used for the present analysis.   
The source term for the first accident (Reactivity Accident: Fresh Fuel) can be 
computed by assuming a total number of fissions (5.0 x 1018) equal to that of the 
Chazhma Bay accident (cf. Chapter Two).  The total inventory of iodine radioactivity 
generated in a criticality accident can be estimated as 0.15 TBq 131I, 3.1 TBq 133I and 9.2 
TBq 135I.  Adopting the iodine release factor of 0.2 taken from NATO (1998), the 
estimated released inventories of radioiodine used in the atmospheric analysis are 
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shown in Table 3-7.  For the second scenario - a reactivity accident involving spent fuel 
- the release term used by the NATO study (NATO, 1998) are adopted.  In the NATO 
study, the fission product inventory was calculated by assuming reactor operation at 
67.5 MW for 1.25 y followed by five years of cooling after the final reactor shutdown.  
Further, the estimated excursion power was assumed to be 2500 MWs (8x1019 fissions), 
which is considered to be sufficient to result in melting of the fuel cladding with a 
consequent steam explosion.  The atmospheric release was based upon the adjustment 
of the computed core inventory by a release factor for cesium and strontium.  The 
resulting source terms are given in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7:  Source Terms used for estimation of accident scenarios (after NATO, 
1998) 
Scenario Nuclide Half-Life Activity (TBq) 
131I 8.04 days 0.029 
133I 20.8 hours 0.620 
Reactivity 
Accident: 
Fresh Fuel 135I 6.61 hours 1.840 
137Cs 30.0 years 350 
134Cs 2.06 years 35 
Reactivity 
Accident: 
Spent Fuel 90Sr 28.8 years 70 
 
As previously discussed, the WSPEEDI code estimates the seventy-year committed 
dose due to inhalation of contaminated air during cloud passage and the dose from the 
acute exposure due to external irradiation from the passing cloud and from the ground.  
However, the WSPEEDI code does not evaluate either the long-term external dose  
from prolonged exposure to radionuclides deposited on the ground or the internal dose 
resulting from contamination of the food chain.  The doses are presented in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8:  Total Dose in Areas of Maximum Impact in Japan and Korea (mSv) 
Reactivity Accident: 
Fresh Fuel 
Reactivity Accident: 
Spent Fuel  
Wind 
Pattern 
 
Affected 
Country 
 
Dose 
(mSv) 131I 133I 135I 137Cs 134Cs 90Sr 
External 3x10-10 6x10-9 2x10-8 4x10-6 4x10-7 - Strong 
North Wind Japan Internal 3x10-8 6x10-8 2x10-8 4x10-4 4x10-5 7x10-4 
External 3x10-10 6x10-9 2x10-10 4x10-6 4x10-6 - Weak 
North Wind Japan Internal 3x10-8 6x10-9 2x10-10 4x10-4 4x10-5 7x10-4 
External 3x10-10 6x10-9 2x10-9 4x10-6 4x10-6 - Korea Internal 3x10-9 6x10-9 2x10-9 4x10-4 4x10-5 7x10-5 
External 3x10-10 6x10-10 2x10-9 4x10-6 4x10-7 - 
Cyclonic 
Wind Japan Internal 3x10-9 6x10-9 2x10-9 4x10-4 4x10-6 7x10-5 
 
It can be seen that the doses received as a result of exposures immediately following the 
accident can be expected to be relatively low.  The highest dose resulting from a 
reactivity accident involving fresh fuel is expected to occur in Japan under strong north 
wind conditions, but would only reach 1.4x10-7 mSv.  Doses from a reactivity accident 
involving spent fuel could be higher - reaching up to 1.2x10-3 mSv in Japan and 5.2x10-
4
 in Korea - but would still be well below one mSv. 
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3.3.6 Conclusions and Discussions 
The WSPEEDI code developed in JAERI was used for assessment of the consequences 
for Japan and Korea after a hypothetical nuclear accident in southern Primorye 
Territory.  Meteorological conditions during the winter are characterized by strong 
northwesterly winds, leading to a high likelihood of atmospheric transport of released 
material to Japan in the event of an atmospheric release.  The nuclide concentrations, 
radiological doses and surface deposition were calculated for the three most common 
wind conditions in this region (Strong North Winds, Weak North Winds and Cyclonic 
Winds).  The calculations showed that although maximum concentrations over Japan 
varied according to the wind condition because of the difference in the wind velocities, 
the accumulated radiation doses have similar values for the three meteorological 
conditions due to the increased residence time under slow wind conditions. 
An evaluation of different accident scenarios indicates that the doses received in Japan 
due to the acute exposure during passage of the contaminated cloud are not expected to 
exceed allowable limits for exposure to members of the public.  However, it should be 
noted that China and the Korean Peninsula are much closer to Vladivostok than Japan 
and the dose could become larger in these areas under certain wind conditions.  The 
dose to members of the public in Russia could be considerably higher.  Furthermore, the 
doses due to chronic exposure to external irradiation or ingestion of contaminated foods 
as a result of radioactivity deposited during the passage of the cloud could be 
considerably higher.  These effects are being examined in our ongoing studies.   
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4 Consequence Assessment 
Main Contributors: Tsunetaka Banba and Keith Compton 
Edited by Keith Compton 
 
This chapter describes a screening approach for identifying the facilities in the Russian 
Far East that may pose the greatest risk to neighboring countries.  The approach is based 
on the identification of a minimum critical emission in the source region that is 
necessary to cause unacceptable levels of contamination in a neighboring country (i.e., 
receptor region), based upon the meteorological characteristics of the region.  This 
minimum critical emission is then compared to the inventory of radioactive materials at 
each facility to whether there is sufficient radioactive material present in the facility in 
the source region to pose a threat to the specified receptor region.  If sufficient material 
is present, the necessary airborne release factor is determined by dividing the critical 
emission by the inventory to determine the necessary airborne release factor of 
atmospherically transportable material.  This release factor is then compared to the 
release factor for a variety of accidents (e.g., reactor accidents, high-temperature fires, 
low-temperature fires, etc.) to determine whether a feasible pathway requiring further 
study exists.   
The approach is illustrated by the evaluation of the radiological risk to Japan from 
nuclear naval facilities in southern Primorye Territory.  These sites were chosen because 
of the high likelihood of atmospheric transport from southern Primorye Territory (cf. 
Chapter Three), the proximity of the Japanese Islands to the sites near Vladivostok (the 
distance between Vladivostok and Japanese Islands varies from 700 to 1000 km), the 
high population density of the Japanese islands, and the large inventories of 
radioactivity present in southern Primorye Territory (cf. Chapter Two).  It should be 
noted that the approach is applicable to other regions and other pollutants where 
atmospheric pathways may transport contaminants across political or administrative 
boundaries.  It may thus be used as a tool in negotiations on transboundary risk 
mitigation.   
The utility of this approach is the ability to rapidly identify facilities with the potential 
for transboundary impacts.  It was seen in Chapter Two that there are a wide variety of 
facilities containing radioactive materials in the Russian Far East, ranging from buried 
liquid waste tanks and solid waste burial ground to spent fuel storage facilities and 
decommissioned submarines.  It is clear that not all of these facilities pose a 
transboundary threat.  However, obtaining the detailed information necessary to 
establish a reliable source term for modeling transboundary atmospheric transport and 
carrying out a detailed simulation of all possible scenarios would be a prohibitive task.  
Information on the design details of naval facilities that is necessary to construct an 
accurate source term may be classified or otherwise difficult to obtain.  Detailed 
modeling of long-range atmospheric transport and deposition is computationally 
expensive and is still subject to considerable uncertainty even when the meteorological 
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conditions at the time of release and the exact details of the source term are known23.  
For these and other reasons, a simplified screening model is useful for either providing 
policy-relevant information (e.g., that there are no facilities that are capable of causing 
doses above the permissible level in the receptor region) or for designing further studies 
to adequately inform the policy process.  Facilities that cannot be screened out by such 
an analysis may, for example, be subject to more detailed analysis or may be candidates 
for mitigation assistance provided by neighboring countries.  
It should also be noted that such an analysis requires an adequate definition of the 
policy goal to be attained24.  The use of the approach presented here requires a 
quantifiable endpoint that has been accepted as a decisionmaking standard, such as dose 
to members of the public or intervention levels in foodstuffs.  In some cases, a screening 
analysis may be a sufficient quantitative policy analysis, e.g., when clear and relatively 
non-controversial quantitative standards exist and it can be demonstrated that these 
standards will not be exceeded even under the worst cases.  A more complex model may 
be necessary if the simple model proves too conservative or cannot adequately capture 
the relevant physical processes - recognizing, however, that more complex models are 
not necessarily more accurate nor are they necessarily characterized by less uncertainty 
(cf. the fourth point of the conclusions of Davis et al. (1998) and others).  In other cases, 
the policy goals may be either subject to controversy (e.g., radiation standards) or may 
be primarily non-quantitative (e.g., national security issues).  We therefore emphasize 
that a screening analysis of this type is therefore not a prescriptive analysis.  It is only an 
aid to decisionmaking. 
4.1 Methodology 
The method is based on the assumption that the maximum areal concentration of the ith 
nuclide in a target country j (χi,j) arising as a result of deposition after an accident and 
atmospheric transport is a linear function of the total emission - namely, that can be 
expressed as  
4.1 j,iij,i ATFQ ⋅=χ ,  
where χi,j is the maximum total (wet and dry) areal deposition after passage of the 
contaminated cloud (Bq/m²), Qi is the emission (Bq) from the source facility in an 
atmospherically transportable form (e.g., vapor or aerosol release to the atmosphere), 
and ATFi,j is the atmospheric transfer factor (defined as the maximum level of total 
deposition in a target country j resulting from a unit release of nuclide i in the source 
country). 
                                                 
23
 Examples of the uncertainties in long-range atmospheric modeling can be seen in the results of the 
ETEX experiment (summarized by Van Dop et al., 1998).  It should be noted that the ETEX experiment, 
which used an inert non-depositing perfluorocarbon tracer, does not yield information necessary to 
validate the deposition component.  For an evaluation of the ranges in model uncertainty and the pitfalls 
in modeling deposition and foodchain uptake, see Kirchner et al. (1998).  
24
 See, e.g., Quade (1980) for a discussion of the importance of problem formulation in analysis.  A clear 
understanding of the goal of the analysis, and particularly the decision which the analysis is intended to 
inform, is a condicio sine qua non for a sound policy-relevant analysis.   
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The minimum critical emission is defined as the emission that gives rise to the critical 
deposition level χcrit (discussed below), and can be computed by rearranging the 
deposition equation 4.1 to yield 
4.2 
i,crit
j,i
wet
j,i
dry
j,i,crit
ATFATFQ
χ
+
= . 
If the emission exceeds the minimum critical deposition, the level of deposition in the 
target country would (given the same atmospheric conditions) exceed the critical 
deposition level. 
The fundamental problem is the selection of the critical deposition level χcrit and the 
identification of the atmospheric transfer factor for a given source-receptor pair.  The 
issues surrounding the selection of appropriate values for these parameters will be 
discussed in the following sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. 
4.1.1 Selection of Critical Deposition Level 
The critical deposition level χcrit (kBq/m²) for the specified region is a policy-based 
constraint that represents a quantitative expression of a particular policy goal.  It 
therefore requires consideration of both scientific and policy factors.  For example, the 
policy goal could be to restrict doses to individual members of the public to below some 
level generally regarded as safe; alternatively, the policy goal could be to ensure that 
exposure to artificial sources of radiaiton not exceed some specified percentage of the 
total radiation exposure.  For dose-based standards, the case of prolonged exposures 
(such as might arise due to the deposited radioactivity) has been discussed in some 
detail in ICRP Publication 82 (ICRP, 2000).  In that report, it was considered that post-
accident interventions to reduce existing annual doses below 10 mSv could be 
considered optional but would not generally be justifiable.  Standards for practices are 
more restrictive, ranging from annual doses of 0.01 mSv (as an exemption level) to 1 
mSv (as a constraint)25.   
If a dose-based constraint is selected, the dose must be converted into a specified level 
of deposition.  In other words, the analyst must derive the level of deposition that could 
lead to the specified dose under a particular set of exposure conditions.  The scientific 
(as opposed to policy) considerations arise when trying to estimate the dose arising from 
the deposition.  Such an approach has been used by UNSCEAR (1993) to estimate the 
committed effective dose resulting from a lifetime of exposure to fallout from weapons 
testing.  It can also be computed, given exposure patterns in the country, by computer 
codes such as RESRAD (Yu et al., 1993, 2000).  However, as Kirchner et al. (1998) 
suggest, deposition-dose transfer factors can be difficult to compute and subject to 
considerable uncertainty.  Furthermore, because of variations in exposure patterns 
within a country, estimations of exposure involve implicit policy judgements regarding 
the proper characterization of the population at risk. 
                                                 
25
 The question arises as to whether ex-ante planning to prevent an accident that could occur (as opposed 
to ex-post responses to an accident that has already occurred) should be treated as a "practice" or an 
"intervention". 
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We note that the difficulties associated with a dose-based standard could be avoided to 
some extent by resorting to the use of regulatory default values in exposure assessments 
or by selecting a non-dose based level.  For example, a critical deposition level could be 
defined as that which would double the existing contamination due to fallout.  However, 
background levels of contamination are often quite variable.  Selecting an appropriate 
value for "background" may be technically difficult.  Furthermore, issues of equity may 
arise as individuals residing in areas of higher natural background would be afforded a 
different level of protection than those residing in areas of low backround.  Resorting to 
such decision criteria is also likely to be a source of controversy and raises a different 
set of policy issues.  It is not our purpose to advocate any particular approach.  The 
analysis that follows will use a dose-based approach because this has been widely 
accepted as a relatively impartial and equitable approach and because it illustrates the 
application of this method. 
4.1.2 Selection of Atmospheric Transfer Factor 
The next step is the estimation of an appropriate atmospheric transfer factor.  The 
atmospheric transfer factor is the total deposition of a given radionuclide i in the 
specified region j resulting from a unit emission of radionuclide i at the source (cf. 
Equation 4.1).  It is a measure of the ground deposition per unit radioactivity released, 
and has units of Bq/m² per Bq released, or 1/m².   
Dry deposition is expected to occur whenever there is atmospheric contamination 
present at ground level, whereas wet deposition requires the occurrence of rainfall 
coinciding with the passage of the contaminated cloud.  Wet deposition can result in 
considerably higher levels of deposition than dry deposition but generally over much 
smaller areas and with a lower probability of occurrence for any given location.  
Because of these differences, it is appropriate to define a separate expression for the 
minimum critical emission under either wet or dry deposition conditions: 
4.3a 
i,crit
i
dry
i,crit
dry ATFQ
χ
= , and 
4.3b 
i,crit
i
wet
i,crit
wet ATFQ
χ
= . 
It should be noted that the transfer factor for a short-term release is likely to be quite 
different from that for a long-term release.  Long-term releases average over the full 
spectrum of atmospheric conditions and therefore tend to result in lower levels of 
contamination spread over larger areas.  Short-term releases, in contrast, tend to affect 
smaller areas, but result in higher levels of contamination in the areas where 
contamination does occur.  Because of the uncertainty and variability inherent in  
modelling atmospheric transport, the transfer factor for a particular source-receptor-
nuclide combination is a random variable.  The transfer factor is better represented by a 
probability distribution rather than a single expected value.  The statistics used to 
characterize this distribution can  based on simple analytical expressions (e.g, for a 
maximum value).  A more complete characterization can be developed by the use of 
more complex models such as WSPEEDI (Chino et al., 1995), DERMA (Sørenson, 
1998), or others.    
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Analytical models that treat the emission as an instantaneous puff, neglect both 
synoptic-scale dispersion (thereby assuming that long-range dispersion can be 
characterized by a constant horizontal dispersivity coefficient in the range of 104-105 
m²/s; cf. Desiato et al. 1998) and depletion due to deposition, and assume a relatively 
low boundary layer height (~200 m) are likely to be reasonably conservative and can be 
used to develop a maximum value for the atmospheric transfer factor.  At long distances 
from the site, a dry deposition velocity for aerosols on the order of 10-3 m/s may be 
appropriate.  Wet deposition is considerably more difficult to model.  It can be handled 
by applying a simplification for scoping model purposes and define a wet deposition 
velocity analogous to a dry deposition velocity as JWwet ⋅=υ , (Hanna, Briggs, and 
Hosker, 1982), where the deposition flux is proportional to the vertically integrated 
average atmospheric concentration.  If we assume that the plume is completely 
vertically mixed within the boundary layer, then the atmospheric concentration 
averaged over the mixing layer and the ground level atmospheric concentration are the 
same.  The wet and dry deposition velocities can then be directly compared.  The 
volumetric washout coefficient Wv for small (~1 µm ) aerosols (such as radiocesium) is 
between 105 - 106 (Till and Meyer, 1983).  Defining a daily rainfall of 100 mm as a 
heavy rainfall event, we can define an "average" wet deposition velocity over a period 
of one day as 12-120 cm/s.  We can see that this value is approximately two to three 
orders of magnitude higher than the removal rate from dry deposition.  However, dry 
deposition occurs over a longer period and the removal rate of contaminants may 
exhibit a saturation effect during heavy rainfall.  This can occur if the scavenging rate 
exceeds the rate of replenishment from advection into the area affected by rainfall.  As 
pointed out by Hanna, Briggs, and Hosker (1982), "the washout ratio has been observed 
to decrease with precipitation amount during any given experiment, presumably because 
the pollutant cloud becomes more dilute.  On average, Wr decreases by a factor of 2 for 
every order of magnitude increase in rainfall."  The authors go on to note that "Washout 
ratios are probably best suited to long-term estimates, in which the variability induced 
by single storm events is integrated out."  Application of a ratio of 100 for the dry/wet 
deposition transfer factor is therefore taken as a reasonably conservative estimate of the 
potential effect of wet deposition.  However, this estimate is subject to considerable 
uncertainty. 
More complex models such as WSPEEDI (Chino et al., 1995), DERMA (Sørenson, 
1998), or others are an alternative to simple analytical models.   If more detailed 
modeling results are available, the distribution of computed values of depositions can be 
used (see Mahura et al., 2002 and Brown et al., 2003 for a more detailed evaluation of 
such results) as a surrogate for the probability distribution of the atmospheric transfer 
factor.  This is likely to be a reasonable approach for evaluating dry deposition patterns.  
However, the use of more complex models in deriving estimates of the distribution for 
wet deposition may not yield either increased accuracy.  The uncertainty in estimates of 
distributions describing wet deposition arise from a number of factors, including the 
inherent uncertainty in the state of the art in wet deposition modeling and because 
operating the model with sufficient historical data to characterize the statistical 
distribution of deposition during rainfall events may require simulating daily releases 
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over a period of decades.26  When attempting to estimate the conditional distribution 
(e.g., the deposition at a specific point given that rainfall has occurred), a large number 
of samples would be required to generate a reliable distribution at all points, and 
particularly when trying to estimate the tail of a conditional distribution.  The results 
obtained from a more limited sample (e.g., one year of meteorological observations) are 
likely to significantly underestimate the potential for maximum wet deposition peaks.  
Furthermore, against a backdrop of potential changes in rainfall patterns due to global 
climate change, we note the intrinsic uncertainty entailed by the use of historical 
measurements to forecast future events.  The computational expense of deposition 
modeling is quite high, and coupled with the potential lack of data over a sufficient 
period of time and the potential changes in rainfall patterns as a result of global climate 
change, render accurate statistical estimates of potential for wet deposition difficult. 
4.1.3 Critical Release and Critical Release Factor 
Provided that the critical deposition and the atmospheric transfer factor can be obtained, 
they can be combined to identify a "critical" emission (Qcrit,i,j) by equation 4.3.  This is 
the amount of a radionuclide nuclide that must be released at the source location 
necessary to yield the specified critical deposition level (χcrit,i,j) of nuclide i at the 
receptor location j.  This critical emission can then be compared to inventories of 
material at individual facilities.  If the inventory of radioactive material in a facility is 
less than the critical emission, then it is clear that there is no possibility (to within the 
specified level of confidence used to derive the critical emission) of any accident 
causing transboundary contamination greater than the critical level.   
For facilities that contain inventories greater than the critical emission, the ratio of the 
critical emission to the inventory yields a critical release fraction.   
4.4 
i
jicrit
ji I
Q
CRF ,,
,
=  
It is clear that facilities containing less radioactive material than the critical emission 
(CRF>1) are, by definition, incapable of causing deposition levels above the defined 
critical deposition level.  
Screening a facility containing multiple nuclides can be carried out with the use of a 
"sum of fractions" rule, namely,   
4.5a 1
,,
≤∑
i jicrit
i
Q
I
 
where Ii is the inventory of the ith nuclide at the facility.  A physical interpretation of a 
sum of fractions rule is available when the assessment endpoints are additive (e.g., 
under dose standards) and when all radionuclides are characterized by a release fraction 
of 100%.  If the sum of fractions is less than unity, then it follows that no combination 
of nuclides can result in deposition yielding doses exceeding the dose standard.  If the 
                                                 
26
 When run for purposes of reconstructing a release - such as Chernobyl - the meteorological conditions 
are known and it is not necessary to estimate a distribution of possible events.  However, when run in a 
predictive mode, numerical models require a considerable amount of historical data in order to generate 
adequate statistical distributions.   
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sum exceeds unity, then either a single nuclide or a combination of nuclides may be 
capable of deposition exceeding the dose standard, and an examination of individual 
nuclide-specific release factors is necessary.   
Under non-additive endpoints (e.g., ratio to background), more caution is needed.  A 
maximum of fractions may be more appropriate in such a case, i.e. 
4.5b 1
,,
≤



jicrit
i
i Q
IMAX , 
in order to satisfy the condition that no isotope will exceed a given critical value.   
The advantage of this approach is that it requires essentially no data on the construction 
of the facility or the characteristics of the accident in order to perform the screening 
assessment.  This is because the approach assumes that all of the material is released in 
a transportable form into a fully mixed atmosphere, i.e., a release fraction of 100% for 
all radionuclides.  The approach only requires a reasonable estimate of the total 
inventory.   
In the case that the critical release fraction is less than 100%, the computed critical 
release fraction assists in identifying the type of accident that may give rise to a 
sufficient emission.  For example, a facility that with an inventory of 125% of the 
critical emission for 137Cs would require an accident releasing 80% of the 137Cs.  
Depending upon the physical form of the material, such a release fraction may be 
infeasible (e.g., for refractory nuclides such as plutonium) or may be possible under 
only the most severe accident conditions (e.g., complete spent fuel melting).  
Conversely, if the facility contains one thousand times more material than the critical 
emission, then an accident releasing only 0.1% of the material present could result in 
deposition above the defined critical deposition level.  This level of release may be 
possible even under a less severe accident scenario (e.g., a "normal" low-temperature 
industrial fire affecting only a part of the more volatile materials present).  A discussion 
of radionuclide specific release fractions under different accident scenarios will be 
discussed in section 4.2. 
4.2 Release Fractions from Severe Accidents 
Computation of the critical release fraction allows an identification of the types of 
accidents that may require more detailed evaluation.  Comparison of the critical release 
fraction with the respirable airborne release fraction (RARF) provides an indication of 
the atmospherically transportable material released as the result of an accident.  The 
RARF is the product of the airborne release fraction27 and the respirable fraction28 
(DOE, 1994).  The respirable fraction is important in this case because of size 
limitation, not because of the inhalation pathway.  Particles greater than 10 um, which 
                                                 
27
 defined as the "the coefficient used to estimate the amount of a radioactive material that can be 
suspended in air and made available for airborne transport under a specific set of induced physical 
stresses" 
28
 defined as "the fraction of airborne radionuclides as particles that can be transported through air and 
inhaled into the human respiratory system and is commonly assumed to include particles 10-µm 
Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter (AED) and less" 
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are not considered as part of the respirable fraction, are also likely to be depleted by 
gravitational setting before significant long-range transport can occur (cf. Hanna, 
Briggs, and Hosker, 1982).  References such as DOE (1994) provide tabulations of 
respirable airborne release fractions (RARF) for different chemical and physical forms 
under different types of accidents (e.g., drops, spills, fires, etc).     
For the case of a severe criticality accident on a nuclear submarine, NATO (1998) 
estimated an excursion power of 2500 MWs (8x1019 fissions), which was considered to 
be sufficient to result in melting of the fuel cladding with a consequent steam explosion.  
For fire accidents in spent fuel facilities, release fractions were evaluated by Banba 
(2001) for two cases.  The first case is a high-temperature fire in which the clad 
combustion is assumed to propagate throughout the stored spent fuel, and other case is a 
low-temperature fire in which fuel is exposed to air but does not reach temperatures at 
which a Zircaloy fire ignites.  The latter case also includes a normal industrial-type fire 
condition.   
During a criticality accident, releases to containment are expected to be typical of severe 
reactor accidents such as Chernobyl.  According to Travis et al. (1997), the estimated 
Chernobyl release during the accident occurring at the Chernobyl Unit-4 power plant in 
the Ukraine, as a percentage of core inventory, was 100% of the noble gases, 20% of the 
iodine, ~13% of the cesium and tellurium, 4% for strontium, 5.6% for barium, and 
approximately 3% for ruthenium and the lanthanides.   
The release fractions during high and low temperature fires were discussed by Banba 
(2001) based upon a review of Alexander et al. (1984), DOE (1994), and Lorenz and 
Osborne (1995).  If self-sustaining cladding oxidation (a "clad fire") occurs, fuel rods 
are predicted to reach 1,500 to 2,100˚C over a substantial portion of their length.  At 
these temperatures, the release fraction is predicted to be substantial.  Table 4-1 
summarizes the results for the high-temperature cladding fire discussed in Banba 
(2001). 
Table 4-1: Estimated Release Fractions of Main Elements During a High-
Temperature  Fire in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities (after Banba, 2001). 
Chemical Family Element or Isotope Release Fraction 
Noble gases 
Alkali Metals  
Halogens 
Chalcogens 
Alkali Earths 
Transition Elements 
Miscellaneous 
 
 
 
Kr, Xe 
Cs, Rb 
I 
Te, Se 
Sr, Ba, Y 
Zr 
Mo  
Ru 
Eu, Ce 
U 
Pu 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.02 
2 x 10-3 
2 x 10-4 – 2 x 10-3 
10-6 
2 x 10-5 
2 x 10-4 – 2 x 10-3 
10-6 – 6 x 10-5 
10-6 – 10-2 
 
Additional information on potential release fractions from heated spent fuel is provided 
by Restrepo (1991), as reported in DOE (1994).  The values are given in Table 4-2.  It 
can be seen that the values are somewhat lower for the noble gases, alkali metals, and 
halogens, but higher for chalcogens, alkali earths, and most other elements.  
   74
Table 4-2:  Estimated Release Fractions of Main Elements From Heated Spent 
Fuel (after Restrepo, 1991). 
Chemical Family Element or Isotope Release Fraction 
Noble gases 
Alkali Metals  
Halogens 
Chalcogens 
Alkali Earths 
Miscellaneous 
 
Kr, Xe 
Cs, Rb 
I 
Te, Se 
Sr, Ba, Y 
Mo 
Ru 
Ce, U, Pu 
Eu, Am 
0.5 
0.2 
0.05 
0.07 
0.03 
0.03 
2x10-3 
4x10-4 
6x10-4 
 
For a less severe accident in which fuel is exposed to air but does not reach 
temperatures at which a cladding fire ignites, and for a usual industrial type fire, it is 
assumed that a maximum temperature of fire is less than 900˚C.  Estimated release 
fractions of main elements during a low-temperature fire are given in Table 4-3.  For 
noble gases the value of 0.4 estimated by Travis et al. (1997) on the basis of the high 
burnup/high linear power calculation was used.  This value is therefore believed to be 
conservative.  The fractions for the alkali metals, halogens, chalcogens, alkali earth, 
molybdenum, ruthenium, and lanthanides were based on experimental observation 
(Lorenz, 1995; DOE, 1994)). 
Table 4-3:  Estimated Release Fractions of Main Elements During a Low-
Temperature Fire in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities (after Banba, 2001). 
Chemical Family Element or Isotope Release Fraction 
Noble gases 
Alkali Metals  
Halogens 
Chalcogens 
Alkali Earths 
Miscellaneous 
 
Kr, Xe 
Cs, Rb 
I 
Te, Se 
Sr, Ba, Y 
Mo, Ru, 
Eu, Ce 
U, Pu 
0.4 
10-6 – 10-8 
3 x 10-3 
10-5 – 10-7 
10-8 
10-7 – 10-8 
10-7 – 10-8 
10-7 – 10-8 
 
For mechanical destruction of the fuel, a complete failure of the cladding is assumed.  
This leads to a release of the volatile material present in the gap between the fuel matrix 
and the cladding.  A suggested release fraction in this case is reported by DOE (1994) to 
be 5% for noble gases, halogens (specifically, iodine), and alkali metals (specifically, 
cesium), and zero for all other elements.   
4.2.1 Identification of Potential Accidents 
4.2.1.1 Reactivity accident during refueling  
A risk estimation for a reactivity accident during defueling was carried out by Takano et 
al. (2001).  It is known that there have been two reactivity accidents during refueling by 
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the year of 1985.  It is possible to roughly estimate that about 270 submarine refuelings 
had taken place by the year 198529.  Each submarine is presumed to contain two 
identical reactor cores.  On this basis, it can be estimated that the frequency of reactivity 
accidents during refueling is approximately 0.37 % per refueling (two reactivity 
accidents among 540 reactor refuelings).  There are about 40 nuclear submarines in 
service and about 60 retired submarines at Russian Far East.  If we assume that all of 
these submarines will experience defueling within the next ten years, there will be 200 
reactor defueling processes.  Assuming the frequencies of reactivity accidents during 
defueling and refueling are the same30, the expected number of reactivity accidents over 
the next ten years is approximately 0.74.  The above estimation is very simple and the 
value might include large uncertainties.  After experiencing such accidents, some 
countermeasures were taken to prevent the occurrence of the similar sequences and, in 
this case, the frequency might be reduced.  However, such information is not available.  
In any case, it is clear that the likelihood of a criticality accident is non-negligible.   
It is difficult to estimate the amount of material that would be released in the event of a 
criticality accident.  However, the estimated excursion power used in the NATO (1998) 
study was estimated to be 2500 MWs (8x1019 fissions), which was considered to be 
sufficient to result in melting of the fuel cladding with a consequent steam explosion.  
We note that the Chazhma Bay accident was estimated to have had a power excursion 
of 5x1018 fissions, approximately one order of magnitude less (Sivintsev et al., 1994). 
We expect that the release fractions from a severe criticality accident on the order of 
that assumed in NATO (1998) would lie somewhere between the Chernobyl-type 
accident and those estimated in Table 4-1.  For less severe criticality accidents resulting 
in mechanical fuel destruction, a gap release of 5% for noble gases, iodine, and cesium 
may be more appropriate as the primary release would arise from the mechanical 
destruction of the fuel. 
4.2.1.2 Fire in dry storage facility or during defuelling 
Lysenko et al. (2002) have evaluated the short-range (<20 km) impacts of a fire accident 
involving spent nuclear fuel.  An estimation of the likelihood of such an accident was 
not provided.  A hypothetical aircraft accident can be assumed for the dry storage 
facilities, as the consequences of this accident are expected to bound all other dry 
storage accident scenarios involving an impact that results in fire.  Depending upon the 
method of construction of the facility and the exact location of the impact, much of the 
aircraft structure may be stopped by the dry storage building structure.  However, the 
heavy dense jet engine rotor shaft is expected to be capable of penetrating the building 
and damaging the containers within.  Due to the severity of the impact, it can be 
conservatively assumed that the cask is breached and the fuel elements in the cask are 
damaged.  The release of fission products occurs due to the impact and resultant fire.  
The fire is probably a normal industrial-type fire below 900 - 1000°C (that is, a low 
temperature fire), because this fire occurs from aviation fuel.  Therefore, fire 
                                                 
29
 If the refueling cycle was longer than that assumed, the estimated frequency would increase since the 
number of refuelings would have been less.  By the same reasoning, the existence of retired submarines 
will also make the frequency slightly higher. 
30
 Which is likely to be conservative.  Defueling procedures call for the maintenance of the core in a dry 
condition.  This significantly lowers the risk of a criticality accident by removing the moderator. 
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propagation is unlikely after an aircraft accident.  The likely release fractions for a low 
temperature fire were presented in Table 4-3.  The values given in Table 4-2 by 
Restrepo (1991) provide an upper bound on the release fraction for an intense fire that 
did not result in clad combustion.  For the fuel that is directly impacted and 
mechanically destroyed, the release fractions given by DOE (1994) are expected to be 
reasonable.  
4.2.1.3 Clad fires 
It is difficult to evaluate the potential for fuel fires, because the composition of the fuel 
and clad are not known.  Although it is believed that the fuel is stainless-steel clad 
(Lysenko et al, 2002), zirconium cladding cannot be ruled out.  If the fuel is clad with 
stainless steel, the maximum potential release fraction is likely to be less than that given 
in Table 4.1 because of the lack of a significant potential for a clad fire.  Stainless steel 
clad fuel may be subject to the formation of uranium hydride (UH3).  Uranium hydride 
is an ignitable and combustible compound for which a mass of 1 g is required for 
ignition.   Low-temperature ignition and combustion of UH3 may become an issue if 
water has been allowed to enter the transport casks.  As mentioned above, the formation 
of UH3 is of concern because of its low temperature of ignition and combustion.  The 
moisture level in dry storage facilities will be important to the spent fuel condition.  It 
was estimated that approximately 10 g of moisture could remain after drying spent fuel 
in a 7 m³ internal free volume storage system. If the potential quantity of reactive 
residual gas were approximately 0.6 moles of H2 and it all were to react with metallic U 
as a single location, the approximately 70 g of UH3 that could be formed.  This is 
considerably more than the quantity that may be required for ignition during subsequent 
fuel handling, packaging, or drying operations.  However, even if the burning of the fuel 
occurs, the temperature of fire is not expected to exceed the melting temperature of clad 
because of unfavorable self-sustaining rapid oxidation of clads.   
In the event that the fuel is zirconium clad, hydride formation is not likely.  
Thermodynamic calculations for the reaction of zirconium-clad UO2 commercial spent 
fuel with water indicate that UH3 formation is thermodynamically unfavorable 
(Guenther et al. 1996), and UH3 has not been a problem during pool storage of 
commercial UO2 spent fuel clad with zirconium alloys.  However, zirconium presents 
other potential problems.  Sailor et al. (1987) evaluated the likelihood of zirconium fires 
in drained spent fuel pools.  Although their results are primarily applicable to relatively 
fresh spent fuel in which the loss of decay heat removal is the initiating event, some 
aspects of the study are relevant if there are other heat sources (such as fuel oil fires or 
other chemical fires) present.  They found that temperatures as low as 650°C can be 
expected to cause clad failure and release of some fission products if the temperatures 
are sustained over a long period (several hours).  However, below 800°C the energy 
from oxidation is insufficient to significantly increase the fuel rod temperature.  If the 
external heat load is sufficient to heat zircalloy-clad fuel elements to about 900°C, a 
self-sustaining oxidation of zirconium (cladding fire) can occur.  That is, the exothermic 
oxidation reaction provides sufficient energy to match the external heat contribution and 
the temperature rises rapidly.  If self-sustaining oxidation occurs, the fuel rods are 
predicted to reach 1,500 to 2,100°C over a substantial portion of their length.  For the 
case of decay heat initiated clad fires, the most sensitive parameters for clad fire 
initiation are the decay heat level and the fuel element geometry (related to natural 
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circulation flow resistance).  This problem has been studied by Kupca and Natalizio 
(1999) for the case of spent fuel onboard decommissioned non-defueled submarines, 
who concluded that decay heat removal was unlikely to be a problem after two years of 
storage, even if there is a loss of coolant.  In summary, a zirconium cladding fire could 
result in a high-temperature fire, and thus the release fractions given in Table 4-1  are 
feasible.  Depending upon the storage configuration, the fire may or may not propagate.  
However, in the event of cask storage, it is not expected that the fire would propagate 
beyond a single casks.  For stainless-steel clad fuels, the limits given in Table 4-2 are 
expected to be reasonable upper bounds.   
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Selection of Target Region 
The analysis is carried out for Japan as the target region.  The selection of Japan is due 
to the following reasons: 
• As indicated in Chapter 2, Japan has a high probability (34-87%) of being affected 
by a major release from one of the facilities in southern Primorye Territory.  
Furthermore, the probability is highest in the winter, when precipitation in western 
Japan could result in washout or rainout of the transported material. 
• Japan is a densely populated region.  Widespread deposition over large areas could 
yield large collective doses. 
• Japan has expressed concern over the impact of the radiological impact of the 
Russian Pacific Fleet, as indicated by the financial assistance provided to the 
Russian Federation in construction of the LRW processing facility at Bolshoi 
Kamen.   
The selection of Japan as the target region does not imply that other regions, such as 
Korea, China, or Alaskan territories of the United States are not of interest.  However, 
with the possible exception of Northern China or the Korean peninsula, it is expected 
that the impacts on Japan would bound the impacts on the other neighboring countries.  
However, with the development of an appropriate atmospheric transfer factor, a similar 
analysis could be carried out for the different regions of these countries. 
4.3.2 Critical Deposition Level 
In this study, the critical deposition level χcrit was defined on the basis of a total 
effective equivalent dose standard. Because the 10 mSv annual dose discussed in ICRP 
82 (ICRP, 2000) refers to all sources of exposure (i.e., not only exposure due to the 
accident), and because this refers to post-accident intervention rather than pre-accident 
planning, a level below this was taken.  In this case, the intervention level is defined as 
the level of deposition necessary to yield an individual lifetime effective dose of 1 mSv.  
Given that the accident occurs, this gives rise to a lifetime risk of death from exposure 
to the deposited nuclides at the level of 5x10-5, which we consider to be consistent with 
standards for both practices (exposures which are lower but more likely to occur) and 
interventions (in which the benefit of the intervention must be weighed against the cost 
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and disruption entailing from the intervention).  It should be emphasized again that the 
purpose of this analysis is simply to screen the facilities giving rise to the risk.  A 
lifetime dose of 1 mSv from an exposure that has a relatively low probability of 
occurrence is, in our view, a reasonably conservative figure for use in screening 
assessments. 
The scientific challenge arises in the identification of the appropriate deposition-dose 
conversion factor.  There are a number of methods for determining this conversion 
factor, two of which were examined in this study.  The first approach involved the 
computation of nation-specific dose factors for Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States for the nuclides identified above.  The computer code RESRAD (Yu et al., 
1993, 2000) was used to develop dose factors for soil contamination.  This computed 
dose factor was based on the dose received in the first year after deposition and is thus 
suitable for comparison with annual dose limits.  The second approach was simply the 
use of the deposition-dose parameter P25 calculated by UNSCEAR for estimating the 
effect of fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons (UNSCEAR, 1993).  This 
value is more suitable for estimating the total dose received.  The values in this report 
are based on the UNSCEAR (1993) values and a basic lifetime dose limit of 1 mSv from 
all pathways (ingestion, inhalation, and external ground-plane irradiation) because these 
resulted in more limiting (lower) critical deposition values, in keeping with the 
conservative nature of the assessment.   
4.3.3 Determination of Atmospheric Transfer Coefficient 
The goal of the atmospheric transport analysis is to determine the feasible range of the 
atmospheric transfer coefficients for different radionuclides.  At a given location, one 
can define a transfer coefficient for dry and wet deposition.  As discussed in Section 
4.1.2, the transfer coefficient can be estimated by a variety of methods.  An example of 
a computational approach was previously discussed in Section 3.2.  Romanova and 
Takano (2002) used the computer code WSPEEDI (Chino et al, 1995) to determine the 
ground level deposition of 137Cs under three wind conditions, assuming a unit release.  
The results of dry deposition modeling in that report were shown in Figure 3-16.  In 
each wind condition, the maximum value (observed at or near the release point) was 
computed to be between 2-4 x10-12 m-2, and maximum centerline deposition over much 
of Japan ranges between 10-13 - 10-12 m-2.   
Based upon the results of Romanova and Takano (2002), the dry deposition transfer 
coefficient is set at 5x10-13 m-2.  We set this transfer coefficient equal for all 
radionuclides, which is functionally equivalent to assuming that all nuclides are 
characterized by the same deposition velocity.  In reality, this transfer coefficient is 
likely to be different for each radionuclide.  It will vary according to both the chemical 
form of the radionuclide and with the aerosol size fraction.  Both of these will be 
strongly affected by the release event.  It will also vary considerably according to the 
region of the atmosphere where the radioactivity is transported (i.e., boundary layer 
transport, stratospheric transport, etc).  However, for the sake of simplifying the 
example, we assume that the dry deposition velocity for all radionuclides is equal to 0.1 
cm/s, as assumed by Romanova and Takano (2002).  As previously discussed, the ratio 
of the atmospheric transfer factors for wet deposition to that of dry deposition is set at 
100. 
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4.4 Results 
The limited set of radionuclides for which both inventory and dose information is 
available is used.  This subset includes cesium, strontium, americium, and isotopes of 
plutonium.  Table 4-4 shows the critical deposition values and the minimum critical 
emission under wet and dry conditions for the selected radionuclides  
Table 4-4:  Nuclide-Specific Parameters for Facility Screening Analysis 
Minimum Critical Emission Qcrit,I,Japan 
(Bq) 
Nuclide 
Deposition-Dose Value 
(mSv per kBq/m², 
UNSCEAR 1993) 
Critical Deposition 
Value (kBq/m²) 
(based on 1 mSv) (based on dry 
deposition) 
(based on wet 
deposition) 
239Pu 0.85 1.2 2.4x1015 2.4x1013 
240Pu 0.85 1.2 2.4x1015 2.4x1013 
241Pu 0.012 83.3 1.7x1017 1.7x1015 
241Am 0.98 1.0 2.0x1015 2.0x1013 
90Sr 0.057 17.7 3.5x1016 3.5x1014 
137Cs 0.15 6.6 1.3x1016 1.3x1014 
 
It should be noted that the computed critical deposition values for 137Cs are of the same 
order of magnitude as that existing across much of the Northern Hemisphere as a result 
of atmospheric weapons testing (3.4 kBq/m²), about ten times background for 90Sr (2.1 
kBq/m²), and roughly two orders of magnitude greater than background for the 
plutonium isotopes.   
We then use data on radionuclide inventory provided by Lavkovsky (2000)31 for spent 
fuel storage on floating workshops and shore-based facilities in the Primorye Region.  
Because we have no isotope-specific data on the material in storage at the facilities at 
Cape Sysoeva, we assume that the isotopes are present in the same ratio as in the spent 
fuel stored onboard the PM-74.  This results in the computed inventory provided in 
Table 4-5.  This is probably reasonable for Buildings 11 and 30, which are stated to 
contain spent nuclear fuel (Danilyan et al., 2000a).  However, because the contents of 
Construction 7 and 31 are only given as solid waste - with no indication of the type or 
form - this is less accurate. 
The net inventory in the major (Itotal>1000 TBq) facilities in Southern Primorye 
Territory is given in Table 4-6.  The ratio of the minimum critical emission to the 
activity in each source yields the critical release fraction for an accident involving the 
spent fuel in each facility.  Dividing the critical emission values in Table 4-4 by the 
inventories given in Table 4-6 yields the critical airborne release fraction under either 
wet or dry conditions, shown in Table 4-7 and 4-8 respectively.  A designation of 
">>100%" indicates a ratio greater than 10.  A designation of ">100%" indicates a ratio 
                                                 
31
 Updated information on inventories has been prepared by Kobzev and Lavkovsky (2001) and is being 
summarized by Brown et al. (2003).  The updated inventories will be used in subsequent analyses. 
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Table 4-5:  Estimated Radionuclide Inventories (Bq) in Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Waste Management Facilities Based 
upon Analogy with Spent Fuel Stored on the PM-74  
(based on Table 3 of Lavkovsky, 2000) 
 
 
Building 11 Building 30 Construction 7 Construction  31
239Pu 9.08x1012 1.47x1014 4.13x1012 2.41x1012 
240Pu 2.14x1012 3.46x1013 9.71x1011 5.67x1011 
241Pu 1.61x1014 2.62x1015 7.34x1013 4.28x1013 
241Am 5.0x1011 8.0x1012 2.3x1011 1.3x1011 
90Sr 3.48x1015 5.64x1016 1.58x1015 9.22x1014 
137Cs 3.74x1015 6.07x1016 1.70x1015 9.93x1014 
Total 8.14x1015 1.32x1017 3.70x1015 2.16x1015 
 
 
Table 4-6:  Isotopic Inventories (Bq) in Major Facilities in Southern Primorye Territory  
(Based On Table 3 of Lavkovsky, 2000, and Table 1 of Lysenko Et Al., 2002) 
 
Bolshoi 
Kamen Pavlovsk Bay Cape Sysoeva 
Reference Submarine 
(Lysenko et al., 2002) 
Nuclide PM-74 PM-80 PM-125 PM-133 K-610 Bldg 11 Bldg 30 Bldg 7 Bldg 31 One core Both cores 
239Pu 2.7x1013 3.2x1012 1.1x1013 1.1x1013 3.4x1012 9.1x1012 1.5x1014 4.1x1012 2.4x1012 6.5x1012 1.3 x1013 
240Pu 6.4x1012 5.1x1011 2.7x1012 2.7x1012 8.0x1011 2.1x1012 3.5x1013 9.7x1011 5.7x1011 4.1x1012 8.2 x1012 
241Pu 4.8x1014 7.2x1012 2.2x1014 2.2x1014 3.2x1013 1.6x1014 2.6x1015 7.3x1013 4.3x1013 1.1x1015 2.2 x1015 
241Am 1.5x1012 9.6x1011 8.3x1010 8.3x1010 1.2x1012 5.0x1011 8.0x1012 2.3x1011 1.3x1011 1.1x1013 2.2 x1013 
90Sr 1.0x1016 1.1x1015 4.5x1015 4.5x1015 9.5x1014 3.5x1015 5.6x1016 1.6x1015 9.2x1014 4.2x1015 8.4 x1015 
137Cs 1.1x1016 1.1x1015 4.8x1015 4.8x1015 1.0x1015 3.7x1015 6.1x1016 1.7x1015 9.9x1014 4.9x1015 9.8 x1015 
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Table 4-7: Critical release fractions under dry deposition conditions 
 
Bolshoi 
Kamen Pavlovsk Bay Cape Sysoeva Reference Submarine
Nuclide PM-74 PM-80 PM-125 PM-133 K-610 Bldg 11 Bldg 30 Bldg 7 Bldg 31 One core Both cores
Sum of 
Fractions 1.1 0.12 0.50 0.50 0.11 0.39 6.4 0.18 0.10 0.51 1.0 
239Pu >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% 
240Pu >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% 
241Pu >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% 
241Am >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% 
90Sr >100% >>100% >100% >100% >>100% >>100% 63% >>100% >>100% >100% >100% 
137Cs >100% >>100% >100% >100% >>100% >100% 22% >100% >>100% >100% >100% 
 
Table 4-8: Critical release fraction under wet deposition conditions 
 
Bolshoi 
Kamen Pavlovsk Bay Cape Sysoeva Reference Submarine 
Nuclide PM-74 PM-80 PM-125 PM-133 K-610 Bldg 11 Bldg 30 Bldg 7 Bldg 31 One core Both cores 
Sum of 
Fractions 110 12 50 50 11 39 640 18 10 51 100 
239Pu 87% >100% >100% >100% >100% >100% 16% >100% >100% >100% >100% 
240Pu >100% >>100% >100% >100% >>100% >>100% 68% >>100% >>100% >100% >100% 
241Pu >100% >>100% >100% >100% >>100% >>100% 64% >>100% >>100% >100% 76% 
241Am >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >>100% >100% >>100% >>100% >100% 93% 
90Sr 3% 32% 8% 8% 37% 10% 1% 22% 38% 8% 4% 
137Cs 1% 12% 3% 3% 13% 4% 0.2% 8% 13% 3% 1% 
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between 1 and 10.  The Sum of Fractions entry represents the computation of Equation 
4.4, and allows the contribution from all nuclides to be combined for screening 
purposes.  A sum of fractions of greater than one indicates that a sufficient inventory to 
exceed the critical deposition level could (but may not) exist in the facility. 
It can immediately be seen that only three facilities (the floating workshop PM-74, both 
cores on a single submarine, or the spent fuel warehouse Building 30) contain sufficient 
inventories to cause lifetime doses exceeding one mSv under dry deposition conditions.  
The dose is primarily due to 90Sr and 137Cs.  However, the inventories of the PM-74 and 
a single submarine are just at the limit.  If an accident either affected only a single core 
or single tank, or if less than the full amount of all nuclides were released, the lifetime 
dose would be less than 1 mSv.   
Table 4-9:  Airborne Release Fractions under different accident conditions 
Element Chernobyl (NEA, 1995) “Gap” Activity Loss  (DOE, 1994) 
High Temperature 
Fire 
Low Temperature 
Fire 
Pu 3.5% 0 0.0001%-1% N/r 
Sr 4-6% 0 0.2% 10-8 
Cs 20-40% 5% 90% 10-6 - 10-8 
 
When the critical release fractions are compared to the values in Table 4-9, it can be 
seen that only a major release from Building 30, the spent fuel storage facility at Cape 
Sysoeva, is capable of releasing sufficient material to result in lifetime doses above one 
mSv.  Such an accident would have to be one that results in a high temperature fire or 
criticality accident affecting between a quarter to a half of the spent fuel assemblies in 
storage.  A low-temperature fire or a gap release would not be expected to give rise to a 
sufficient release.  
However, under wet deposition conditions, none of the facilities can be completely 
ruled out simply based on atmospheric dispersion alone.  The critical release fraction 
must then be compared to the airborne release fractions as shown in Table 4-9 for 
plutonium, strontium, and cesium under a variety of accident conditions.  It can be 
immediately seen that it would be extremely unlikely that transboundary plutonium 
contamination could occur at levels sufficient to cause a lifetime dose of greater than 1 
mSv.  The worst-case release fraction of plutonium, a Chernobyl-type reactor fire 
affecting all of the fuel stored in Building 30, is still considerably less than the critical 
release fraction.  However, the fission products 137Cs - and to a much lesser extent, 90Sr 
- are present in sufficient (i.e., the lowest critical release fraction is lower than the 
largest feasible release fraction given by Table 4-9) quantities in several facilities.  
Damage to less than 10% of the fuel elements in Building 30 (or all of the fuel elements 
on board the floating workshops or in a single core) that resulted in loss of the "gap" 
activity of 137Cs could result in areas of contamination above 6 kBq/m² in Japan, but 
only if a heavy rainfall event occurred during the passage of the cloud.  Damage to  
1) the majority of the the spent fuel assemblies on the two floating workshops, in a 
single submarine core, or in Building 11; or to  
2) about a third of the fuel onboard the PM-74 or both submarine cores,  
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that resulted in a gap release could also just exceed the critical level in the event of 
heavy rainfall during cloud passage.  A criticality accident or high temperature fire 
would also be sufficient and would require less fuel to be affected. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
K. L. Compton, V. M. Novikov, F. L. Parker, Yu. V. Sivintsev  
There have been extensive studies of the current and potential environmental impact of 
Russian Northern fleet activities.  However, despite the fact that the total number of 
ships in both fleets are comparable, there have been very few studies published in the 
open literature of the impact of the Pacific fleet.  This study of the Pacific fleet's impact 
on neighboring countries was undertaken to partially remedy this lack of analysis.  This 
study is focused on an evaluation of the inventory of major sources of radioactive 
material associated with the decommissioning of nuclear submarines, and an evaluation 
of releases to the atmosphere and their long-range (>100km) transboundary transport.  
A logical next step would be an analysis of the effects within Russia. 
The main bases of the Pacific fleet are located in southern Primorye Territory, near 
Vladivostok, and in Kamchatka Oblast, near Petropavlovsk.  Information on the amount 
and type of radioactive material stored at both sites has been provided by collaborating 
Russian scientific institutes.  The transport analyses carried out by the IIASA RAD 
project and presented in this report comprise two elements:  1) a set of trajectory 
analyses of the probability of contaminants reaching certain countries and during which 
times of the year, and 2) a case study to evaluate one of the more significant cases, 
namely, transport of radioactive material to Japan from an accident in Southern 
Primorye Territory.  Finally, a description of an approach to identify high-priority 
facilities for remediation or further evaluation, based upon their potential for 
transboundary impact, was applied to evaluate the effect of an accident in southern 
Primorye Territory upon Japan.   
The potential human health impact of these facilities is affected by a large number of 
variables:  the type of accident; the height to which the contaminant cloud is driven into 
the atmosphere; the time of year, which will profoundly impact the path and dilution of 
the contaminants and the potential exposure pathways; the degree of deposition of the 
contaminant; and the human and environmental exposure.   
It is important to note that because of the proximity of the facility in southern Primorye 
Territory to China and the Korean Peninsula, intermediate range atmospheric transport 
(<100km) might be also of transboundary nature, and may have serious impacts.  
However, apart from noting the potential for transboundary impacts to North China or 
North Korea resulting from intermediate range transport, the effects are not discussed 
further.  Our ongoing work (Brown et al., 2003) is studying that problem. 
5.1 Conclusions 
5.1.1 Source Term 
The report contains the details of the types of ships involved, the amount of radioactive 
material in the spent fuel and reactor components, problems in operation, storage of fuel 
and wastes and details of accidents that have occurred.  The information was provided 
by Russian scientific institutions (Kurchatov Institute, CDB "Lazurit", and DalRAO), 
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and was evaluated by the IIASA RAD project. The following conclusions can be drawn 
with respect to the evaluation of sources:  
1) Existing information about the source term in Russian Far East is limited and 
subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Significantly fewer international projects deals with environmental issues in the Russian 
Far East, possibly because of significantly less attention of Western countries to that 
region.  There are significant differences in the reported descriptions of the 
environmental situation in the Russian Far East.  The task of developing a reliable 
source term is hampered by the variety of names used to refer to different facilities, the 
inconsistencies between reported inventories from different sources, and the omissions 
in available reports of important facilities.  The reported inventory of 2200 TBq in 
Construction 19 at Kamchatka is a striking example of the problems involved in 
compiling a consistent source term from the available literature.  There was no definite 
explanation why the official Russian data shows that the Pacific Fleet, having less than 
70% of the capacity of Northern Fleet, produced twelve times more radioactive waste 
than the Northern Fleet.  One possible explanation is that the infrastructure in the Far 
East is so poor that no transportation of radioactive waste to the storages in the central 
part of Russia took place in the past.  However, this is only a conjecture. 
2) Despite the problems, it has been possible to draw a general picture of the sources 
of radioactive contamination in the Russian Far East.  It can be seen that there are 
a few large sources that contribute the vast majority of the radioactive inventory.  
Of all categories of radioactive material (liquid waste, solid waste, and spent fuel), 
spent fuel contributes the vast majority of the radioactive inventory, followed by 
solid radioactive waste.  The majority of the radioactivity in liquid radioactive 
waste is associated with the wet storage of damaged spent fuel elements. 
For spent fuel and solid radioactive waste, the inventories are dominated by the Cape 
Sysoeva facility.  The largest single source of radioactivity in spent fuel is Building 30.  
For solid radioactive waste, the dominant sources are constructions 1-5, 7, 31, and 32, 
all of which contain more that 1,000 TBq and which together constitute 99% by activity 
(11,000 TBq) of the solid radioactive waste in the Russian Far East32.  The vast majority 
(97.5%) of the reported radioactive inventory in liquid radioactive waste is onboard the 
two floating workshops containing damaged spent fuel, with most of this being onboard 
the PM-32 (210 TBq out of a total of 220 TBq, or 95%) (Danilyan et al. 2000b, Table 
18).   
3) Additional data necessary for a full risk analysis is beginning to be obtained, but is 
not yet complete.   
These studies made the radiological picture clearer not only by specifying the 
radioactive inventory but also by making available data important for risk analysis, such 
as the conditions on ships for storage of spent nuclear fuel.  It is clear from the 
description of the service ships that most of the ships are in extremely poor condition 
and are storing wastes for which they were not designed.  However, critical information 
for properly evaluating potential releases is missing, particularly for land-based 
                                                 
32
 Or 83% of a total inventory of 13,000 TBq, depending upon the true inventory of Construction 19 in 
Kamchatka.  The inventory of Construction 19 in Kamchatka needs to be clarified, as the discrepancy has 
a significant impact on the results. 
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storages.  Information on the design and construction of spent fuel storage facilities, 
such as the conditions of storage (the type of storage, the characteristics and condition 
of the fuel stored in the building, the availability and condition of the systems for fire 
protection and heat removal, the conditions of storage that would affect the ability of a 
fire to propagate throughout the facility, etc) is necessary to evaluate the risk posed by 
these facilities. 
5.1.2 Transport and Consequence Analysis 
The evaluation of long-range atmospheric transport and a review of potential 
consequences were carried out by the IIASA RAD Project based on the data provided 
by Russian scientific institutes and publicly available meteorological data. The 
following conclusions can be drawn with respect to airborne transport and the 
consequences following a major accident at a Russian Pacific Fleet facility near 
Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk: 
1. Radioactive material released from either site could reach neighboring countries 
within a relatively short time (twelve hours to three days) 
The results of the trajectory analysis show that releases from the facilities in southern 
Primorye Territory are most likely to pass over North China and North Japan.  
Transport time to North China and North Japan could occur in as little as 0.5 and 1.6 
days, respectively. For releases at the Kamchatka sites, the Aleutian Islands and the 
Western Shore of Alaska are at the highest risk of impact. Because of their greater 
distance from the site, their average transport times are 3.0 and 5.1 days, respectively. 
2. Although detectable amounts of radioactivity may reach neighboring countries, 
committed effective doses from inhalation and external irradiation as a result of 
exposure during passage of the contaminated cloud are expected to be several 
orders of magnitude  below 1 mSv. 
Using the computer code WSPEEDI together with meteorological data provided by 
JAERI, the impact on Korea and the Japanese islands from a hypothetical accident in 
southern Primorye Territory was evaluated under three typical winter weather patterns.  
A criticality accident similar to that which occurred in August 1985 in Chazhma Bay 
that resulted in a release of 2.5x1012 Bq of iodine (2.9x1010 Bq 131I, 6.2x1011 Bq 133I, 
and 1.8x1012 Bq 135I) could result in a maximum dose in Japan of ~4x10-8 mSv under 
either strong or weak wind conditions.  The maximum dose in Korea would be similar 
(~2x10-8 mSv), but would occur as a result of a cyclonic wind condition.  If the same 
accident were to release fission products (3.5x1014 Bq 137Cs, 3.5x1013 Bq 134Cs, and 
7x1013 Bq 90Sr), the maximum doses would be higher (up to ~10-3 mSv in Japan, due to 
137Cs and 90Sr, and ~5x10-4 mSv in Korea), but still quite low.  It is worth noting that 
there have been three severe submarine reactor accidents in the past near Vladivostok, 
including one reactivity accident and two loss of coolant accidents.  None of these 
accidents appear to have resulted in appreciable contamination in Japan.   
3. The number of facilities with sufficient inventories of radioactive material to give 
rise to any significant transboundary contamination is very limited.33   
                                                 
33
 As noted, we defined significant contamination as that giving rise to a lifetime dose of 1 mSv, 
corresponding to a lifetime risk of fatal cancer due to exposure to deposited radioactivity of 5x10-5. 
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The lack of a probabilistic risk assessment of the sites in the Russian Far East available 
to us, coupled with a lack of data about the details of the facilities, forced us to use an 
inverse approach based on the critical value of radioactive deposition in the neighboring 
country as a result of accidental radioactive release from a nuclear risk site followed by 
atmospheric transfer to the country of interest. Application of a screening methodology 
to the inventories reported for Vladivostok to evaluate the risk to Japan indicates that 
only one source - Building 30, the storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Cape 
Sysoeva Waste Management Facility - might be capable of causing significant 
contamination in Japan due to dry deposition.  A major accident at this facility releasing 
on the order of 1016 Bq (~300,000 Ci) of 137Cs (~20% of the total inventory) could result 
in contamination due to dry deposition at levels of about 6 kBq/m², resulting in 
individual lifetime equivalent doses on the order of 1 mSv.  However, such an accident 
would require either a criticality accident affecting all of the fuel at the facility or a 
high-temperature fire that propagated throughout the majority of the facility.  Such an 
accident seems very unlikely, although it is not possible to evaluate the likelihood of 
such an accident without additional data on the facility and the conditions of storage.  
Although fallout from an accident at the other facilities - including the decommissioned 
submarines - cannot be ruled out, they are not expected to be capable of giving rise to 
widespread contamination.  Deposition above the "critical" level (6 kBq/m²) in Japan 
would only be possible if rather heavy rainfall occurred during passage of the peak of 
the cloud resulting from a major accident.  Transboundary plutonium contamination is 
not expected even under worst-case conditions, such as complete spent fuel melting 
combined with rainfall during plume passage over Japan. 
5.2 Recommendations 
1) The only significant source of transboundary risk to Japan is an accident involving 
severe damage to large amounts of spent fuel.  Measures to improve spent fuel 
management in the Russian Far East and to ensure the integrity of the spent fuel 
could reduce the potential transboundary risks to Japan.  Ensuring that criticality and 
fire protection systems are adequate may be particularly useful. 
2) The number of facilities that warrant further investigation in regard to potential 
transboundary impacts to Japan are limited, and most are at the Cape Sysoeva Waste 
Management Facility.  Better information at this site, including the details of 
construction, the condition of the facilities, and a fire safety assessment, would yield 
a better picture of the transboundary risks.   
3) The generally lower inventories of radioactivity in storage near Petropavlovsk and 
the longer distances to the United States suggests that the transboundary risks to the 
United States are also expected to be low.  However, this should be confirmed with 
a more detailed evaluation of the potential for atmospheric transport and a clearer 
inventory of radioactive material in storage in Kamchatka Oblast. 
 
   88
6 References 
1. Alexander, C.A., and others (1984).  “Actinide Release from Irradiated Fuel at High 
Temperatures", Proceedings of the ANS Topical Meeting on Fission Product and 
Source Term Research, Snowbird, UT, July 1984. 
2. Baker, Wayman, ed. (1992).  Research Highlights of the NMC Development 
Division: 1989-1991.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Washington, DC.  469 pp. 
3. Baklanov A., A. Mahura, D. Jaffe, L. Thaning, R. Bergman, and R. Andres (2002).  
"Atmospheric Transport Patterns and Estimation of Consequences after the Nuclear 
Accident at the Russian North-West"  Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 
60(23-48) 
4. Banba, T. (2001).  "Radionuclide release fractions from the spent nuclear fuel 
storage facilities under potential fire accident conditions in the Russian Far East 
Region"  Internal RAD Project Report, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
5. Bellona (1996).  The Russian Northern Fleet Report 2, Bellona Foundation, 
(available at http:/www.bellona.no/imaker?id=10090&sub=1, accessed March 
2001) 
6. Bradley, D.J. (1997).  Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management 
in the Former Soviet Union, Battelle Press, Columbus, USA, 716 pp.    
7. Brown, K.G., and others.  (2003).  Analysis of the Dose Commitments Resulting 
from Atmospheric Transport and Deposition fron Nuclear Risk Sites in the Russian 
Far East.  (IIASA interim report, in preparation).  International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
8. Chaikovskaya, E. L., V. L. Visotskii, and D.V. Gichev.  (2001).  "Characteristics of 
the Formation of the Radiation Situation on Territory of Primorskii Territory."  
Russian Journal of Atomic Energy, 91:3(223-237) 
9. Chino, M., H. Ishikawa, H. Yamazawa, H. Nagai, and S. Morinchi (1995).  
WSPEEDI (Worldwide Version of SPEEDI) A Computer Code System for 
Prediction of Radiological Impacts on Japanese due to Nuclear Accident in Foreign 
Countries.  Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Japan. 
10. Danielsen, E. (1961). "Trajectories: Isobaric, Isentropic and Actual" Journal of 
Meteorology 18(479-486) 
11. Danilyan V.A., V. L. Vysotsky, and A. A. Maksimov (2000a).  "Radioecological 
Situation on territory of land-based technical bases of Far Eastern region" Russian 
Journal of Atomic Energy 89:2(673–679) 
12. Danilyan V. A., Vysotsky V. L., A. A. Maksimov., and Yu.V. Sivintsev (2000b) 
"Effect of the Utilization of Nuclear-Powered Submarines on the Radioecological 
Conditions in the Far-East Region" Russian Journal of Atomic Energy 89:6(982-
1003) 
13. Davis, P. A., M. R. Avadhanula, D. Cancio, P. Carboneras, P. Coughtrey, G. 
Johansson, R. H. Little, G. M. Smith and B. M. Watkins (1998).  "BIOMOVS II: An 
   89
international test of the performance of environmental transfer models"  Journal of 
Environmental Radioactivity 42:2-3(117-130)  
14. Desiato, F., D. Anfossi, S. T. Castelli, E. Ferrero and G. Tinarelli (1998). "The role 
of wind field, mixing height and horizontal diffusivity investigated through two 
Lagrangian particle models"  Atmospheric Environment, 32:24(4157-4165)  
15. DOE (1994).  Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for 
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities (DOE-HDBK-3010-94) U.S. Department of Energy 
16. Draxler, R. (1987).  "Sensitivity of the trajectory model to the spatial and temporal 
resolution of the meteorological data during CAPTEX" Journal of Climatology and 
Applied Meteorology 26(1577-1588) 
17. Egorov, N.N., V. Novikov, F. L. Parker, and V. Popov, Eds. (2000).  Radiation 
Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex Earthscan Publications, London.  236 pp. 
18. Goriglejan, E.A. (1999).  "Design Support to Minimize the Risk of Environmental 
Impact of Damaged Nuclear Steam Generating Plants of the Russian Nuclear 
Submarines During Their Long-Term Storage in Sarcophaguses".  pp 291-302 in 
Analysis of Risks Associated with Nuclear Submarine Decommissioning, 
Dismantling, and Disposal, A. A. Sarkisov and A. Tournyol du Clos, eds.  Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, The Netherlands. 
19. Guenther, et al. (1996).  Initial Evaluation of Dry Storage Issues for Spent Nuclear 
Fuels in Wet Storage at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (INEL-96/0140) 
20. Handler, J. (1998).  "The Lasting Legacy - Nuclear Submarine Disposal".  Janes 
Navy International, 103:1(12-20), Jan/Feb 1998  
21. Handler, J. (1995).  "Russia's Pacific Fleet - Problems with Nuclear Waste".  Janes 
Intelligence Review, 7:3(136-140), March 1995 
22. Handler, J. (1994a).  Preliminary Report on Greenpeace Visit to Vladivostok and 
Areas around the Chazhma Bay and Bolshoi Kamen Submarine Repair and 
Refueling Facilities, Greenpeace, Washington, DC.   
23. Handler, J. (1994b).   "Russia's Pacific Fleet - Submarine Bases and Facilities".  
Janes Intelligence Review, April 1994, pp.166-171 
24. Hanna, S.R., G.A. Briggs, and R. Hosker (1982).  Handbook on Atmospheric 
Diffusion (DOE/TIC-11223) Office of Health and Environmental Research, US 
Department of Energy, Washington, DC. 
25. Harris, J. M. & Kahl, J. D. (1990). "A descriptive atmospheric transport climatology 
for Mauna Loa Observatory, using clustered trajectories"  Journal of Geophysical 
Research (13651-13667) 
26. Harris, J.M. and Kahl, J.D. (1994).  "Analysis of 10-day Isentropic Flow Patterns 
for Barrow, Alaska: 1985-1992" Journal of Geophysical Research 99(25845-25855) 
27. ICRP (2000).  Protection of the Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation 
Exposure (ICRP Publication 82).  International Commission on Radiation 
Protection, Elsevier Science Ltd. 
   90
28. Interfax (2002).  "Fire breaks out in Russian Pacific Fleet's nuclear submarine", 
November 22, 2002 (cited in RANSAC Nuclear News, accessed 9 Dec 2002 from 
http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/nuclearnews/11.22.02.html#1m)  
29. Ishikawa, H. (1995).  "Evaluation of the Effect of Horizontal Diffusion on the Long-
range Atmospheric Transport Simulation with Chernobyl data" Journal of Applied 
Meteorology 34:7(1653-1665) 
30. Ishikawa, H. (1994).  "Development of Worldwide Version of system for Prediction 
of Environmental Emergency Dose Information, WSPEEDI (III)" Journal of 
Nuclear Science and Technology (Japan) 31:9(969–978) 
31. Jaffe, D., A. Mahura, and R. Andres (1997a).  Atmospheric Transport Pathways to 
Alaska from Potential Radionuclide Sites in the Former Soviet Union (Research 
Report, UAF-ADEC Project 96-001) Fairbanks, AK. 71 pp. 
32. Jaffe, D.A., A. Mahura, J. Kelley, J. Atkins, P. C. Novelli, and J. Merrill (1997b). 
"Impact of Asian Emissions on the Remote North Pacific Atmosphere: 
Interpretation of CO Data from Shemya, Guam, Midway and Mauna Loa" Journal 
of Geophysical Research 23(28627-28636) 
33. Jaffe, D., A. Mahura, R. Andres, A. Baklanov, L. Thaning, R. Bergman, and S. 
Morozov (1998). Atmospheric Transport from the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Pilot 
Study Research Report, UAF-FOA-BECN Joint Project) 61 pp. 
34. Kahl, J.D. (1996). "On the prediction of trajectory model error" Atmospheric 
Environment 30(2945-2957) 
35. Kirchner, G., S. R. Peterson, U. Bergström, S. Bushell, P. Davis, V. Filistovic, T. G. 
Hinton, P. Krajewski, T. Riesen and P. U. de Haag (1998). "Effect of user 
interpretation on uncertainty estimates: examples from the air-to-milk transfer of 
radiocesium" Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 42:2-3(177-190) 
36. Kobzev, V. I., and S. A. Lavkovsky (2001).  "Collection, Processing and 
Submission of  Information in Addition to the Existing Database of  ISTC Project 
101 on Radioactive Waste Resulting from the Russian Nuclear Fleet Activity at the 
Far East", Contractor Report to IIASA of July 30 2001, Lazurit Central Design 
Bureau, Nizhniy Novgorod, Russian Federation. 
37. Kudrik, I. (1999). "Spent fuel storage barge on fire", (accessed 9 Dec 2002 from 
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/pacific/incidents/13896.html)  
38. Kupca, S. and A. Natalizio (1999).  "Accident Risk Associated with Fueled 
Decommissioned Nuclear Powered Submarines.  pp 41-52 in Analysis of Risks 
Associated with Nuclear Submarine Decommissioning, Dismantling, and Disposal, 
A. A. Sarkisov and A. Tournyol du Clos, eds.  Kluwer Academic Publishers, The 
Netherlands. 
39. Kutcher V.A. et al. (1996).  "Nuclear Submarines of Russia. First Generation 
(Vol.IV, Part 1)", "Rubin" Central Design Bureau of Marine Technologies, St. 
Petersburg (in Russian, cited in Lavkovsky 2000) 
40. Kuzin, V.P. and V.N. Nikolsky (1996).  "USSR Navy 1945-1991" Historical Marine 
Society, St. Petersburg (in Russian, cited in Lavkovsky 2000) 
   91
41. Lavkovsky, S. A. (2000).  "Selection  and Submission of  Information from the 
Existing Database of  ISTC Project 101 on Radioactive Wastes Resulting  from  the 
Russian Nuclear Fleet Activities at the Far East", Contractor Report to IIASA of 
December 9 2000, Lazurit Central Design Bureau, Nizhniy Novgorod, Russian 
Federation. 
42. Lorenz, R.A., and M.F. Osborne (1995). A Summary of ORNL Fission Product 
Release Test With Recommended Release Rates and Diffusion Coefficients 
(NUREG/CR-6261) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. 
43. Lysenko, N. I., B. G. Pologich, and Yu. V. Sivintsev (2002).  Radioecological 
consequences of accidental helicopter/airplane fall on a nuclear submarine during a 
removal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or on a shore storehouse of SNF (Paper 
Number 31/3-529-02), Russian Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute", Moscow, 
Russia. 
44. Mahura, A. (2002)  Assessment of Impact of Russian Nuclear Fleet Operations on 
Russian Far Eastern Coastal Regions (IR-02-004).  International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
45. Mahura, A., A. Baklanov, J.H. Sorensen, F. Parker, V. Novikov, Kevin Brown, and 
K.L. Compton.  (2002) Probabilistic Analysis of Atmospheric Transport and 
Deposition Patterns from Nuclear Risk Sites in Russian Far East (Scientific Report 
02-09), Danish Meteorological Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark/ International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. December 2002. 
46. Mahura A., D.A. Jaffe, R.J. Andres, and J. T. Merrill (1999a).  "Atmospheric 
transport pathways from the Bilibino nuclear power plant to Alaska"  Atmospheric 
Environment 33:30(5115-5122) 
47. Mahura A., D. Jaffe and R. Andres (1999b).  "Air Flow Patterns and Precipitation 
Probability Fields for the Kola NPP".  pp. 87-93 in Abstracts of the International 
Conference "Nuclear Risks, Environmental and Development Cooperation in the 
North of Europe", held 19-23 June 1999 in Apatity, Murmansk Region, Russia.  
48. Mahura, A., D. Jaffe, R. Andres, D. Dasher, and J. Merrill (1997a).  "Atmospheric 
Transport Pathways to Alaska from Potential Radionuclide Sites in the Former 
Soviet Union" pp 173-174 in Volume 1 of Proceedings of American Nuclear 
Society Sixth Topical Meeting on Emergency Preparedness and Response, held 
April 1997in San Francisco, CA.  
49. Mahura, A., Jaffe D., Andres, R., Dasher, D., Merrill, J.(1997b).  "Atmospheric 
Transport Pathways from the Kola Nuclear Power Plant" pp 52-54 in Volume 2 of 
Extended Abstracts of Intentional Symposium on Environmental Pollution of the 
Arctic and The Third International Conference on Environmental Radioactivity in 
the Arctic, held June 1-5 1997 in Tromso, Norway.  
50. Merrill, J. (1994). "Isentropic Airflow Probability Analysis"  Journal of 
Geophysical Research 99(25881-25889) 
51. Merrill, J., R. Bleck, and L. Avila (1985).  "Modeling Atmospheric Transport to the 
Marshall Islands" Journal of Geophysical Research 90(12927-12936) 
   92
52. Merrill, J., R. Bleck, and D.B. Boudra (1986).  "Techniques of Lagrangian 
Trajectory Analysis in Isentropic Coordinates" Monthly Weather Review 114(571-
581) 
53. Mordashev, V. and A. Pechkurov (2000).  The Natural, Geographical and Climatic-
Meteorological Characteristic of the Regions of the Far East of Russia Contractor 
Report to IIASA. 
54. NATO (1998).  NATO/CCMS Pilot Study: “Cross-Border Environmental Problems 
Emanating from Defence-Related Installations and Activities”, Phase II: 1995-1998, 
Final Report, Vol. 4: “Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence-Related 
Problems” (Report No. 227), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels. 
55. NEA (1995).  Chernobyl: Ten Years On.  Radiological And Health Impact: An 
Assessment By The NEA Committee On Radiation Protection And Public Health, 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris. 
56. OTA (1995). Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic (An Analysis of Arctic and Other 
Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination). Office of Technology 
Assessment. Congress of the United States. (OTA-ENV-623). Office of Technology 
Assessment, Washington.  239 pp. 
57. Poirot R.L., and P.R. Wishinski (1984).  "Visibility, sulfate and air mass history 
associated with the summertime aerosol in northern Vermont"  Atmospheric 
Environment 20(1457-1469) 
58. Quade, Edward S. (1980)  "Pitfalls in Formulation and Modeling."  Chapter Three 
in Pitfalls of Analysis, Giandomenico Majone and Edward S. Quade, Eds.  John 
Wiley and Sons, London. 
59. Randel, William (1992) Global Atmospheric Circulation Statistics, 1000-1mb; 
NCAR Technical Note TN-366+STR.  National Center for Atmospheric Research, 
Boulder, CO.  256 pp. 
60. Restrepo, L. (1991).  Building 771, Subteam 6 Report, Chapter 7, Criticality 
Assessment. EG&G Rocky Flats, Golden, CO (cited in DOE (1994)) 
61. Romanov, V.I. (1993).  "Hot particles near a nuclear object in case of explosive 
hypothetical  accident" Russian Journal of Atomic Energy 75:5(377 - 381) (In 
Russian, cited in Sivintsev 2000a) 
62. Romanova, V., and  M. Takano (2002).  Atmospheric Transport of Radioactive 
Nuclides from Russia to Neighboring Countries (IR-02-010) International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
63. Romesburg, C.H. (1984).  Cluster Analysis for Researches Lifetime Learning, 
Belmont, CA. 334 pp. 
64. Sailor, V.L., K.R. Perkins, J.R. Weeks, H.R. Connell (1987).  Severe Accidents in 
Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82 (NUREG/CR-4982) U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. 
65. Sarkisov, A. A (1999). “Analysis of current status and methods of resolving of the 
nuclear submarine decommissioning problem” pp. 4-41 in Nuclear Submarine 
Decommissioning and Related Problems” (Proceedings of the International 
   93
Workshop held June 19-22 1995 in Moscow), “KomTech" Moscow. (In Russian, 
cited in Sivintsev 2000a). 
66. Shilgan, Yu.P. "Issues of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in  Nuclear Submarine 
Disposal",  In Ecological Problems of Nuclear Submarine Disposal (Proceedings of 
an International Seminar held July 4-9 2001 in Severodvinsk, Russia.) (in Russian, 
cited in Kobzev and Lavkovsky, 2001) 
67. Sivintsev, Yu. (2000a).  Assessment of Impact of Decommissioned and Utilized 
Russian Nuclear Submarines on the Environment of the Far Eastern  Regions.  
Contractor Report to IIASA of November 2000. 
68. Sivintsev, Yu. (2000b).  "Number of fission in the Chazhma Bay Accident in 1985" 
Russian Journal of Atomic Energy 89:3(269) 
69. Sivintsev, Yu. and O. Kiknadze (1998a). "Inventory of Radionuclides in the Ship 
Nuclear Reactors Dumped in the Sea of Japan" Radiation Protection Dosimetry 
75:1-4(195-198). 
70. Sivintsev, Yu. and O. Kiknadze (1998b).  Estimation of Radionuclide Inventories 
with Prediction of Release Rates for Dumped Radioactive Wastes in the Far Eastern 
Seas (RRC "Kurchatov Institute" Report 31/8104 in fulfilment of IAEA Technical 
Contract No. 9488), Russian Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute", Moscow. 
71. Sivintsev, Yu., V. Vysotsky, and V. Danilyan (1994a).  "Radioecological 
Consequences of Radiation Accident on the Nuclear Submarine in Chazhma Bay" 
Russian Journal of Atomic Energy 76:2(158-160), 1994 (In Russian, cited in 
Sivintsev 2000a). 
72. Sivintsev, Yu. (1994b). Study of the Radionuclides Inventory and Fuel 
Characteristics in the Dumped Reactors of Nuclear Submarines and Nuclear 
Icebreaker "Lenin" - Part 2 - Nuclear Submarines. Russian Research Centre 
"Kurchatov Institute", Moscow. (also available as IAEA-IASAP-5 from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.) 
73. Sørensen, J.H. (1998).  "Sensitivity of the DERMA long-range Gaussian dispersion 
model to meteorological input and diffusion parameters" Atmospheric Environment  
32:24(4195-4206) 
74. Stohl, A. (1998).  "Computation, accuracy and applications of trajectories - A 
review and bibliography" Atmospheric Environment 32:6(947-966) 
75. Takano, M., V. Romanova, H. Yamazawa, Y. Sivintsev, K. L. Compton, V. 
Novikov, and F. L. Parker (2001).  "Reactivity Accident of Nuclear Submarine near 
Vladivostok"  Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology (Japan) 38:2(143-157) 
76. Till, J. E. and H. R. Meyer, Eds. (1983).  Radiological Assessment:  A Textbook on 
Environmental Dose Analysis (NUREG/CR-3332), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC. 
77. Travis, R.J.,  R.E. Davis, E.J. Grove, M.A. Azarm (1997).  A Safety and Regulatory 
Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Plants (NUREG/CR-6451) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC. 
   94
78. Trenberth, Kevin & Olson, Jerry (1988).  Evaluation of NMC Global Analyses: 
1979-1987 (NCAR Technical Note TN-299+STR) National Center for Atmospheric 
Research, Boulder, CO.  82 pp. 
79. UNSCEAR (1993).  "Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation".  UNSCEAR 1993 
Report to the General Assembly (with Scientific Annexes).  United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, New York. 
80. Van Dop, H., R. Addis, G. Fraser, F. Girardi, G. Graziani, Y. Inoue, N. Kelly, W. 
Klug, A. Kulmala, K. Nodop and J. Pretel (1998).  "ETEX: A European tracer 
experiment; observations, dispersion modelling and emergency response" 
Atmospheric Environment 32:24(4089-4094) 
81. Yamazawa, H.,  Akiko Furuno, Masamichi Chino (1998).  "Evaluation of a Long-
range Lagrangian Dispersion Model with ETEX" Atmospheric Environment 
32:24(4343-4349) 
82. Yu, C. et al. (1993).  Manual for Implementing Residual Radioactive Material 
Guidelines Using RESRAD, Version 5.0 (ANL/EAD/LD-2), Environmental 
Assessment Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne IL 
83. Yu, C. et al. (2000).  RESRAD 6.0 for Windows: A computer code for evaluating 
radioactively contaminated sites,  Environmental Assessment Division, Argonne 
National Laboratory, Argonne IL 
84. Zakharkin, B.S. (1995).  "Chemical Basis of the Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel from Naval Reactors at RT-1" p. 174 in Summary of Workshop on Russian 
Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management.  Office of Technology 
Assessment, Washington, D.C., April 1995. (cited in Sivintsev 2000a) 
